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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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International Energy Agency
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Investor-owned utility
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INTRODUCTION
Energy efficiency is one of the most economical and effective tools we have to improve
environmental quality while at the same time helping to ensure the provision of reliable electricity
service. The goal of energy efficiency is decades old, but progress lags behind potential due to the many
practical and regulatory hurdles it faces. Encouragingly, however, state policy efforts have been
dramatically ramping up in the past several years. A confluence of many factors is driving this renewed
attention to energy efficiency: fuel price volatility, new air pollution regulations on traditional power
plants, concerns about electric grid reliability, a continued quest for energy security, increasing efforts to
craft state-level solutions to the problem of climate change in the continued absence of comprehensive
federal legislation, and the development of new technologies that allow greater efficiency. A number of
states have set impressively ambitious new energy efficiency savings targets, generally overseen by
state public utility commissions (PUCs). How these commissions can craft effective regulatory rules and
incentives to meet these targets is a pressing question that has received much attention in recent
literature on state utility-sector energy efficiency policies. But even where ambitious state goals are not
in place, PUCs and energy efficiency advocates have many regulatory tools at their disposal to help
encourage greater consideration of and penetration of energy efficiency.
This handbook examines the range of legal and regulatory tools that state PUCs have to
promote energy efficiency. It draws from a broad and deep body of literature on the topic, an
examination of relevant state laws and regulations, and interviews with experts in the private and public
sectors. The handbook may prove useful in those states that are more advanced in their energy
efficiency policies by illuminating potential refinements or alternative design options in areas that prove
to be sticking points. It is intended primarily, however, as a resource for those in states that are not yet
as advanced in energy efficiency policy. By highlighting the breadth of strategies that PUCs have at their
disposal, this handbook aims to be useful to PUC commissioners and staff, and to energy efficiency
advocates, no matter what political or practical constraints they might be facing in their states.
The remainder of this introduction focuses on why increasing energy efficiency should be a firstorder goal in all states, and why PUCs have such an integral role in advancing this goal. Following
sections detail the myriad ways that commissions, and advocates appearing in front of commissions, can
tackle the issue of increasing energy efficiency’s role in meeting future electricity demand. The first
portion of the handbook focuses on policies directly aimed at promoting energy efficiency. The
handbook then turns its attention to strategies for helping energy efficiency considerations permeate
other, more traditional areas of PUC decision-making. When certain policies have proven particularly
effective, this fact is noted, and the same is true where certain strategies have fallen out of favor. But
the goal of this handbook is less to prescribe a particular pathway to a successful state energy efficiency
strategy, and more to provide to interested parties a collection of the range of options available. The
report closes with a brief section written specifically for advocates, which explains how to intervene in
relevant PUC proceedings and provides resources on effective PUC intervention.

Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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The Benefits of Energy Efficiency
It is worth stepping back for a moment, at the beginning of any somewhat technical document on
energy efficiency policy, to take stock of the many reasons that energy efficiency will be a critical
resource in the coming decades.
First and foremost, energy efficiency offers the cheapest way to help meet future demand for
electricity. Any form of electricity generation necessarily comes at a cost, whereas energy efficiency
often saves consumers money. Residential, commercial, and industrial consumers of electricity have
seen a steady rise in prices over the last decade: between 1998 and 2011, residential prices rose from
8.26 cents/kWh to 11.54 cents/kWh; commercial prices rose from 7.41 cents/kWh to 10.19 cents/kWh;
and industrial prices rose from 4.48 cents/kWh to 6.77 cents/kWh.1 Although many complex variables
factor into electricity prices, one of the reasons for this upward trend is that as a country, we are
massively under-investing in energy efficiency. Energy efficiency saves money: one of the most
comprehensive studies of energy efficiency’s savings potential, produced by McKinsey and Company in
2009, found that by 2020, the U.S. could consume 23 percent less energy per year by investing $520
billion in energy efficiency, and that this investment would yield present-value savings of roughly $1,200
billion.2 These potential savings provide a compelling reason for regulators to pay careful attention to
energy efficiency opportunities.
Energy efficiency offers a range of other benefits that add to its appeal. By reducing the amount of
electricity necessary to meet demand, including demand at peak times, it improves the reliability of the

1

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Table 5.3. Average Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers: Total by EndUse Sector, 1998 through April 2012, available at http://205.254.135.7/electricity/data.cfm. Record lows in natural
gas prices may cause this price trend to slow or reverse as gas replaces coal in electricity generation, at least in the
near term, although there is much uncertainty over whether these low prices will persist. See Henry D. Jacoby,
Francis M. O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy, ECON.
OF ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 37, 38, 42 (2012).
2
See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 7-8 (McKinsey & Co. July 2009); see
also Efficiency and Climate Policy: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global
Warming, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of Richard Cowart, Director, Regulatory Assistance Project: studies
show that “the cost-effective reservoir of efficiency opportunities is large enough to meet 50% to 100% or more of
all new electric demand” in the country) (May 8, 2008). Even looking only at existing programs and best practices,
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) estimates that energy efficiency programs have the potential to
“realistically” reduce the growth rate of electrical consumption by 22% (to 0.83%) per year, from 2008-2030. But
under a more vigorous approach, the growth rate could be reduced by 36% (to 0.68%) per year. In 2030, this
would represent an achievable reduction in electricity consumption of between 236 billion and 382 billion kWh (58% reduction in projected consumption). EPRI, ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVABLE POTENTIAL FROM ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. (2010-2030), EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2009); McKinsey & Co., EPRI and McKinsey
Reports on Energy Efficiency: A Comparison (2009), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/Unlocking_energy_ef
ficiency_in_the_US_economy. Of course, the fact that energy efficiency investments overall save money does not
mean that those who stand to lose from reduced energy consumption—traditional utilities whose revenue
increases with sales volumes—might not initially oppose such policies. Strategies to reduce such opposition by
incentivizing utilities to be full collaborators in implementing energy efficiency policy are discussed infra section 3.
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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electric grid.3 Avoiding brownouts and blackouts is a paramount concern for grid operators, utilities,
and state and federal regulators alike. In the face of historically high summer temperatures and
considerable controversy over how coal plant retirements can be expected to impact reliability,4 energy
efficiency’s ability to ease worries over electric grid reliability is another major reason it should be
promoted.
Energy efficiency also allows utilities and states to avoid building as much new transmission and
generation, thereby not only saving money but also improving environmental quality. Transmission and
generation have huge environmental footprints, both in terms of the land and resources required for
construction, and in terms of the air and water pollution that most electricity generation emits as a
byproduct. As federal air quality standards increase in stringency, one of energy efficiency’s important
roles may be in helping states to cost-effectively meet new standards by acting as a substitute for dirtier
electricity sources.5 In fact, states are able to receive direct credit for improvements in energy efficiency
made as part of their Clean Air Act State Implementation Plans. Recent Environmental Protection
Agency guidance clarifies how states can use energy efficiency to help meet air quality regulations.6
Moreover, turning to energy efficiency instead of new transmission and generation can help state
regulators avoid the protracted and costly siting battles that often accompany proposals to build these
new facilities.
Finally, energy efficiency has a significant potential role in addressing what has come to be the
dominant environmental crisis of our time: climate change. Improved energy efficiency is one of the
most effective and lowest cost methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Several recent studies show just how important energy efficiency will be in securing a
sustainable energy future. In examining how the world might feasibly halve its energy use by 2050, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) found that end-use fuel and electricity efficiency would need to
account for 38 percent of reduced CO2 emissions (Figure 1).7 That number amounts to the same

3

See Ned Raynolds & Richard Cowart, The Contribution of Energy Efficiency to the Reliability of the U.S. Electric
System (Alliance to Save Energy & Regulatory Assistance Project 2000), available at
http://ase.org/resources/electricity-reliability-white-paper.
4
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RESOURCE ADEQUACY IMPLICATIONS OF FORTHCOMING EPA AIR QUALITY REGULATIONS (Dec.
2011), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2011%20Air%20Quality%20Regulations%20Report_120111.pdf; N. AM. ELEC.
RELIABILITY CORP., 2011 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.nerc.com/files/2011LTRA_Final.pdf.
5
See generally SARAH HAYES & RACHEL YOUNG, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: THE SLIP SWITCH TO A NEW TRACK TOWARD COMPLIANCE
WITH FEDERAL AIR REGULATIONS (ACEEE Rep. No. E122, Jan. 2012) (exploring how energy efficiency may prove to be a
cost-effective method for complying with new federal air regulations).
6
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROADMAP FOR INCORPORATING ENERGY EFFICIENCY/RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
INTO STATE AND TRIBAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (July 2012), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/eere/pdfs/EEREmanual.pdf.
7
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES: SCENARIOS & STRATEGIES TO 2050, at 3 (2010).
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law

8

Public Utility Commissions and Energy Efficiency

contribution as nuclear, renewable, and end-use fuel switching combined, causing the IEA to conclude
that “increasing energy efficiency . . . should be the highest priority in the short term.”8

Figure 1: Role of Various Policy Options in Driving Carbon Emissions Reductions9

Energy efficiency is also one of the least expensive solutions for reducing carbon emissions, with
investments often netting a return rather than a cost. This fact is illustrated by the now-famous
McKinsey & Company “cost curve” (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Costs of Various Greenhouse Gas Abatement Technologies10

8

Id. at 5.
This figure is reprinted from id. at 3.
10
This figure is reprinted with permission from © MCKINSEY & CO., IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON CARBON
ECONOMICS: VERSION 2.1 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT CURVE 8 (2010).
9

Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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As this curve illustrates, many of the most cost-effective energy efficiency measures will more than pay
for themselves: for example, residential appliances, lighting, and electronics, residential HVAC retrofits,
insulation retrofits, new build building efficiency, and industrial energy efficiency improvements all have
negative abatement costs, making them rare win-win solutions that save consumers money and cut
carbon emissions at the same time. These negative costs stand in contrast to the majority of new
electricity sources, including renewable and nuclear power, as well as fossil fuel power, especially with
carbon capture and storage technology. Moreover, energy efficiency avoids many of the regulatory and
technical hurdles currently plaguing renewable energy, including concerns over renewables’ ability to
compete with natural gas given historically low gas prices, worries about renewables’ impacts on grid
reliability, and difficulties siting and financing the major transmission lines necessary to connect areas
with great renewable energy potential to areas with large energy demand.11

The Need for Regulation
Given the host of benefits just catalogued, it is fair to ask why energy efficiency needs regulating
at all. Why won’t the market simply capture all of the cost-saving opportunities available?
Markets fail with respect to energy efficiency for a number of reasons. First, energy efficiency is
plagued by a host of well-catalogued structural and market barriers that make consumers unlikely to
seek out optimum levels of energy efficiency investment.12 In some cases, misaligned incentives mean
that the person responsible for making an energy efficiency investment would not be the same person
who would reap the savings and increased comfort of that investment, as in the case of the landlordtenant or the homebuilder-homeowner relationship.13 Similarly, long pay-back periods for some
efficiency investments, coupled with the frequency with which people move in the United States, can
make homeowners skeptical of receiving the full value of their efficiency investments.14 Others may
simply not have the up-front capital to devote even to efficiency investments that are sure to net them a
return over the years, and securing energy efficiency financing can be difficult.15 And finally, a lack of

11

st

See Steven Ferrey, Efficiency in the Regulatory Crucible: Navigating 21 Century ‘Smart’ Technology and Power, J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 11-16 (Winter 2012).
12
Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to Design Market Interventions to Overcome the
Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy Markets, 19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2011), collects many of the longstanding arguments about market failures that contribute to the “energy efficiency gap.” The barriers being
discussed today are, by and large, the same ones identified twenty years ago, suggesting that we still have a long
way to go in creating an efficient energy efficiency marketplace, and that the problem is more one of lack of action
than lack of understanding. See WILLIAM H. GOLOVE & JOSEPH H. ETO, MARKET BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A CRITICAL
REAPPRAISAL OF THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE ENERGY EFFICIENCY (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., March
1996); see also Marilyn A. Brown, Market failures and barriers as a basis for clean energy policies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y
1197 (2001).
13
Hofmeister, supra note 12, at 14-15.
14
Id.; see also CHOI GRANADE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
15
Hofmeister, supra note 12, at 16-17; Brown, supra note 12, at 1202-03.
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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information about the many cost-saving opportunities available, or a lack of time to devote to the task,
may be prime hurdles stopping many would-be investors.16
Another contributing impediment to energy efficiency is that we have a highly regulated electric
utility sector that remains, in most states, insulated from competition as a presumed natural
monopoly.17 Electric utilities are the primary interface between the electric wholesale market and
electricity consumers, and are therefore in the best practical position to promote energy efficiency
measures to consumers. However, under a traditional regulatory model, they have little incentive to
encourage consumers to invest in energy efficiency, given that such measures would lower their
electricity sales and, thereby, revenues. Intelligent policies to help better align utilities’ business models
with the goal of energy efficiency are therefore a crucial piece of solving the energy efficiency puzzle.18
Finally, many of energy efficiency’s benefits are classic “public goods” that the market is prone
to under-provide. “Public goods” offer overall societal benefits that the market under-supplies because
profits cannot be earned on them.19 As discussed above, energy efficiency provides public goods in
many forms, including increased grid reliability, decreased air and water pollution, and increased public
health. These public good attributes are another classic reason that market intervention is necessary for
energy efficiency.
For all of these reasons, regulation to promote energy efficiency is necessary and justified. We
have known of the barriers discussed above for a long time, but still have a long way to go in eliminating
them. The central challenge for regulators today remains continuing to experiment with policy solutions
that can overcome these barriers that keep us from saving money and energy. With its catalogue of
potential regulatory solutions, this handbook hopes to move this effort forward.

Progress to Date
State-level action on energy efficiency is not a new idea; it has been pursued with waxing and
waning degrees of enthusiasm since the 1970s. Policies to date have had a demonstrable payoff: in
2010, for example, energy efficiency programs saved a reported 112 Terawatt-hours of energy—enough
to power 9.7 million U.S. homes for one year.20 And in the most recent several years, progress by many
states has been rapid: electric energy efficiency program budgets rose from $2.7 billion in 2007 to $5.4
billion in 2010, and further rose to over $6.8 billion in 2011.21

16

Hofmeister also catalogues a range of “cognitive” barriers that further explain why people under-invest in
energy efficiency. See supra note 12 at 18-31.
17
See generally Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 259 (2006).
18
See id. at 298.
19
See DAVID J. BJORNSTAD & MARILYN A. BROWN, A MARKET FAILURES FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN
ENERGY EFFICIENCY (Joint Institute for Energy & Envt. Rep. No. JIEE 2004-02, June 2004).
20
THE EDISON FOUNDATION INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY, SUMMARY OF RATEPAYER-FUNDED ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY IMPACTS,
EXPENDITURES, AND BUDGETS 2 (2012).
21
Id. at 4.
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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Progress nevertheless varies drastically from state to state, and even in leading states, a
tremendous amount of potential remains unachieved.22 A recent American Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy (ACEEE) study estimates that with penetration of known advanced technologies, the
United States could reduce its energy consumption by a further 42% by 2050.23
Encouragingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly given energy efficiency’s myriad benefits described
above, energy efficiency appears to be a bipartisan issue, at least at the state level. The National
Governors Association reports that in 2011, forty-eight states took some measures to expand their
energy efficiency programs.24 Accordingly, although large divergences exist in the efficacy of various
state programs, all states have at least some political will to tackle the issue of improving energy
efficiency. This fact makes energy efficiency particularly appealing during these politically polarized
times, since it stands out as one of the few issues able to bridge the partisan divide and reach
implementation in the short term.25

The Scope of this Handbook
Achieving the kind of massive energy efficiency gains discussed above will take significant efforts
at multiple scales. This handbook collects strategies being pursued by one of the most important
regulators in the utility-sector energy efficiency field: state public utilities commissions (referred to in
this report as “PUCs” but also known in various states as public service commissions, regulatory
authorities, corporation commissions, or other names26).
For unfamiliar readers, PUCs are the state regulatory entities charged with overseeing utilities
and other entities operating within the state. In this handbook, we are primarily concerned with their
oversight of electric utilities—those utilities with the critical mission of delivering electricity to the
homes and businesses of the state.27 PUCs’ traditional, long-standing goal has been to ensure “just and

22

“In the U.S., as in most countries, analyses have shown that the efficiency potential has been tapped only in
small measure.” Cowart, supra note 2, at 2. A 2009 McKinsey & Company study estimated that we can further
reduce residential energy consumption by approximately 28% as compared to a business-as-usual baseline
through 2020. See CHOI GRANADE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
23
See AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY [hereinafter ACEEE”], THE LONG-TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY
POTENTIAL: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS v-vi (Jan. 2012).
24
See Nat’l Governors Assoc., Clean: 2011 Update, State Energy Actions, at 9 (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1201CLEANENERGYEXECSUMMARIES.PDF.
25
See MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., THE 2011 STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD iii (ACEEE Oct. 2011) (“Energy efficiency []
is a pragmatic, bipartisan solution that political leaders from both sides of the aisle have supported over the past
year.”).
26
See Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the “Public Interest”, W. VA. L. REV.
739, 753 n.88 (2011).
27
Although some PUCs have authority over municipally owned utilities as well as investor-owned utilities, most
PUCs have oversight only over investor-owned utilities, which are private companies owned by shareholders. DAN
ST
YORK & MARTIN KUSHLER, THE OLD MODEL ISN’T WORKING: CREATING THE ENERGY UTILITY FOR THE 21 CENTURY 1 (ACEEE Sept.
2011). Investor-owned utilities are responsible for 66% of retail electricity sales across the United States. MIT
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 6 (2011).
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law
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reasonable rates” and reliable service for electricity consumers.28 This mission is still central, but there
is growing recognition that this duty demands a broader conceptualization of the PUC’s role.29 More
specifically, many legislators and regulators are coming to realize that it should be within the PUC’s
sphere of responsibility to ensure that energy efficiency—as a clean, cheap, reliability-enhancing
resource—is taken seriously and implemented to the greatest extent feasible by regulated utilities.
It should be noted that enhancing the efficiency of natural gas delivery, as well as electricity, is
another important and complementary policy goal. This handbook, however, limits itself to electric
utility energy efficiency, both for the sake of manageability and also because natural gas programs are
newer and less developed, meaning that it is more difficult to draw comprehensive strategies and design
options from them at this point.30
This handbook focuses on PUCs for several reasons: first, PUCs have primary jurisdiction over
the end-use electricity sector, where the most opportunities for energy efficiency improvements exist. 31
And PUC buy-in matters a lot; experts recently ranked PUC support for energy efficiency as one of the
key drivers of its success.32 Particularly as we exhaust the “low-hanging fruit” of energy efficiency
achievements, more robust PUC policies will be imperative to drive the “broader and deeper” cuts
necessary to wring the next generation of cost-effective energy efficiency out of our electric system.33
Second, there has been considerable recent advancement by PUCs in the range and depth of
policies being used to promote energy efficiency, but there is a great disparity among the PUCs of
various states in the extent to which energy efficiency policies are being pursued. For example, in 2009,
“[t]he top twenty states in terms of their [ratepayer-funded energy efficiency] spending per capita
account[ed] for 85 percent of nationwide spending on energy efficiency programs.”34 This disparity
points to a particularly large opportunity for those state PUCs just entering the field of energy efficiency,
or looking to become more active in the field, to learn from more experienced PUCs.

28

See York & Kushler, supra note 27, at 1. For a historical account of the creation and role of PUCs, see Timothy P.
Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE. J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
29
See, e.g., Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
325, 327 (2001).
30
See MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., MEETING AGGRESSIVE NEW STATE GOALS FOR UTILITY-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY: EXAMINING KEY
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH SAVINGS 2 (ACEEE Report No. U091, 2009). Increasing the efficiency of natural gas
delivery systems is certainly, however, a rich area of policy that could benefit from future attention.
31
See Climate Change: Emissions, Envtl. Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/fq/emissions.html
(last visited April 17, 2012).
32
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 14. A recent report benchmarking the performance of several dozen utilities’
energy efficiency programs also found that “[s]tate policies and political support for energy efficiency are major
drivers of utility spending . . . .” M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCS., LLC, BENCHMARKING ELECTRIC UTILITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
PORTFOLIOS IN THE U.S. 7 (Ceres Nov. 2011).
33
See SETH NOWAK ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: STATE AND UTILITY STRATEGIES FOR HIGHER ENERGY SAVINGS
11 (ACEEE June 2011).
34
Michael Dworkin et al., A Driving Need, a Vital Tool: The Rebirth of Efficiency Programs for Electric Consumers, in
CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 226 (Joey Lee Miranda, ed. 2009).
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Finally, there is a dearth in the abundant and generally excellent literature surrounding state
energy efficiency policy of papers detailing exactly what PUCs’ roles—as opposed to other state actors’
roles—should and can be. There are many detailed reports covering the policies and strategies we
discuss below, and we provide bibliographies, organized by topic, of these reports. There are also more
exhaustive surveys and reports available on what each state as a whole is doing to promote energy
efficiency. But there are multiple agencies involved in energy efficiency policy in each state, as well as
multiple private actors and multiple sectors. This handbook differs from many other reports in that it
focuses on the PUC’s particularized role, disaggregating its work from the work being done by other
state agencies and private actors. In doing so, it necessarily leaves out many of the groundbreaking
initiatives coming out of a variety of other state agencies.35 This handbook also takes a wide view of
how PUCs might promote energy efficiency, covering not only those critically important policy solutions
that PUCs can adopt to drive energy efficiency improvements, but also the various ways that PUCs might
encourage energy efficiency to permeate their broader decision-making authority. It is therefore both
narrower and more comprehensive in scope than previous reports.
This handbook focuses on PUC-level policies that drive end-user energy efficiency in the
electricity sector. By energy efficiency, we mean reductions in the amount of energy it takes to
accomplish a particular function, e.g., heating or lighting, without a reduction in end-user benefits. We
do not examine here the issue of energy conservation, whereby energy users take steps to alter their
lifestyles to become less electricity consumptive. The range of policies explored in the handbook
includes mandates, incentives, information-forcing policies, planning policies, rate design,
environmental review policies, and several additional tools.
The handbook does not discuss in detail the energy efficiency programs that utilities or thirdparty administrators are implementing in order to comply with PUC-driven policies, e.g., lighting swapouts, efficiency audits, weatherization, etc., though these are obviously integrally related to achieving
PUC-established (or statutorily established) energy efficiency goals and mandates. PUCs have, for the
most part, chosen to leave the design and implementation details of such programs to specialized
boards and/or program administrators (either utilities, a designated state agency, or third-party
administrators), who are better equipped to select and tailor particular strategies to their locations and
markets.36 For interested readers, a description of the main categories of energy efficiency programs
appears in Appendix A. Similarly, it does not discuss means to increase the efficiency of electricity
generation—a separate important topic.37

35

For example, this handbook does not address state-level appliance efficiency standards or state building codes,
even though these are two additional critical strategies for driving state-level energy efficiency gains, because
these policies are administered by other state agencies.
36
See MIT, supra note 27, at 177.
37
Efficiency in generation is often thought to require less regulatory intervention than end-use efficiency, given
that generators will themselves often have significant economic incentives to make their generation as efficient as
possible.
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Intended Audience
This handbook is intended for two primary audiences: first, it hopes to assist those PUC
commissioners and staff who wish to know more about PUC-level policy options to advance energy
efficiency. Second, it aims to serve as a valuable resource for those advocates and their elected
representatives who want to encourage their state PUCs to devote greater attention to energy
efficiency. For this latter group, the handbook includes a section outlining the basics of PUCs
proceedings and how the public can participate in them.
PUCs are not uniform entities such that lessons can be transferred seamlessly from one state to
another. States find themselves at different points in the process of deregulating the electricity sector
(or, in some cases, re-regulating it), and these different stages of restructuring translate into different
roles for PUCs. In particular, some PUCs still find themselves with considerable control over electric
generation and long-term utility planning, whereas PUCs in areas with competitive wholesale markets
have largely ceded these functions to the market and have control only over the retail side of
electricity.38 Commissioners and advocates should keep in mind their particular state context when
considering whether a policy successful in another state could be transferred. Sensitive to these
differences, this handbook notes in its policy descriptions whether any particular policy tends to work
best in deregulated or regulated markets, as the case may be. But the differences among state electric
industry regulatory structures do not preclude drawing transferable lessons—to the contrary, many
states with highly divergent levels of deregulation have found success with similar policies, and whether
or not a state is restructured does not appear to play a major role in its success in adopting energy
efficiency policies.39

The Legal Authority of PUCs
A final preliminary point bears treatment up front: the legal authority of PUCs to implement the
various policies and strategies detailed below. PUCs are creatures of statute. Their authority is
established by state legislatures.40 Accordingly, their power only extends as far as their statutory
authorization (as this authorization is interpreted in subsequent legal decisions). The power that PUCs
have to implement energy efficiency policy therefore varies state to state, but perhaps to a lesser extent
than some might perceive.
In some states, PUCs have explicit statutory mandates to consider environmental issues or
energy efficiency in certain areas of their energy decision-making.41 And some legislatures have
mandated a particular energy efficiency savings target that the PUC is instructed to work to achieve.
However, it is not always necessary for an energy efficiency policy mandate to flow directly from the
state legislature in order for a PUC to take action on encouraging energy efficiency. Several state PUCs
38

See id. at 178.
See KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at v.
40
See John A. Sautter, State Environmental Law and Carbon Emissions: Do Public Utility Commissions Use
Environmental Statutes to Fight Global Warming?, 23:8 ELEC. J. 37 (Oct. 2010).
41
Id. at 39.
39
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have declared that their basic authority over ensuring “just and reasonable rates” provides all the
statutory authorization needed for implementing efficiency policies.42 Of course, the extent to which
any particular state PUC can pursue specific energy efficiency policies based on a general, broad
statutory mandate will be tempered by relevant administrative and judicial decisions. Regardless, there
is at least precedent—and a persuasive case to be made, based on the benefits energy efficiency policies
bring to ratepayers—for PUCs pursuing aggressive energy efficiency goals directly. Strong support from
a state governor’s office can help encourage PUC action even in the absence of a particular legislative
mandate. And for advocates and program participants, there may be a distinct advantage to pursuing
programs directly to the PUC: adopting programs administratively has the potential advantage of
offering more flexibility, as commissions are able to modify programs without the need for additional
legislation.43
PUCs in some states may be limited in their ability to craft binding energy efficiency mandates,
either by jurisdiction or by political feasibility. Nevertheless, as this handbook explains, much can still be
done to cultivate an institutional culture in which energy efficiency is considered an important future
resource, rather than an unrelated side project.44 Furthermore, PUCs can and should take a role in
leading the charge for energy efficiency policies in front of the state legislature, in those situations
where legislation is needed to accomplish a particular policy goal.45 Similarly, there are multiple
avenues through which advocates can attempt to secure robust end-use energy efficiency mandates and
supporting policies: the state legislature, the governor’s office, and the state PUC.
With this background established, the following sections turn to an examination of the methods
that PUCs have to promote energy efficiency. Sections one through six look at specific policy options
that PUCs are using to promote energy efficiency as well as demand response. Sections seven through
nine examine ways that energy efficiency considerations can enter into other areas of PUC decisionmaking. The final several sections lay out some of the newest experiments in energy efficiency policy,
discuss the interplay between energy efficiency and greenhouse gas policies, and provide an overview
for advocates of how to intervene in PUC proceedings.

42

See STATE & LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK [hereinafter “SEE ACTION”], SETTING ENERGY SAVINGS TARGETS FOR
UTILITIES 2 (Sept. 2011). For example, Arizona’s Corporation Commission concluded that its state constitutional
authority to ensure just and reasonable rates gave it the authority to adopt a major energy efficiency mandate of
its own accord. See Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, In the Matter of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Electric Energy
Efficiency, Decision No. 71819, Docket No. RE-00000C-09-0427, at 8 (March 5, 2010).
43
Of course, to the extent advocates are worried about the potential weakening of a program through
modification, this flexibility might in some situations prove a disadvantage.
44
Cf. APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR STUDY AND EVALUATION, RATEPAYER-FUNDED LOW-INCOME ENERGY
PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBILITIES 22 (2007) (describing that state PUCs have differed in the degree to which
they were willing to use their general authority over rates to justify the creation of low-income programs).
45
The Department of Energy reports that State Utility Commissions often lead successful calls for energy efficiency
legislation. See SANDY GLATT, STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS ANALYSIS 6 (Dep’t of Energy 2010).
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1. SETTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGETS
One critical first step in a state achieving its energy efficiency potential is the establishment of an
energy efficiency mandate or target. Study after study has confirmed that these announced goals are
important drivers in pushing private actors to pursue the socially optimal level of energy efficiency
improvements.46 Recognizing this fact, states and PUCs have pursued a few different major strategies in
setting energy efficiency targets, each of which is addressed below.

1.1

Energy Efficiency Resource Standards

The most popular method of setting energy efficiency targets is through Energy Efficiency Resource
Standards (“EERS”). As of fall 2011, 24 states had adopted some version of EERS.47 An EERS is a
performance-based mechanism that requires the program administrator to take measures so that a
certain percentage of energy savings is achieved over a specific timeframe (relative to some baseline,
usually a previous year’s total electricity sales).48
In the most common version of an EERS, either state legislation or a PUC order calls for all covered
utilities to achieve a set level of electricity savings over a given period of time. This simple description of
an EERS policy, however, masks several design issues that must be considered, including:
Stringency of the targets: The stringency of the selected targets is probably the single most important
determination in setting an EERS. Targets should be challenging but feasible. Experts recommend that,
where possible, targets should be based on an energy efficiency market potential study—a study that
analyzes in detail a state’s particular situation to determine how much energy efficiency can be costeffectively implemented.49 The most ambitious state EERS policies are calling for average annual savings
of 1.5% per year and greater, but targets vary greatly from state to state.50

46

See, e.g., Nicole Hopper et al., Energy Efficiency as a Preferred Resource: Evidence from Utility Resource Plans in
the Western United States and Canada, at 18 (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab Pub. No. LBNL-1023E, Sept. 2008) (“The
adoption of multiple, aggressive policies targeting energy efficiency and climate change does appear to produce
sizeable energy efficiency commitments.”); MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: A
PROGRESS REPORT ON STATE EXPERIENCE 18 (ACEEE June 2011); KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 5.
47
MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 46, at 18. This ACEEE report counts as “EERS policies” those state policies
that mandate “all cost-effective” energy efficiency investments, as well as those that include energy efficiency
within a Renewable Portfolio Standard. This handbook discusses these two policy variations infra in separate
subsections.
48
SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 46; NOWAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 4.
49
SEE ACTION, supra note 42, at 4.
50
See id. at iii; SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 46. The least ambitious states call for annual savings around .25%. SEE
ACTION, supra note 42, at iii.
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Whom the target applies to: in most states, utilities are
responsible for meeting EERS targets.51 Other states
have created “energy efficiency utilities”—independent
organizations responsible for administering the state’s
energy efficiency programs.52 And in some states, a
state agency maintains responsibility for overseeing
and achieving energy efficiency targets.53 There is no
consensus as to which of these administrators is most
effective; much depends on a particular state’s
regulatory context.54
What counts towards the target: An EERS classically
targets end-use efficiency measures at utility
customers’ homes or facilities.55 However, some states
are trending towards greater flexibility in the types of
policies and programs that can contribute towards
EERS savings targets. In particular, some PUCs are
allowing utilities to receive credit for their role in
developing, implementing, and advancing state building
codes and appliance standards.56 Others allow a
portion of targets to be met through efficiency
enhancements to a utility’s generation, transmission,
Allowing more
and distribution infrastructure.57
flexibility in the types of programs utilities can utilize to

For example: Arizona
In August 2010, the Arizona Corporation
Commission (ACC) adopted an EERS under its
state constitutional authority to ensure “just and
reasonable rates.” The EERS requires investorowned utilities to achieve increasing levels of
annual savings—beginning at 1.25%, ramping up
to 2% in 2014—that will result in 22% cumulative
savings by 2020—an impressively aggressive
target. The program requires utilities to file plans
every other year with the ACC indicating how they
will meet their targets, and to file annual updates
apprising the ACC of their progress. Utilities can
recover the costs of approved cost-effective
energy efficiency investments, and the ACC works
with individual utilities to develop performance
incentives.
The state is also reportedly
considering decoupling and allowing building code
improvements to count towards EERS targets.
One early study suggests that if successfully
implemented, Arizona’s program will save its
ratepayers $9 billion, and may defer the need for
new baseload power plants by ten years. 2011
was the first year of compliance.

51

SEE ACTION, supra note 42, at 2.
For details on this program option, see the “For example” box detailing Vermont’s program structure at page 19.
53
New York illustrates yet another administrative option: it has implemented a combination of two models by
splitting administration authority between a state agency (the New York State Energy Research & Development
Authority) and utilities. See N.Y. Public Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard, Case
No. 07-M-0548, at 44-51 (June 23, 2008).
54
However, designating a separate energy efficiency utility reportedly does not work as well in states with more
limited energy efficiency budgets. See Glatt, supra note 45, at 9.
55
See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 9. For example, utilities most successful programs have been aimed at
changing customers’ lighting choices. Customer rebates for the purchase of more efficient appliances are also a
popular utility program. Id. at 11-12.
56
See Adam Cooper & Lisa Wood, Making Building Energy Codes and Appliance/Equipment Standards Part of
Utility Energy Efficiency Portfolios (Institute for Electric Efficiency Aug. 2011). For example, California allows
utilities to receive credit towards their efficiency goals for their work advancing codes and standards, and utilities
met about 9% of their EERS targets through codes and standards savings between 2006 and 2008. Id. at 5.
57
NOWAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 9. Minnesota has adopted this model, allowing improvements to generation,
transmission, and distribution infrastructure to account for a specified portion of the overall efficiency target. Id.
But some suggest that utilities already have adequate business incentives to make these infrastructure
investments, such that it is inappropriate to credit them under an EEPS.
52
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meet their targets may become increasingly important as states adopt more aggressive targets.
Flexibility: States have built varying levels of flexibility into their EERS. Some have chosen to make their
EERS voluntary—a choice unlikely to drive the same sort of savings as in states with mandatory
policies.58 Others have adopted various forms of cost controls, which typically cap the overall impact
that energy efficiency policies can have on rates and adjust targets downward if necessary. Similarly,
some states allow for adjustments to targets based on extenuating circumstances. All of these policies
may help make an EERS more politically feasible, but may impede achievement of aggressive savings
targets.59
Measurement and verification: PUCs typically require covered utilities to file periodic program reports
documenting how they achieved their required savings. To ensure that savings are real and verifiable,
PUCs must establish measurement, quantification, and verification requirements. Measurement and
verification are vital to confirm the efficacy of energy efficiency programs and avoid wasting ratepayer
funding. Robust measurement and verification also serves an additional important role: to the extent
that energy efficiency can be relied upon and accurately measured, regional grid planners can better
factor estimated energy efficiency reductions into their calculations of future projected load growth,
helping regions to avoid overbuilding new generation or transmission lines.
Setting protocols for how to validate efficiency savings is a highly complex endeavor, and
implementation of these rules can amount to a significant percentage of budget expenditures. For these
reasons, PUCs and advocates should carefully select and monitor measurement and verification rules.
However, there is currently no standard methodology required by PUCs across different states, and
there is some disagreement as to whether a standardized system would even be appropriate for states
with very different goals.60 For the time being, the best solution for states adopting new EERS might be
to adopt a protocol from an established state with similar energy-saving goals.61
Two other major policy issues contribute greatly to the success of any EERS: program funding and
utility sector buy-in.62 If a program is inadequately funded, or if utilities are not incentivized to be
collaborative partners in achieving EERS targets rather than fighting against them, success is more

58

SEE ACTION, supra note 42, at 12.
Id.
60
Steven R. Schiller et al., National Energy Efficiency Evaluation, Measurement and Verification (EM&V) Standard:
Scoping Study of Issues and Implementation Requirements, at 1-2 (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, April
2011).
61
See, e.g., Cal. PUC, California Energy Efficiency Evaluation Protocols: Technical, Methodological, and Reporting
Requirements for Evaluation Professionals (April 2006), available at
http://www.calmac.org/publications/EvaluatorsProtocols_Final_AdoptedviaRuling_06-19-2006ES.pdf. PUCs might
also look to the requirements that are established by various Independent System Operators and Regional
Transmission Organizations, some of which have established measurement and verification protocols for energy
efficiency’s participation in regional capacity markets. See, e.g., ISO New England, Manual for Measurement and
Verification of Demand Reduction Value from Demand Resources (revised June 1, 2012), available at
http://www.iso-ne.com/rules_proceds/isone_mnls/index.html.
62
See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 20-21.
59
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difficult. These two policy issues are important and complex enough that they merit their own separate
sections and are discussed infra sections 2 and 3.
Recent studies show that most states are meeting
or exceeding their EERS targets; a few are lagging
slightly behind their targets and attribute this gap
primarily to the effects of the recession and sluggish
state economies.63 Some PUCs in states that are
struggling to meet their goals are taking an active role
in ensuring progress: for example, the Maryland Public
Service Commission recently ordered that its utilities
“form work groups to develop additional programs
designed to reach those goals, and to file a report with
the group’s recommendations” by a set date.64
Overall, EERSs appear to be effective in driving
increased energy efficiency investment due to their
establishment of concrete goals and timelines.65

1.2
“All Cost-Effective
Efficiency” Policies

Energy

For example: Vermont
Vermont has one of the oldest efficiency
mandates in the country. In 2000, its Public
Service Board (PSB) created “Efficiency Vermont,”
a utility devoted exclusively to energy efficiency,
and adopted a requirement that it implement all
cost-effective energy efficiency. This general
requirement is translated into specific contractual
goals, which are set by the PSB, are expressed in
absolute kWh, and amounted to approximately a
6.75% savings target between 2009 and 2011.
Efficiency Vermont is run by the Vermont Energy
Investment Corporation (VEIC), which receives
incentive payments for meeting its goals, and is
responsible for submitting an annual report to the
PSB for monitoring and verification. Efficiency
Vermont has consistently achieved impressive
levels of savings, though whether it will meet its
very ambitious current almost 7% 3-year goal
remains to be seen. The state has recently
switched to a 12-year appointment model that
will give VEIC the ability to engage in longer-term
and more comprehensive program planning.

A second way for states and PUCs to mandate
energy efficiency—which is perhaps best considered a
“variation on a theme” given its similarity to an EERS—
is to adopt a law or regulation that requires utilities to
pursue “all cost effective energy efficiency.” This
policy differs from an EERS in that rather than setting a
statewide numerical target (based perhaps on a
feasibility study), the policy requires utilities or
administrators—with PUC oversight—to take the lead
in determining how much energy efficiency can cost-effectively be implemented.66 The general
mandate to pursue all energy efficiency that is cost-effective is translated into numerical goals through

63

See id. at 27-32.
Md. Public Serv. Comm’n, Order No. 84569, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2011).
65
See Matthew Brown, The Energy Efficiency Resource Standard: Observations on an Emerging State Policy
(Harcourt Brown 2010); MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 46, at 1; Glatt, supra note 45, at 9.
66
See Nicole Hopper et al., supra note 46, at 9.
64
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an annual process involving the PUC, individual utilities, and stakeholders.67 A number of states,
including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Washington, California, and Vermont have adopted this model.68
One particular version of this model—first adopted by California—is a “loading order” policy, which
requires utilities to consider cost-effective efficiency before all other resources in their supply
planning.69 California’s PUC recently strengthened its loading order policy by clarifying that utilities
must do more than simply meet the energy efficiency and renewable energy targets set by the PUC. As
a recent decision from the California PUC explained, “[w]hile hitting a target for energy efficiency or
demand response may satisfy other obligations of the utility, that does not constitute a ceiling on those
resources for purposes of procurement.”70 This decision demonstrates how a strict loading order policy
can lead to both the setting of numerical targets and a continuing utility obligation to pursue energy
efficiency above and beyond these targets—a critical combination in ensuring that truly all cost-effective
energy efficiency gets implemented.71 Intervenors in front of the California PUC were instrumental in
getting the PUC to adopt this stricter interpretation of its loading order policy, demonstrating the power
that energy efficiency advocates have to shape PUC policies.72

1.3

Including Energy Efficiency in Renewable Portfolio Standards

Some states, instead of setting separate energy efficiency targets, have opted to include energy
efficiency as an eligible resource in their state renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”), which set targets
for the amount of electricity that utilities must procure from renewable (or in some states, “clean”)
resources each year. Generally, states allow energy efficiency investments to go some way towards
meeting RPS targets, but impose a cap on how much of the target a utility can meet with energy
efficiency investments. For example, Nevada allows energy efficiency to meet up to 6.25% of a utility’s
responsibility to procure 25% renewable resources by 2025.73 The theory behind adopting this type of
restriction on the percentage of an RPS that energy efficiency can satisfy is that an RPS is intended to
spur market innovations in energy supply, and if energy efficiency is allowed too great a role, an RPS
may fail in its aim to promote clean energy technologies.74 However, given that energy efficiency is the
lowest-cost, cleanest resource available, it may be advisable for states choosing to incorporate energy

67

See, e.g., MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 46, at 1, 18. Because this policy is driven by a mandate to pursue
only “cost-effective” solutions, the success of a policy is shaped to a large extent by how this term is defined.
Methods and best practices for evaluating cost-effectiveness are summarized infra section 2.1.
68
Id. at 1-2.
69
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5(b)(9)(C).
70
Cal. PUC, Decision Approving Modified Bundled Procurement Plans 21, Rulemaking 10-05-2010 (Jan. 12, 2012).
71
There are reports that in some states, all cost-effective energy efficiency may be on the books for years before
being fully implemented. For example, Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP) reports that Connecticut’s
all cost-effective efficiency policy is just finally being ramped up, due to a reorganization of the states’ agencies
(see infra section 10.2) and an ambitious new Commissioner, despite having been on the books for years. NEEP, A
REGIONAL ROUNDUP OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY IN THE NORTHEAST & MID-ATLANTIC STATES (Fall 2011).
72
Section 12 of this handbook discusses how to intervene in PUC proceedings.
73
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704.7821(b).
74
See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT & THE CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS [hereinafter “RAP & C2ES”], CLEAN
ENERGY STANDARDS: STATE AND FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 27 (Nov. 2011).
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law

21

Public Utility Commissions and Energy Efficiency

efficiency into their RPSs to place generous limits on energy efficiency’s role coupled with aggressive
targets expected to result in significant investment in new technologies as well as all cost-effective
energy efficiency.
Early reports on energy efficiency’s inclusion in RPS suggest that this version of an EERS has resulted
in less aggressive energy efficiency savings than others, although in theory this policy option could—if
targets are adequately stringent and energy efficiency plays a great enough role—produce the same
kind of results as a traditional EERS.75
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2. FUNDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS
[I]f a state wants to “talk the talk” of setting high energy savings goals, they will need to
“walk the walk” in terms of providing sufficiently high levels of funding for energy
efficiency programs.76
States are unlikely to reach their energy efficiency targets unless they also put mechanisms in
place to fund energy efficiency programs. Energy efficiency programs have significant costs to
implementing utilities.77 Although energy efficiency measures may result in net gains to consumers
when electricity bill savings and non-energy benefits are taken into consideration, utilities do not
themselves reap all of these benefits. A 2009 survey of fourteen states78 found that, on average, energy
efficiency had a utility cost of saved energy of about 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh).79 Importantly,
this number is still considerably lower than utilities’ supply-side options for meeting demand, which cost
at least three times as much.80
Energy efficiency initiatives are typically funded by money collected from ratepayers.
Ratepayer funding is accepted as fair practice given that it is electricity customers who ultimately benefit
from energy efficiency investments in the form of lower electricity bills, more reliable electricity, and
improved health and environment.81
There are two key areas in which PUCs make determinations about energy efficiency program
financing. The first question is what and how much: what kinds of energy efficiency investments will the
PUC allow utilities or third-party administrators to recover from ratepayers? How much total funding
will be allocated to this endeavor? The second is how: what mechanism will PUCs utilize in order to
authorize these costs to be recouped? This section addresses possible answers to these questions in
turn.
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KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
STEVEN NADEL & JOHN SHENOT, STATE & LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, SETTING ENERGY SAVINGS TARGETS FOR
UTILITIES: UTILITY MOTIVATION AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP 3 (2011).
78
California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
79
KATHERINE FRIEDRICH ET AL., SAVING ENERGY COST-EFFECTIVELY: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE COST OF ENERGY SAVED THROUGH
UTILITY-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS 15 (ACEEE REPORT NO. U091, 2009); see also NADAL & SHENOT, supra note
77, at 3. The “utility cost of saved energy” measures the cost to utilities of implementing an energy efficiency
program, factoring in the discount rate, the estimated measure life in years, the total program cost in millions of
dollars, and the incremental annual MWh saved that year by the energy efficiency program. It does not include
customer costs and/or non-energy benefits of energy efficiency. See Friedrich, supra, at 2. Measuring the utility
cost of saved energy allows energy efficiency investments to be compared directly to supply-side investments. Id.
at 15.
80
Id.; see also LAZARD, LTD., LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS: VERSION 3.0 (2009).
81
There are, however, numerous debates about whether certain ratepayers bear more than the fair share of the
costs of these programs without reaping adequate benefits. The details of these debates are beyond the scope of
this report.
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2.1

Funding Levels & Cost-Effectiveness

The first critical threshold issue confronting PUCs is how much and what kinds of spending to
authorize. Deciding how much funding to authorize is of critical importance—in one recent survey of
industry experts, “the relative size of the [energy efficiency] program budget” ranked as the number one
factor determining the success of a state’s electric utility energy efficiency policies.82 As might be
expected, energy efficiency expenditures vary greatly among different states, depending on the
ambition of targets and the size of the state, among other factors. Ideally, funding levels should be set
based on energy efficiency potential and estimated costs of the programs necessary to reach that
potential (rather than the opposite case, where a predetermined level of funding dictates what the
energy efficiency goals of a state will be). Ensuring that overall program budgets are in line with
announced energy efficiency goals is one key role for energy efficiency advocates to play.
To best measure how states’ energy efficiency spending compares, experts recommend using
“budget as a percent of utility revenues,” a measure which approximates the magnitude of energy
efficiency spending in a state.83 In 2010, Vermont led the country in electric energy efficiency budget as
a percent of revenue, spending 4.57% of utility revenues on energy efficiency (with an actual budget of
$34.0 million). Massachusetts and California ranked second and third, with budgets as percents of
revenues at 3.69% and 3.42%, respectively (and budgets of $301.9 million and $1,158.1 million,
respectively). In contrast, 28 states spent less than 1% of utility revenues on energy efficiency, and 16 of
these spent less than 0.5% of utility revenues on energy efficiency.84
Of primary concern for regulators, of course, is what these high levels of spending do to
electricity bills. Importantly, higher spending on energy efficiency does not correlate with higher
electricity bills: the American Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy recently found that many of the
states with the lowest spending on energy efficiency have some of the highest average monthly bills.85
Rates may increase modestly in those states that are investing significantly in energy efficiency—for
example, a 2010 Massachusetts analysis found that its aggressive level of efficiency spending would
increase electricity rates between 0.5% and almost 4% through 2012, depending on the customer class.
However, the same analysis predicted a significant negative impact on overall electricity bills over the
long term, leading to significant net benefits.86 A longer-term analysis of Massachusetts’ energy
efficiency potential through 2030 found that if its full energy efficiency portfolio is implemented,
customer bills over the lifetime of the installed measures would be lowered by $5.6 billion dollars, or
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See KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
Id. at 6-7; see also MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., supra note 25, at 10.
84
Id. at 11-12. For a detailed chart showing state levels of energy efficiency spending and a figure comparing
spending across states, see id. at 11-13.
85
See Michael Sciortino et al., Opportunity Knocks: Examining Low-Ranking States in the State Energy Efficiency
Scorecard 9-11 (ACEEE Rep. No. E126, May 2012). Although rates are in some instances higher in high energy
efficiency states, these higher rates are counterbalanced by lowered electricity consumption. See id.
86
See Tim Woolf, Bill Impacts of Energy Efficiency Programs, Presentation of the Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Uts. to NARUC
Winter Meetings Energy Resources and Environment Committee (Feb. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/Woolf-efficiency-bill-impacts.pdf.
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about 5.5% (with bill savings accounting for and net of any rate increases).87 These early numbers on
the impacts of even very aggressive programs should give some comfort that energy efficiency does
indeed pay out for consumers. Commissioners and advocates should, however, be sensitive to how
these overall benefits are distributed among customer classes and participants versus non-participants
(though, practically, in states with very aggressive energy efficiency targets, there are likely to be few
non-participants).88
Once overall spending levels are determined, there is the further question of how to ensure that
dollars are wisely invested. PUCs generally maintain significant oversight of how ratepayer money is
spent. This oversight is particularly important in states that have “all cost-effective energy efficiency”
policies. Most PUCs impose a requirement that utilities or administrators demonstrate that the energy
efficiency investments they make are “cost-effective” before ratepayer recovery is allowed.89 Much
depends, then, on how a PUC chooses to define and measure cost-effectiveness.
There are four predominant cost-effectiveness tests: the Participant Test, the Ratepayer Impact
Measure Test, the Program Administrator Cost Test, and the Total Resource Cost Test.90 These tests,
officially promulgated by the California PUC and the California Energy Commission in the 1983 California
Standard Practice Manual, have been used by states and PUCs for nearly thirty years.91 Although
different in application, each test compares the net present value of a stream of benefits over the life of
an investment with the net present value of a corresponding stream of costs.92 However, the selection
of one or another of these tests has a significant bearing on the types of energy efficiency programs that
utilities will be permitted to pursue.
Participant Test: The Participant Test measures cost-effectiveness from the perspective of the energy
efficiency program participant. By comparing bill savings (using retail rates) that the customer will
realize over the life of an efficiency upgrade to the cost incurred by the customer to make the upgrade,
PUCs can determine the cost-effectiveness of an energy efficiency program through the eyes of the
consumer.93 Of the forty-four states with formally approved ratepayer-funded energy efficiency
programs, no state claimed to use the Participant Test as its primary means of cost-benefit analysis.94

87

See Peter Cappers et al., Benefits and Costs of Aggressive Energy Efficiency Programs and the Impacts of
Alternative Sources of Funding: Case Study of Massachusetts, at 8-76 – 8-77. (ACEEE Summer Study on Energy
Efficiency in Buildings 2010). This study compared an “aggressive” scenario to a “business as usual” scenario with
some energy efficiency still being implemented, but on a smaller scale. See id.
88
See Woolf, supra note 86.
89
CHRIS NEME & MARTY KUSHLER, IS IT TIME TO DITCH THE TRC? EXAMINING CONCERNS WITH CURRENT PRACTICE IN BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS 5-299 (2010); MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE EVALUATION OF
RATEPAYER-FUNDED ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS 30 (ACEEE REPORT NO. U122, 2012).
90
NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-299.
91
Id. at 5-300. Commentators note that the universal acceptance of a single common source for cost-effective
practice standards is striking in a field where inconsistency and diversity among states is the norm. KUSHLER ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 31.
92
NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-300.
93
Id.
94
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59–60.
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Ratepayer Impact Measure (RIM) Test: The RIM Test analyzes savings from the perspective of the
customer who does not participate in the energy efficiency program. It compares the value of avoided
supply investments by the utility, which includes avoided generation, transmission, and distribution
costs, to the sum of the program costs and the utility's lost revenue from reduced sales.95 Of the fortyfour states with formally approved ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, Virginia is the only
state that uses the RIM Test as the primary means of cost-benefit analysis.96 This test largely has been
abandoned by states upon a determination that it does not capture all desirable energy efficiency
opportunities.97 Because the RIM Test focuses only on the impact on nonparticipants, its application
often results in the rejection of programs that could produce large energy savings and significant
reductions to customers' bills.98
Total Resources Cost (TRC) Test: The TRC Test combines the viewpoints of the customers in the
Participant and RIM tests. It differs from the other tests because at least in theory, it is capable of
incorporating environmental and other non-energy benefits into the calculation, such as improved
comfort, building durability, and health and safety.99 In doing so, it considers the avoided costs of
secondary fuel, water, or other resources instead of the actual retail price for such resources (unlike the
Participant Test, which focuses on actual retail prices).100 The TRC Test compares the value of avoided
energy and other resources from all sources with the full cost of the efficiency measures, plus all nonmeasure program costs.101 Of the forty-four states with formally approved ratepayer funded energy
efficiency programs, twenty-nine identify the TRC Test as their primary means of cost-benefit analysis.102
Many praise the TRC test as the most comprehensive of the available mechanisms for measuring
cost effectiveness, but it has also been criticized for significant shortcomings.103 For example, under the
TRC Test all participant costs for an energy efficiency upgrade are counted as costs, but most or all of
the customer benefits outside of utility savings are not considered.104 Full incorporation of
environmental benefits, including the value of avoided carbon emissions, has also proven challenging.105
Commentators have suggested numerous improvements that could strengthen the TRC Test;106 PUCs
95

NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-301.
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59–60.
97
BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: HOW TO PROCURE ELECTRICITY RESOURCES TO PROVIDE
RELIABLE, LOW-COST, AND EFFICIENT ELECTRICITY SERVICES TO ALL RETAIL CUSTOMERS, at B-3 (2003).
98
Id.
99
NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-301.
100
Id. at 5-301.
101
Id.
102
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59–60. Six states still adhere to the “Societal Test,” a test that the California
Manual previously espoused but that is now rolled into the TRC test in the manual. See NEME & KUSHLER, supra note
89, at 5-301 n.3.
103
E.g., ROBIN LEBARON, NAT'L HOME PERFORMANCE COUNCIL, GETTING TO FAIR COST EFFECTIVENESS TESTING: USING THE PAC
TEST, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE TRC TEST, AND BEYOND 5–11 (Draft 2011); NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-303 to 5304.
104
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 36.
105
LEBARON, supra note 103, at 6–11.
106
These suggested best practices include: (1) applying the TRC Test at the broad portfolio level instead of at the
individual project level; (2) evaluating the costs and benefits over a multi-year time frame instead of a single year;
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and advocates using or considering the TRC Test may want to look carefully at ways in which the test in
its current applications might disserve or under-serve their goals.
Program Administrator Cost (PAC) Test: The PAC Test measures cost-effectiveness from the perspective
of the utility by comparing the value of the utility’s avoided costs with the cost to the utility of acquiring
the efficiency resources that produce the avoided costs.107 It does not consider energy benefits of fuels
not provided by the utility, any other resource benefits such as water savings, or any customer
contributions to the cost of an efficiency investment.108 Of the forty-four states with formally approved
rate-payer funded energy efficiency programs, five states reported using the PAC Test as their primary
means of cost-benefit analysis: Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Texas, and Utah.109
These tests share an important component that bears additional mention: they rely on a calculation of
avoided costs. Avoided costs are the “costs that would have been spent if the energy efficiency savings
measure had not been put into place.” 110 The method through which avoided costs are measured can
significantly affect the results of any cost-effectiveness test.111 There are a large number of factors that
can be included in avoided costs. Generally, most methodologies include an “energy-related”
component and a “capacity-related” component.112 Energy-related savings might include “market
purchases or fuel and operation and maintenance losses, system losses, ancillary services, energy
market price reductions, co-benefits in water, natural gas, fuel oil, etc. , air emissions, [and] hedging
costs.”113 Capacity savings in the avoided cost calculation may include “capacity purchases or generator
construction, system losses (peak load), transmission facilities, distribution facilities, ancillary services
related to capacity, capacity market price reductions, [and] land use.”114 Most states choose to analyze
some subset of these considerations in their avoided cost calculations.115 As if these factors did not
create enough complexity, there are additional decisions to be made about how to develop forecasts of
future electricity and capacity costs, how to factor in area- and time-specific marginal costs, how to

(3) addressing only the incremental costs of a program instead of the entire cost of the program; (4) using a
societal discount rate to measure the net present value of costs and benefits, as opposed to a weighted average
cost of capital for utilities; (5) including the values of non-energy savings and avoided externalities in TRC testing;
(6) reducing participant costs based on whether the projects are whole-house or single-measure; (7) instituting
thoughtful, well-reasoned caps on the effective useful life of an energy efficiency measure; (8) incorporating the
value of avoided carbon emissions as a benefit in the TRC Test; (9) recognizing spillover and market transformation
effects in net-to-gross calculations; and (10) considering all energy savings, not just those obtained by the
participating utility. See id.
107
NEME & KUSHLER, supra note 89, at 5-301.
108
Id.
109
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59–60.
110
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 4-1 (2006).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 4-2; see also, e.g., Rick Hornby et al., Avoided Energy Supply Costs in New England: 2009 Report, at 1-3
(Synapse Energy Economics Oct. 2009), available at http://www.synapseenergy.com/Downloads/SynapseReport.2009-10.AESC.AESC-Study-2009.09-020.pdf
113
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 110, at 4-2.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 4-3.
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select a discount rate, and how to value the program’s effect on GHG emissions.116 Ultimately, each PUC
must decide how best to balance accuracy and simplicity in determining what measure(s) of avoided
cost are appropriate (some avoided costs may be calculated at a utility level, and utilities within a state
may vary in their methodologies).117 But given the importance of avoided cost calculations in
determining cost-effectiveness and therefore in determining the level of energy efficiency a state will
pursue, avoided cost calculations are one area where commissioners, staff, and advocates should pay
careful attention to the policy decisions being made. Moreover, avoided cost calculations deserve
particularly careful attention as a result of the recent natural gas boom and resultant declining natural
gas prices, as fuel costs are one major component of avoided costs. Declining natural gas prices, to the
extent they persist, may change the calculus significantly on what energy efficiency policies are deemed
cost-effective, and advocates of energy efficiency would be wise to make sure the very real, but often
economically undervalued, benefits of energy efficiency are taken fully into consideration.118

2.2

Funding Mechanisms

A second financing decision that a PUC must make is how to ensure that utilities or program
administrators recover the costs of implementing energy efficiency programs. Generally, there are two
types of funding mechanisms used to generate revenue for cost recovery: (1) a system benefits charge
(SBC), which is a per-kilowatt-hour charge that typically is applied statewide, or (2) a specifically
determined rate charge that is usually applied on a utility-by-utility basis.119 Specifically determined rate
charges can take the form of tariff riders or rate case recovery. Capitalization is an alternative, but
uncommon, approach to funding energy efficiency programs.
System Benefits Charges: SBCs, also called public benefits charges, are surcharges imposed on electric
ratepayers to collect funds for energy efficiency programs.120 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia
use SBCs for various environmental programs.121 SBC funds typically flow to the selected energy
efficiency program administrator. In California, Connecticut, Nevada, and Rhode Island, SBCs fund
utility-run energy efficiency programs.122 In Massachusetts and New York, the utilities and PUCs work in
tandem to use SBC funds for programs.123 In Oregon and Vermont, an independent nonprofit third party
116

Id. at 4-1–4-12.
Id.; see also Synapse Energy Economics, Review of Avoided Costs Used in Minnesota Electric Utility
Conservation Improvement Programs (Nov. 2004).
118
See, e.g., RICK HORNBY ET AL., AVOIDED ENERGY SUPPLY COSTS IN NEW ENGLAND: 2011 REPORT 1-1 (JULY 2011), available at
http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/projects/EEU/2011AvoidedCosts/AESC%202011%20Complete%202011%20
07%2021%20FINAL.pdf (noting that compared to 2009, “[d]ramatic increases in the quantity of technically
recoverable shale gas resources—coupled with decreases in the expected costs of finding, developing, and
producing gas from those resources—lead[] to lower projections of avoided costs for natural gas and gas-fired
electric energy”).
119
Id. In those states that participate in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), see infra section 11.1, RGGI
auctions provide an additional source of revenue that is often spent on energy efficiency.
120
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2-8 (2006).
121
Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7
(2006).
122
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 16–20.
123
Id. at 16, 18.
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oversees the use of SBC funds.124 New Jersey is
the only state in which the PUC directly
administers SBCs and uses the funds for energy
SBCs are mostly
efficiency programs.125
126
except in New York,
established by statute,
where the Public Service Commission instituted
the SBC and named the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)
as the third-party administrator of the charge.127
Some states combine the SBCs with other funding
mechanisms. Connecticut utilities, for example,
fund energy efficiency programs through a
statewide SBC as well as through the ISO New
England Forward Capacity Market and auction
proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative.128
System benefits charges can have at least one
disadvantage that has hindered energy efficiency
spending in some states recently: if the funds
enter the realm of general state revenues, the
money may be devoted to other state spending
needs and may not find its way to the utilities.129

For example: Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, the state legislature has
mandated that the Department of Public
Utilities (DPU) require utilities to levy a $0.0025
per kWh monthly charge on all customer bills to
fund energy efficiency programs. This money
goes into a trust fund that is used to pay a
portion of program costs anticipated by each
utility. The DPU supplements program funding
by using amounts generated by the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, by the NOx
Allowance Trading Program, and by distribution
companies and municipal aggregators under the
ISO New England Forward Capacity market.
This funding allows Massachusetts to provide
one of the most aggressive set of energy
efficiency programs in the United States,
established by its 2008 Green Communities Act.
Massachusetts' energy efficiency programs are
expected to yield electric savings of 2.4 percent,
amounting to the most aggressive EERS target in
the country.

Rate Case Recovery: Some state energy efficiency programs are funded through general rate cases.
Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin use this mechanism.130 Rate case recovery can be beneficial for
utilities because it is consistent with existing regulatory rules and procedures. Ideally, this process
assures utilities of timely cost recovery, although some utilities may object to having a time lag between
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Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 19.
126
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.8 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245l (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25, § 19
(West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-60 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 702.100, 702.600 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. §
757.612 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-2-1.2, 39-26-8 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 209 (2012).
127
N.Y. Public Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Case No. 94-E0952, Opinion and Order Regarding Competitive Opportunities for Electric Service, Opinion No. 96-12 (May 20,
1996), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={076F3B08-917D-47FE83C0-8B2B32822A67}.
128
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 20. Many of the other states participating in RGGI also dedicate some portion of
RGGI auction proceeds to energy efficiency.
129
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 2-8.
130
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 17–18; Incentivizing Utility-Led Efficiency Programs: Program Cost Recovery,
ACEEE, http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/toolkit/utility-programs/program-cost-recovery (last visited Mar. 18,
2012).
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when energy efficiency expenditures are made and when those costs are recovered through the next
rate case.131
Tariff Riders: A tariff rider for energy efficiency allows for a periodic rate adjustment to account for the
difference between planned costs, which are included in rates, and actual costs.132 Tariff riders are
designed to prevent utilities from over- or under-recovering costs.133 They are used less frequently than
SBCs. Idaho, Iowa, Texas, and Washington all use this mechanism to allow for cost recovery of energy
efficiency investments.134 In each state, the utilities administer and implement energy efficiency
programs.135
Capitalization: This approach treats energy efficiency costs like an investment in physical capacity (as
opposed to rate case recovery, which treats efficiency costs as an expense). Capitalization adds the
amortized cost and an approved return on capital to the revenue requirement, which is then passed on
to customers as an increase in per-kWh or per-therm rates.136 Although once used by Idaho, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington, this method of cost recovery is no longer preferred because it spreads out the
recovery over a long period of time, raises the total cost of efficiency programs, and allows for a return
on capitalized program costs not tied to program performance.137
As this discussion suggests, there is no agreed solution on the best way to finance utility-sector
energy efficiency programs, and most mechanisms have their benefits and drawbacks. What does
appear clear, however, is that making the commitment to finance energy efficiency through PUC-

131

Id. For an example of utility objection to this practice, see Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., In the Matter of the
Application of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. For Authorization to Deploy a Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish a
Surcharge For the Recovery of Cost, Case No. 9208 (Aug. 13, 2010), at 32-41, available at
http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/Intranet/casenum/CaseAction_new.cfm?CaseNumber=9208. These objections can
be alleviated to some extent by implementing a “frequent balancing mechanism” between rate cases. See
Incentivizing Utility-Led Efficiency Programs, supra note 130. Another issue that may arise when using traditional
rates to fund energy efficiency programs is the potential for cross-subsidization among and across customer
classes. Although rates affect all customers equally within a customer class, not every customer will take equal
advantage of and benefit from energy efficiency programs. One easy solution is to ensure that the offered
programs are advertised and marketed in such a way that the maximum number of customers has the opportunity
to benefit. This issue occurs between customer classes as well (for example, industrial customers versus
residential customers). This problem is typically solved by either requiring each class to pay for its own programs,
or by requiring utilities to have robust programs for all customers, giving everyone an opportunity to participate.
See STEVEN NADAL ET AL., SEE ACTION, SETTING ENERGY SAVINGS TARGETS FOR UTILITIES 13 (2011).
132
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 2-8.
133
KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 20.
134
Id. at 18–20.
135
Id.; see also Customer Energy Efficiency Programs: Idaho, ACEEE, http://aceee.org/sector/statepolicy/idaho/customer-energy-efficiency-programs (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
136
Incentivizing Utility-Led Efficiency Programs, supra note 130.
137
Id.; see also United States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter U.S. EPA], Aligning Utility Incentives
with Investment in Energy Efficiency 4-10 n.12 (2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf.
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administered, system-wide mechanisms is a fundamental step in achieving robust energy efficiency
savings.

FUNDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about funding utility or third-party run energy efficiency programs may find the following
resources helpful:
BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: HOW TO PROCURE ELECTRICITY RESOURCES TO PROVIDE RELIABLE, LOWCOST, AND EFFICIENT ELECTRICITY SERVICES TO ALL RETAIL CUSTOMERS (2003).
Environmental Protection Agency, Chapter 4: Program Cost Recovery, in ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES WITH INVESTMENT IN ENERGY
EFFICIENCY (Nov. 2007), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf.
KATHERINE FRIEDRICH ET AL., ACEEE REPORT NO. U091, SAVING ENERGY COST-EFFECTIVELY: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE COST OF ENERGY SAVED
THROUGH UTILITY-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (2009).
MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., ACEEE REPORT NO. U122, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE EVALUATION OF RATEPAYERFUNDED ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS 30 (2012).
MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., ACEEE REPORT NO. U091, MEETING AGGRESSIVE NEW STATE GOALS FOR UTILITY-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY: EXAMINING KEY
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH SAVINGS (2009).
STEVEN NADEL & JOHN SHENOT, STATE & LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, SETTING ENERGY SAVINGS TARGETS FOR UTILITIES: UTILITY
MOTIVATION AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP (2011).
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, DOING MORE AND USING LESS: REGULATORY REFORMS FOR ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL GAS UTLITIES CAN SPUR
ENERGY EFFICENCY (2011).
CHRIS NEME & MARTY KUSHLER, IS IT TIME TO DITCH THE TRC? EXAMINING CONCERNS WITH CURRENT PRACTICE IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (2010).
ST
DAN YORK & MARTIN KUSHLER, ACEEE, THE OLD MODEL ISN’T WORKING: CREATING THE ENERGY UTILITY FOR THE 21 CENTURY 3 (2011).
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3. ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES WITH POLICY GOALS
Mandating and funding robust energy efficiency programs are key first steps in significantly
increasing energy efficiency, but these policies inevitably butt up against the fact that they cut against
the traditional utility business model. Many states -- particularly those that have chosen for utilities to
administer their energy efficiency programs -- have elected to work with utilities to incentivize their
investments in energy efficiency so that they are proactive partners in, rather than opponents of,
aggressive energy efficiency policies.138 Studies comparing state energy efficiency programs have found
that “[i]n the U.S., utility energy efficiency programs have been most successful in those states that
utilize a ‘sticks-and-carrots’ approach, combining a mandated savings goal or target with a
comprehensive business model.”139 The sections below explore two areas where PUCs are taking action
to better align utility incentives with state policy goals.

3.1

Decoupling & Lost Revenue Adjustment

One method of aligning utility incentives and energy efficiency objectives is to remove utilities’
incentive to sell ever more power as a method of increasing profit. The traditional rate formula that
PUCs use to establish utility earnings encourages utilities to increase revenues through increased
electricity sales.140 Revenue regulation and decoupling attempt to address this misalignment by capping
revenue and putting in place a price mechanism that “breaks the link between the amount of energy
sold and the actual (allowed) revenue collected by the utility.”141 However, it is worth noting that
decoupling has been a controversial area of PUC decision-making and it is unclear the extent to which
decoupling drives successful energy efficiency policies.142 Nevertheless, many states and experts in the
field believe that decoupling—or a similar sort of policy—will be a necessary component of future
efforts to achieve wider and deeper energy savings.143 Decoupling may be more important in
deregulated than regulated states, as utilities in deregulated states “appear to be more vulnerable to
revenue losses incurred by decreased sales from efficiency than utilities in vertically-integrated
markets.”144 But decoupling can be applied in both market structures.

138

In states that have chosen a government administrator or a third-party administrator, realigning utility
incentives is less of a concern. However, those states might still encounter strong opposition from utilities if no
reevaluation of utility revenue is undertaken, as irrespective of who administers the programs, energy efficiency
programs will affect utilities’ bottom lines. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Third
Party Provision of Energy Efficiency Programs 8-9 (2011), available at
http://www.naruc.org/Publications/SERCAT_Colorado_2010.pdf.
139
Andrew Satchwell et al., Carrots and Sticks: A Comprehensive Business Model for the Successful Achievement of
Energy Efficiency Resource Standards, at 1 (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Laboratory, March 2011).
140
THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 3 (2011),
available at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/902 [hereinafter RAP].
141
See id. at 2.
142
MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 21.
143
Id.
144
Nat’l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), Decoupling for Electric & Gas Utilities: Frequently
Asked Questions, at 10 (Sept. 2007). As NARUC explains, this may be because “once divested of a generation plant,
the distribution utility is a smaller company (in terms of total rate base and capitalization), and fluctuations in
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Decoupling Basics
Decoupling changes the way that PUCs establish
utility rates. Traditionally, rates are fixed between rate
cases. During a rate case, rates are set, broadly
speaking, by dividing the sum of expenses, the allowable
return, and taxes during the test period (the revenue
requirement) by the units sold during the test period.145
Since the rate is fixed between rate cases, utilities can
increase revenue by lowering expenses or increasing
sales of electricity. However, since “there is a floor
below which expenses simply cannot be reduced
without adversely affecting the level of service,” utilities
generally rely in large measure on increasing units of
electricity sold.146 The resulting profit is often enough to
discourage utilities from becoming “competent vendors
of energy efficiency and load reduction services.”147
Decoupling addresses this problem by fixing revenue
during a rate case and allowing for price adjustments
between rate cases to try to best approximate that level
of revenue. As revenue becomes “decoupled” from
sales, it remains tied only to expenses so that utilities
have no incentive to increase customer demand. 148

For example: California
California, a pioneer in energy efficiency, has one
of the oldest decoupling programs in the nation,
with electricity decoupling beginning in 1982.
Under California’s decoupling policy, utilities
submit their revenue requirements and estimated
sales to regulators at the beginning of a rate case.
California’s PUC sets each utility’s rates and then
adjusts them regularly to ensure that the
approved revenue requirement is met. Any
excess revenue is credited back to customers;
conversely, any shortfall in revenue gets
recovered later from customers. Decoupling in
California has been heralded as a component of
its success in getting energy usage per person to
flatline during a period in which the rest of the
nation has experienced a 50% increase in per
capita energy usage. California has combined its
decoupling efforts with shareholder incentives for
utilities that meet or exceed their energy
efficiency targets.

Implementation of Decoupling
As of July 2012, fourteen states had electricity decoupling programs.149 There are a variety of ways
to implement decoupling. One of the major issues that a regulator must resolve is whether to

throughput and earnings have a relatively larger impact on return.” Id. (quoting US EPA, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON
ENERGY EFFICIENCY, Chapter 2 (July 2006)).
145
See RAP, supra note 140. Revenue Requirement = (Expenses + Return + Taxes). Rate = Revenue Requirement /
Units Sold. Certain fixed costs, notably the amortized costs of generation, transmission, and distribution facilities,
may be recovered through charges that do not vary with the amount of energy actually used by the customer.
146
See id. at 8.
147
See The Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Revenue Decoupling: A Policy Brief of the Electricity
Consumers Resource Council 1 (2007), available at http://www.elcon.org/Documents/Publications/31RevenueDecoupling.PDF.
148
See RAP, supra note 140 at 33-40. Decoupling can also be designed to insulate utility revenue from shocks in
weather and economic downturns, decrease volatility, and potentially decrease the cost of capital for the utility.
Id.
149
See INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY, STATE ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 2-3 (July 2012).
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implement full decoupling150, partial decoupling151, or limited decoupling.152 From an energy efficiency
standpoint, full decoupling is preferred as it completely insulates utility revenue from any deviation in
sales, including any investment in energy efficiency.153 Another major decision needs to be made
whether to adjust the revenue requirement between rate cases to account for changes in cost
structure.154
Concerns and Alternatives
Decoupling is not without its concerns. Opponents of decoupling claim that it may lead to annual
rate increases without the careful scrutiny of a rate case.155 They also claim that utilities are using
decoupling as an excuse to add to rate base, that efficiency is already incentivized without the need for
such a scheme, that decoupling is not appropriate for large-volume users, and that decoupling
disincentivizes good service.156 Proponents of decoupling argue that these concerns can be addressed
with proper and careful design.157
The most popular alternative to decoupling is the “Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism” (LRAM).
“This mechanism, unlike decoupling, does not attempt to completely sever the link between revenue
and sales, but instead attempts to determine the portion of lost revenue that results only from a
successful energy efficiency program. This lost revenue is recovered through a rate adjustment,
removing the utility disincentive to invest in efficiency.”158 There has been a resurgence of state interest
in LRAMs recently, and thirteen states reportedly have current or pending LRAMs.159 However, LRAM
has been critiqued for failing to completely remove utility’s incentive to invest in supply-side resources
over energy efficiency and for being susceptible to gaming by utilities.160

150

Full decoupling involves completely severing the link between utility revenue and sales. See RAP, supra note
140, at 11. Truly full decoupling is rare. Often times, industrial users are exempt from decoupling requirements.
See U.S. Dep’t of Energy & U.S. EPA, supra note 110, at 5-1; RAP, supra note 140, at 48.
151
As its name indicates, partial decoupling only decouples a portion of a utility’s full revenue. See RAP, supra note
140, at 12.
152
Limited decoupling refers to decoupling for specified causes of variations in sales, e.g. decoupling only for
weather variations or reduced usage by existing customers (as opposed to new customers). See id. at 12-13.
153
Full decoupling thereby fully eliminates the “throughput” incentive, whereas partial and limited decoupling only
partially do so. See id. at 11.
154
For example, a utility’s customer base may change between rate cases. Decoupling revenue on a per customer
basis allows for changes in revenue between rate cases if a utility’s customer base changes. See U.S. EPA, supra
note 150, at 5-2. RAP, supra note 140, lays out a number of additional important decoupling design
considerations.
155
See RAP, supra note 140, at 44.
156
See id. at 47-50.
157
See id.
158
See ACEEE, Lost Margin Recovery, http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/toolkit/utility-programs/lost-marginrecovery.
159
Sara Hayes et al., Balancing Interests: A Review of Lost Revenue Adjustment Programs for Utility Energy
Efficiency Programs, at iii (ACEEE Report No. U114, Sept. 2011).
160
Id.
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The following figure from the Institute for Electric Efficiency shows those states that have
implemented or have implementation pending of decoupling or lost revenue adjustment:
Figure 3: Electric Utilities with Decoupling or Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanisms161

161

Reprinted with permission from © INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY, STATE ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS 6 (July 2012), available at
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_StateRegulatoryFrame_0712.pdf.
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DECOUPLING & LOST REVENUE RECOVERY: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about decoupling and its alternatives may find the following more detailed resources
helpful:
Timothy J. Brennan, “Night of the Living Dead” or “Back to the Future?” Electric Utility Decoupling, Reviving Rate-of-Return
Regulation, and Energy Efficiency (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 08-27, Aug. 2008).
ELCON, Revenue Decoupling (2007), http://www.elcon.org/Documents/Publications/3-1RevenueDecoupling.PDF.
EPA, Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Efficiency (2007),
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf.
Sara Hayes et al., Balancing Interests: A Review of Lost Revenue Adjustment Programs for Utility Energy Efficiency Programs
(ACEEE Report No. U114, Sept. 2011), http://aceee.org/research-report/u114.
IEE, State Energy Efficiency Regulatory Frameworks (2012),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_StateRegulatoryFrame_0712.pdf (summarizes decoupling
and
lost revenue recovery policies in a number of states).
NARUC, Third Party Provision of Energy Efficiency Programs (2011),
http://www.naruc.org/Publications/SERCAT_Colorado_2010.pdf (a Colorado discussion of alternatives to utility
management of energy efficiency programs).
Nat’l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Decoupling for Electric & Gas Utilities: Frequently Asked Questions, at 10
(Sept. 2007).
RAP, Decoupling vs. Lost Revenues: Regulatory Considerations (1992),
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/5_19decoupling_lost_revs_compariso_RAP.pdf (Lost
Margin Recovery).
RAP, Revenue Regulation and Decoupling (2011), http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/902.

3.2

Performance Incentives

While decoupling attempts to remove the disincentive for utilities to invest in energy efficiency, it
does not incentivize them to do so.162 Energy efficiency still may not appear attractive to utilities
because “while decoupling may make utilities indifferent to fluctuations in sales, it does not necessarily
remove the incentive to make large supply-side investments that benefit shareholders.”163 Even in
those states with state agency-administered or third-party administered programs, top performers have
“specific economic incentives tied to energy savings performance by the entities responsible for
delivering the programs.”164
As a result, PUCs may wish to devise and implement incentive programs to supplement their
decoupling or revenue stabilization programs.165 Alternatively, some states have eschewed decoupling
entirely and have opted to implement performance incentive programs in place of decoupling,
sometimes because performance incentive programs are seen as “easier to accomplish” than decoupling

162

See supra section 3.1.
ACEEE, Lost Margin Recovery, http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/toolkit/utility-programs/lost-marginrecovery (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). These supply-side decisions benefit shareholders because, as noted supra,
ratemaking typically allows a fixed rate of return on capital investments, giving them an advantage over
investments in energy efficiency.
164
MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 21.
165
See RAP, supra note 140, at 12.
163
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programs.166
program.167

As of January 2011, at least 18 states have implemented some sort of incentive

State PUCs with utility-administered programs have come up with a large variety of individualized
incentive programs. Generally though, these programs can be placed into one of three categories:
Performance Targets, Shared Benefits, and Rate of Return.168 Currently, five states have performance
target incentive programs169; at least twelve states are engaged in a shared benefit incentive program170;
and at least one state has a rate of return program.171
Performance targets are the simplest type of incentive program. Programs in this category seek to
incentivize utilities by measuring them against certain energy efficiency metrics and by offering them
payment of a percentage of the project budget based on performance.172 A common metric is a
percentage energy savings target.173 Alternate design options include metrics for “installation of eligible
equipment” or “market share achieved for certain products.”174 In addition to a target, a floor and
ceiling are often placed on the benefits so that a utility that fails to reach the floor will not receive
benefits and a utility that exceeds the ceiling cannot be paid more benefits. Falling below the floor can
also result in penalties. A prototypical performance target program can be seen in Rhode Island’s
performance incentives scheme approved for Narragansett Company.175 This program included five
performance-based metrics and a kWh savings target for each sector.176 For each performance-based
metric, the utility could earn up to $15,000 for achieving the stated goal in full. For meeting an overall
kWh savings target, the utility could earn 4.4% of total program expenditures, or approximately
$600,000.177

166

See MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY, ALIGNING UTILITY INTERESTS WITH ENERGY
EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES: A REVIEW OF RECENT EFFORTS AT DECOUPLING AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 9 (2006). See also STEVE
KIHM, ENERGY CENTER OF WISCONSIN, WHEN REVENUE DECOUPLING WILL WORK… AND WHEN IT WON’T (2009) (a more detailed
analysis on why a utility might use a performance incentive rather than a decoupling mechanism).
167
See SARA HAYES ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY, CARROTS FOR UTILITIES: PROVIDING FINANCIAL
RETURNS FOR UTILITY INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 5 (2011).
168
See id.
169
These states include Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Washington. See id.
170
These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington. See id at 12.
171
Wisconsin reportedly has a rate of return program in place for one of its electric utilities, which allows the
company to earn the same rate-of-return for energy efficiency investments as it earns on other capital
investments. See State Energy Efficiency Policy Database: Wisconsin, ACEEE, http://www.aceee.org/sector/statepolicy/wisconsin (last visited August 28, 2012).
172
See U.S. EPA, supra note 150, at ES-4, 6-3 to 4.
173
See id.
174
See id. at 6-12 n.1.
175
See R.I. Public Serv. Comm’n, , In re: The Narragansett Electric Company, Demand Side Management Programs
for 2005, No. 3635, Report and Order, at 6 (Sept. 20, 2004).
176
See id.
177
Id. at 8.
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Shared Benefit programs are designed to allow shareholders to reap some of the net benefits of energy
efficiency programs.178 Like performance targets, these programs often scale up rewards to utilities
based on how close to, or far above, an established savings target the utility gets.179 The key difference
between shared benefit and performance target programs, though, is that in shared benefits programs,
the amount of money a utility receives is calculated as a percentage of total net benefits to consumers
derived from the energy efficiency investments.180 Typically, net benefits are measured by comparing
program spending to the avoided cost of supply-side investments.181 This design places added incentive
on a utility to make sure its programs deliver maximum possible benefits. As an example, Minnesota’s
PUC allows recovery of certain percentages of net benefits depending on the percentage of a kWh goal
achieved: if a utility meets 90% of its kWh goal, it gets 0% of net benefits; at 100%, it receives .84%, and
at 150%, it receives 5% of total net benefits.182 Another design option is to include penalties as well as
rewards. California’s shared benefit program provides increasing percentages of net benefit awards to
utilities that achieve greater than 85% of their goals (including additional incentives for exceeding 100%
of the goals), but penalizes utilities that fall below 65% of their goal or whose programs result in any
negative net benefits.183 A recent discussion paper by Resources for the Future suggested that only
those schemes that include penalties for failure to comply are truly “policies,” as targets set in the other
programs are de facto really just “aspirational goal[s].”184
Rate of Return (ROR) programs allow utilities to earn an increased rate of return on equity for
capitalized energy efficiency costs.185 This increased rate of return ideally makes investments in energy
efficiency look more attractive than investments in other capital projects (e.g., power plants or
additional transmission lines). While ROR programs were popular in the 1980s, they have fallen out of
favor.186 The main problem is that they require utilities to capitalize energy efficiency program costs,
which is unappealing to utilities for several reasons.187 Most importantly, capitalization treats energy
efficiency costs as capital outlays rather than expenses.188 This means that utilities may not be able to
recover their costs until far in the future, increasing the risk of non-recovery.189 From the regulator’s
perspective, capitalization is often not preferred because it does not tie spending to program
178

See U.S. EPA, supra note 150, at ES-4, 6-4.
See id.
180
See id.
181
Id. at 6-5. The way that avoided costs are calculated is extremely important in determining the costeffectiveness of energy efficiency, and can be the subject of substantial debate. Id. at 6-12; see also supra section
2.1.
182
See id. at 6-5, 6-6; see also PHYLLIS A. REHA, THE MINNESOTA APPROACH 2, available at
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/5_19MN_DSM_Incentives_Reha.pdf. See generally, MINN.
STAT. § 216B.16 (2011).
183
See U.S. EPA, supra note 150, at 6-7.
184
TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN & KAREN PALMER, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: ECONOMICS AND POLICY 2 (Resources for
the Future Discussion Paper 12-10, Feb. 2012).
185
See U.S. EPA, supra note 150, at ES-4, 6-11.
186
See id. at 6-11.
187
See id. at 4-8.
188
See id.
189
See id.
179
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performance; unlike performance targets, utilities are not rewarded if they achieve higher levels of
efficiency.190 It is likely because of these concerns that states have, by and large, moved away from
utilizing rate of return programs.191
It is somewhat difficult to measure the exact role that incentive programs have had in incentivizing
utilities to pursue energy efficiency. Because energy use is dependent on a wide variety of factors,
including changing fuel prices, fluctuations in the weather, and changes in economic conditions, it is
difficult to attribute energy savings to a particular incentive program.192 Despite this difficulty, some
studies indicate, via survey, that incentive programs do in fact influence utility planning and help level
the playing field between energy efficiency and investment in new capacity.193

PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about performance incentives may find the following more detailed resources helpful:
Reports
Jiyong Eom and James Sweeny. Precourt Energy Efficiency Center. Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Delivered Energy Efficiency
Programs in California. Stanford University (2009), http://www.stanford.edu/group/peec/cgibin/docs/modeling/research/Shareholder%20Incentives%20for%20UtilityDelivered%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Programs%20in%20California.pdf.
EPA, Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Efficiency (2007),
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf (includes several case studies).
Franks et al, ACEEE. Seeking Consistency in Performance Incentives for Utility Energy Efficiency Programs. ACEEE Summer Study on
Energy Efficiency in Buildings (2010), http://eec.ucdavis.edu/ACEEE/2010/data/papers/2052.pdf.
Hayes, et al., ACEEE, Carrots for Utilities: Providing Financial Returns for Utility Investments in Energy Efficiency,
http://ecorebates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ACEEE-2011-Report-on-IOU-Spending-on-Energy-Eff7.pdf.
IEE, Performance Incentives for Energy Efficiency Programs by State (May 2009),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/issueBriefs/IncentiveMechanisms_0509.pdf.
Martin Kushler, ACEEE, Aligning Utility Interests with Energy Efficiency Objectives: A Review of Recent Efforts at Decoupling and
Performance Incentives (includes a survey of 18 state performance incentive programs).
Steve Kihm, Energy Center of Wisconsin, When Revenue Decoupling Will Work . . . and When It Won’t (2009),
http://www.ecw.org/ecwresults/kihmdecouplingarticle2009.pdf (a somewhat technical analysis of when decoupling may
not work and thus when it may be wise to use a performance incentive instead).
Websites
ACEEE. “Incentivizing Utility-Led Efficiency Programs: Performance Incentives,” http://aceee.org/sector/statepolicy/toolkit/utility-programs/performance-incentives
DOE, IREC. “Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency,” http://www.dsireusa.org/

190

See id.
For example, Nevada moved in 2011 from a program allowing its utilities to earn an extra 5% return on equity
for approved demand-side management costs, to a lost revenue recovery model, under the authority of a 2009
law. See Nev. S.B. No. 358, § 11.3 (2009).
192
See HAYES ET AL., CARROTS FOR UTILITIES, supra note 167, at 13.
193
See id.
191
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4. INCREASING CONSUMER PARTICIPATION: ON-BILL FINANCING
A recurring issue that has plagued the energy efficiency policy community for some time is how to
increase consumer participation in energy efficiency programs. Generally, this question is one for utility
and third-party administrators, as PUCs typically do not select particular program designs themselves,
but rather limit their role to one of approval or disapproval of proposed programs. Outside of the PUC
realm, many innovative financing tools are helping to boost participation: energy service companies are
providing improvements backed by private financing, community banks and credit unions are offering
residential energy efficiency financing, and utility- and government-run programs are helping fill in some
of the remaining market gaps.194 These innovative financing efforts are important but beyond the scope
of this handbook, given the focus here on PUCs. There is one area, however, where PUC activity has
proven important in helping property owners to easily obtain and see the benefit of energy-efficiency
improvements: on-bill financing.
On-bill financing offers a partial solution to the high up-front costs of energy efficiency retrofits by
allowing customers to finance energy efficiency improvements through their utility bills.195 In doing so,
the utility leverages its existing relationship with the customer to provide less expensive financing and
reduces the time and effort that would otherwise be expended to acquire alternative financing.196 By
linking financing to electricity bills, utilities reduce the risk of lending, as electricity bills are usually paid
with priority.197 Additionally, utilities can use the customer’s payment history to accurately measure risk,
opening up financing to customers unable to access other forms of credit.198 While the threat of
disconnecting the customer’s power for failing to pay for the energy efficiency improvements is
unappealing,199 energy savings from the improvements are often greater than the associated monthly
charges.200 Some programs even cap the monthly charges at the estimated energy savings, attracting
more consumer participation, but in doing so increasing the risk to lenders.

194

KAREN PALMER ET AL., BORROWING TO SAVE ENERGY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY-EFFICIENCY FINANCING PROGRAMS 1-2
(Resources For the Future April 2012). One particularly promising public model is Property Assessed Clean Energy
(PACE), wherein cities or counties establish energy financing districts that loan money to homeowners, who repay
the loans through assessment on property tax bills. See id. at 15.
195
CATHERINE BELL ET AL., ON-BILL FINANCING FOR ENERGY EFFICACY IMPROVEMENTS: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES, AND BEST PRACTICES (ACEEE Report No. E1118, 2011), available at
http://www.aceee.org/node/3078?id=4491.
196
Id. at 1.
197
Byrd D. J. & R.S. Cohen, A Roadmap to Energy Efficiency Loan Financing, Memorandum from Progressive
Energy Group to U.S. Department of Energy, (Apr. 29, 2011) In a survey of 19 programs, the default rate was less
than two percent, except for Southern California Edison’s program which carried a 6.8 default rate, primarily
attributable to a deterioration in business in the area. BELL, supra note 195, at 11.
198
BELL, supra note 195, at 1-2.
199
Midwest Energy’s How$mart Program initially confronted such concerns. However, the program required the
charge to be less than the energy savings, dispelling these concerns. Id. at 14.
200
Id. at 1. Energy savings may not be greater than the associated monthly charge if a short payback period for the
loan is selected but the savings accrue over a longer time period.
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As shown in Figure 4, at least 20 states now require or encourage their utilities to implement onon
201
bill financing programs. In many of these states (Illinois, Hawaii, Oregon, California, Kentucky, Georgia,
South Carolina, Michigan, and New York),202 the authorization for on-bill
bill financing came from the
legislature. However, some PUCs have independently taken action to explore the possibility of on-bill
on
203
financing.

Figure 4: States with On-bill
bill Financing204

PUCs first initiated on-bill
bill financing in 1993 by encouraging partnerships between utilities and
third-party
party energy efficiency administrators.205 Since then, PUCs have taken a more active role, ranging
from mandating the availability of on
on-bill
bill financing, authorizing the use of ratepayers’ funds for lending,
and establishing collaborative groups to further develop programs, to granting EERS credits to utilities
that implement programs. These various policy options are explained in more detail below. One final
point worth making up front: when implementing on
on-bill
bill financing, it is important to ensure that
participants are provided clear and up
up-frontt material on the risks and obligations of participating,
including, in some states, the existence
ence of a junior mortgage lien
lien.
201

Id. at 2-3.
Id.
203
Id. One reason that on-bill
bill financing has grown in popularity is that PACE programs, discussed supra note XXX,
have encountered some legal difficulties. See James M. Van Nostrand, Legal Issues in Financing Energy Efficiency:
Creative Solutions for Funding the Initial Capital Costs of Investments in Energy Efficiency Measures,
Measures WINTER 2011 J.
OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 2-9. On-bill
bill financing offers an alternative co
conceptual
nceptual model to PACE financing that is similarly
capable of allowing energy efficiency costs to be tied to a particular property and paid off over time through
associated savings. Id. at 10.
204
Reprinted with permission from © 2011 American Council for aan Energy Efficient Economy, BELL ET AL., supra
note 195, at 2.
205
Id. at 2-3; Merrian Fuller et. al., Driving Demand for Home Energy Improvements
Improvements, att 12 (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l
Laboratory 2010), available at http://drivingdemand.lbl.gov/reports/lbnl
http://drivingdemand.lbl.gov/reports/lbnl-3960e-nlrp.pdf/.
202
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Mandating or approving on-bill financing: Several PUCs have mandated that utilities offer on-bill
financing programs.206 In most cases, state legislation provides the authorization for these mandates.
But even where legislators have yet to take such action, PUCs may approve utility tariffs providing for
on-bill financing.207 Additionally, many PUCs authorize the use of ratepayer funds to capitalize these
programs (often funding them from the general energy efficiency funds discussed infra section 2). For
example, the California PUC approved using $40 million of ratepayer funds to capitalize utilities on-bill
financing programs for 2010 through 2012.208
Establishing collaborative groups to further develop programs: PUCs are ideally positioned to convene
utilities, consumer advocates, and community organizations to facilitate conversations on how to design
a balanced on-bill financing program.209 These discussions can identify barriers and also attract new
sources of capital. At least one PUC has created a special task force to congregate financial institutions,
building owners and operators, real estate developers, local governments, and utilities to explore
partnerships to expand on-bill financing programs.210
Granting EERS credits to utilities that implement programs: PUCs can also incentivize utilities to
develop on-bill financing programs by extending Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) Credits to
utilities that implement such programs.211 As discussed supra section 1, an EERS sets long-term energy
efficiency targets and typically requires a yearly percentage reduction in energy consumption from
efficiency measures.
Modifying billing systems: Despite the potential of on-bill financing, many utilities’ billing systems are
not able to handle the more complex charges that on-bill financing requires. PUCs can alleviate this
hurdle by ensuring recovery of the costs of updating utility information and billing systems or even
providing seed money for the improvements. PUCs have authorized the use of ratepayer funds for
recovery of these expenditures. 212 Other programs have set up funds specifically for this purpose, and

206

For example, in 2008, the California PUC directed utilities to create or continue on-bill financing pilot programs
for small commercial customers, to propose on-bill financing for institutional customers, and to investigate
programs for other sectors such as residential customers. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Dec. No. 08-10-032.
207
For example, the Kentucky Public Service Commission, in Case Number 2010-0089, approved on-bill financing
for energy efficiency improvements.
208
BELL, supra note 195. Some states supplement ratepayer funds with funds from other sources: for instance,
capital for New York on-bill financing program comes from ratepayer funds as well as proceeds from the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative auction. Id.
209
Id. at 25.
210
See Cal. PUC, Decision No. 08-09-040, Adopting the California Long-term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan,
Rulemaking No. 08-07-011 (decided Sept. 18, 2008).
211
BELL, supra note 195, at 25. In the New York on-bill financing program, utilities receive credit toward mandated
energy efficiency goals, which are tied to incentive payments from New York System Benefit Funds. Id. at 12.
212
The California PUC permitted utilities to use ratepayer funds to cover the overhead costs of the on-bill financing
which have already been expended. See Cal. PUC, Dec. No. 09-09-047, Approving 2010 to 2012 Energy Efficiency
Portfolios and Budgets, A. 08-07-021, at 286-87 (Oct. 1, 2009). However, the PUC opined that future expenditures
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some even provide utilities with additional compensation based on a percentage of the value of loans
extended.213 These types of programs defray the costs of updating billing systems and encourage
utilities to establish active financing programs.
Effectiveness of On-Bill Financing
Although intended as a method of driving up participation in energy efficiency programs,
participation in on-bill financing programs has, to date, remained low. In more than half of the
programs, participation was below 0.5% of customers in the targeted market.214 The low participation
rates may be the result of a lack of awareness about the program or the potential benefits of energy
efficiency improvements, the inability to find contractors, or a lack of capital necessary to expand the
program.215 Hopefully, rates of participation will rise as word of the programs and their successes
spreads.

ON-BILL FINANCING: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about on-bill financing may find the following more detailed resources helpful:
Reports
Center for Energy and Public Policy, Columbia University SIPA. “On-Bill Financing” for Energy Efficiency (2009),
http://energy.sipa.columbia.edu/researchprograms/urbanenergy/documents/On%20bill%20Financing%20FINAL.pdf
CATHERINE BELL ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, ON-BILL FINANCING FOR ENERGY EFFICACY IMPROVEMENTS: A REVIEW
OF CURRENT PROGRAM CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND BEST PRACTICES, REPORT E1118 (2011).
MATTHEW BROWN, ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, PAYING FOR ENERGY UPGRADES THROUGH UTILITY BILLS: BRIEF #3: STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES:
OPTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2010), available at http://ase.org/resources.
MATTHEW BROWN, ON-BILL FINANCING: HELPING SMALL BUSINESS REDUCE EMISSIONS AND ENERGY USE WHILE IMPROVING PROFITABILITY,
(Nat’l Small Bus. Assoc. 2009). http://www.nsba.biz/docs/09OBFNSBA.pdf
HAYES ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY- EFFICIENT ECONOMY, CARROTS FOR UTILITIES: PROVIDING FINANCIAL RETURNS FOR UTILITY
INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY (2011).
MERRIAN FULLER ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES DIVISION LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, DRIVING DEMAND FOR HOME
ENERGY IMPROVEMENTS (2010), available at http://drivingdemand.lbl.gov/reports/lbnl-3960e-nlrp.pdf/.
State of New York Public Service Commission, Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard Working Group VI – On-Bill Financing Final
Report (2008), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/obf/WGVI-On_Bill_Financing_Final_Report.pdf
Websites
U.S. DOE, EERE. “On-Bill Repayment Programs,”
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/financialproducts/onbillrepayment.html

would not be approved, and expected that future system improvements would be amortized over the larger value
of future loans. Id. at 287.
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The administrator of New York’s on-bill financing program, New York State Energy Research and Development
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5. LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS
Many states have long had in place energy efficiency programs devoted to serving low-income
residents. Some of these programs are mandated by statute; others are created through a PUC
initiative.216 These programs have the dual aims of improving energy affordability and increasing energy
efficiency penetration in the state.217 Often, a state’s low-income energy efficiency program works in
tandem with a rate affordability program that focuses exclusively on making energy more affordable for
low-income residents, though the degree to which these programs are integrated varies.218
Low-income energy efficiency programs are typically targeted towards customers that are below a
set income level, often 150% of the poverty level.219 Targets for programs can be set in a variety of
ways: some PUCs set goals for the number of households to be served or the total amount to be spent,
while others do not cap the number of potential participants.220 Similarly, some states set a limit on
spending per household, while others do not.221 Utilities are most often tasked with program
administration, but independent third-party administrators or government agencies are also sometimes
selected to run low-income energy efficiency programs.222
The funding for low-income programs is collected from ratepayers, though not all ratepayers
necessarily contribute equally. Some states only collect funding from the residential customer class;
others collect low-income program funding across all customer classes.223 Spending levels vary
drastically: at the high end, California spends around $300 million annually.224 A 2007 survey of state
programs found that most spent considerably less, ranging from around $1 million to $16 million.225
Funding from the federal government under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
at least temporarily increased state spending substantially—ARRA provided $5 billion in weatherization
funding for states to increase the size and scope of their programs.226 One other important decision
216

See APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR STUDY AND EVALUATION, EVALUATING LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY
PROGRAMS 99 (2011) [hereinafter APPRISE].
217
See id. at 49-50. These programs also serve an important role in helping offset what otherwise can be a
perverse outcome of energy efficiency policies: although a robust set of energy efficiency programs overall causes
electricity bills to drop, the greatest benefits accrue to the people who can afford to take measures to invest in
energy efficiency in their own homes and thereby lower their energy consumption (public/utility financing often
covers a portion but not the entirety of the cost of energy efficiency measures). See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
EFFICIENCY WORKS 22 (Sept. 2010). Low-income energy efficiency programs help to ensure that the overall net
societal benefit of energy efficiency is better distributed so that the poorest do not end up bearing more costs than
they reap in home improvements. Id.
218
See APPRISE, supra note 216, at 51.
219
Id. at 102.
220
Id. at 44, 100.
221
Id. at 100.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 43-44.
224
Economic Opportunities Studies, California’s Low-Income Energy Efficiency Program 7, available at
http://www.opportunitystudies.org/repository/File/weatherization/CA_LIEE.pdf.
225
See APPRISE, supra note 216, at 100.
226
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Weatherization and Intergovernmental Program,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/wap.html (last visited April 9, 2012).
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that must be made in designing a program is whether to target customers with the highest usage.
Because these customers provide greater opportunities for savings, programs targeting them typically
have more cost-effective service delivery.227 But targeting only high-use customers may mean that
some who most need assistance fail to get it.
State programs also differ in the types of services offered to low-income customers. The most
common services are weatherization (including attic insulation, caulking, weather stripping, low-flow
showerheads, water heater blankets, and door and building envelope repairs), energy education, and
energy-efficient appliance upgrades.228 These upgrades have important positive impacts first and
foremost for participating low-income homeowners and renters who enjoy reduced energy bills and
higher levels of home comfort. But the “co-benefits” of these low-income energy efficiency programs
reach beyond their participants and include reduced emissions, improved health, job creation, local
spending, and higher property values.229

LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about low-income energy efficiency programs may find the following more detailed resources
helpful:
Reports
Applied Public Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation, Evaluating Low-Income Energy Efficiency Programs (2011),
http://www.appriseinc.org/reports/Evaluating%20Low-Income%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Programs.pdf
Merrian Fuller, Driving Demand for Home Energy Improvements (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Laboratory 2010),
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/lbnl-3960e-ppt.pdf
Grayson Heffner & Nina Campbell, Evaluating the co-benefits of low-income energy-efficiency programs (Int’l Energy Agency
2011), http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/low_income_energy_efficiency.pdf
Dan York, Marty Kushler, and Patti Witte, Meeting Essential Needs: The Results of a National Search for Exemplary Utility-Funded
Low-Income Energy Efficiency Programs (ACEEE 2005), http://www.aceee.org/research-report/u053
Websites
Low-Income Weatherization, http://www.publicpower.org/utility/utility.cfm?ItemNumber=24643
Weatherization Assistance Program Technical Assistance Center, http://www.waptac.org/
HUD summary of CA low-income energy efficiency program, http://www.hud.gov/local/shared/working/r9/cpd/lowincome.pdf
US DOE Weatherization Assistance Program, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/wap.html
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6. DEMAND RESPONSE
Although demand response and energy efficiency are often lumped together under the general
rubric “demand-side management,” they are in fact separate concepts that serve related but distinct
goals. Whereas energy efficiency policies seek to lower the overall amount of energy consumed by any
given use of electricity, demand response policies aim to reduce consumption specifically during periods
of peak demand. More specifically, “demand response is a resource that allows end-use electric
customers to reduce their electricity usage in a given time period, or shift that usage to another time
period, in response to a price signal, a financial incentive, an environmental condition or a reliability
signal.”230
The precise relationship between demand response and overall energy usage is a matter of some
debate: although demand response clearly cuts energy usage during peak times, it does not clearly
create net energy savings. While customers may eliminate some energy-consuming activities
altogether, they may alternatively choose to simply shift energy usage to off-peak times or even
increase energy usage during off-peak times to compensate for decreased electricity consumption
during a period of peak demand.231 Nevertheless, demand response’s focus on cutting peak energy has
significant system and environmental benefits. By lowering high-priced peak energy usage and
offsetting the need for new power plants and associated transmission facilities, demand response
lowers electricity rates and increases grid reliability. It also helps markets function more efficiently and
moderates the potential for market power abuse.232 Demand response can reduce carbon emissions by
reducing the need for additional peak generation units.233 And it has tremendous potential to support
large-scale integration of renewable generation by giving grid administrators an additional resource that
can be called upon to respond to periods of variability in renewables’ output.234 Because of demand
response’s importance in addressing many of the same environmental and system reliability concerns as
energy efficiency, this handbook includes the following section on some of the key policy tools that PUCs
have to promote demand response alongside energy efficiency.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and PUCs across the country have taken a variety
of actions to encourage demand response. Given its focus, this handbook will highlight only PUC
actions, but demand response—much more so than energy efficiency—is an area of shared
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See Cal. PUC, Demand Response, at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Demand+Response/ (last visited
March 16, 2012).
231
See MIT, supra note 27, at 147 (“Some conservation may occur through demand response, as when usage at
peak periods is eliminated rather than shifted . . . . But some peak use, such as clothes drying, may simply be
rescheduled, and lower off-peak prices associated with many dynamic pricing structures may further increase offpeak usage. Whether the direct net effect of demand response is to reduce or increase overall consumption is
ultimately an empirical question, and there is considerable uncertainty in estimates of the likely net impact.”)
232
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, EMPOWERING CUSTOMER CHOICE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS 17 (Oct. 2011).
233
Id. at 18.
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Id.; see also MIT, supra note 27, at 67.
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law

46

Public Utility Commissions and Energy Efficiency

responsibility among the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), independent system operators
and regional transmission organizations (ISOs and RTOs), and state policy-makers.235
Regulated utilities have long been players in demand response. As early as the late 1980s, certain
utilities implemented “peak shaving” programs, most commonly in the form of residential air
conditioning cycling programs that allowed the utility to use “a radio frequency switch to shut off
participating consumers’ air conditioning units for some portion of each hour during extended peak
periods,” usually in exchange for a monthly flat fee.236 Since this time, the range of demand response
programs run by utilities has expanded, although most attention has shifted from the residential arena
to the industrial and commercial arenas.
As the value of demand response becomes more apparent and new technologies promise to open
markets to new participants, PUCs are engaging more on the question of what the next generation of
demand response policies should be. In recent years, PUCs in many, if not a majority of states, have
implemented proceedings and policies to examine and augment utilities’ demand response programs
and to determine how to “eliminate regulatory barriers to improved participation in demand
response.”237 This recent upsurge in PUC consideration of demand response policies has been driven at
least in part by a requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that PUCs consider whether to adopt
dynamic pricing, load management techniques, energy efficiency policies, and demand response.238
The variety of ways that states have responded to this requirement, and gone beyond it, showcases the
potential policy drivers PUCs have to promote demand response.

6.1

Mandates & Planning Requirements

One way PUCs can drive demand response participation is to include specific demand response
requirements within an EERS, or as a separate mandate imposed on utilities.239 For example,
Pennsylvania’s Act 129, passed in 2008, calls for a three percent reduction in overall electricity
consumption by 2013 coupled with a 4.5 percent reduction in peak demand, with an additional
requirement that 70% of this reduction in peak come from the residential sector.240 This mandate has
reportedly driven a robust market for demand response service providers, who are contracting with
utilities to help them meet these goals. As an alternative demand response policy model, many states
set utility-by-utility demand response targets (and many combine these two models, setting an overall
state target that is then translated into utility-specific targets by the PUC).241 For example, Colorado’s
235

See Hon. John Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: The Second
Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L. J. 389, 412 (2007) (discussing the jurisdictional overlap
that exists between state regulators and FERC on demand response). ISOs/RTOs have primary jurisdiction over the
rules governing demand response’s participation in wholesale electricity markets.
236
Id. at 394.
237
Id. at 418 (quoting a Minnesota PUC Commissioner’s remarks).
238
See 16 U.S.C. § 2621.
239
For a description of EEPS policies, see supra section 1.
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See PA Act 129 of 2008, HB 2200 (2008).
241
For example, the Maryland Commission reportedly translated the statewide goal of a 15% reduction in peak
demand by 2015 into individual utility-specific reduction targets. It then initiated separate proceedings to consider
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PUC sets peak demand reduction goals for each IOU, which the legislature requires to be “at least five
percent of the utility's retail system peak demand measured in megawatts in the base year.”242 Nevada
has chosen another inventive method of motivating demand response initiatives as part of its EERS: it
awards a “peak-demand multiplier” that “allows savings from efficiency measures that also reduce peak
demand to receive twice the number of credits they would otherwise.”243
Along with increasing mandates for demand response, many PUCs also allow cost recovery for
demand response investments.244 Without cost recovery, utilities are likely to be reluctant to invest
heavily in new demand response measures. As with energy efficiency, recovery is generally limited to
those investments that are demonstrated to be cost-effective.245
Planning requirements can also force utilities to give demand response a hard look as a resource
option, alongside both energy efficiency and supply-side options. For example, Maryland requires its
IOUs to file long-term procurement plans that examine a variety of scenarios representing a range of
potential resources, including demand response (along with “new generation, generation upgrades, . . .
PSC-approved residential energy efficiency programs, potential or proposed commercial and industrial
energy efficiency programs, [and] implementation of a smart grid system and upgrades to the
transmission and distribution system”).246 Similarly, in October 2008, Michigan passed a law requiring
its PUC to set standards for integrated resource plans that include consideration of demand response as
a resource that could “defer, displace, or partially displace” new generation or power purchase
agreements.247

6.2

Rate Design

Another critical component of demand response policy is the issue of how to structure retail rates to
better correspond to wholesale electricity prices—an area where PUCs have considerable control. In
each utility’s demand response plan. See U.S. DEMAND RESPONSE COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE NAT’L COUNCIL ON
ELECTRICITY POLICY, DEMAND RESPONSE AND SMART METERING POLICY ACTIONS SINCE THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005: A SUMMARY
FOR STATE OFFICIALS 33 (2008), available at
http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/Resources/Documents/Final_NCEP_Report_on_DR_and_SM_Policy_A
ctiona_08.12.pdf.
242
Col. Rev. Stat. § 40-3.2-104(2).
243
U.S. DEMAND RESPONSE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, DEMAND RESPONSE & SMART GRID—STATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
POLICY ACTION REVIEW: OCTOBER 2008—MAY 2010 48 (JUNE 2010).
244
See, e.g., N.H. SB 451 (2008); see also Cal. PUC, Demand Response Cost-Effectiveness Protocols, available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Demand+Response/Cost-Effectiveness.htm (2010).
245
As just one example of the type of new demand response program that might be deemed cost effective,
California has been working to develop a cost-effective demand response lighting control technology that would
“be capable of receiving a utility demand reduction signal and transmitting, over the building power lines, a loadshed signal to multiple receiver devices, which are installed at light switches that are deemed ideal to shed lighting
load.” Lighting California’s Future: Cost-Effective Demand Response vii (March 2011), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/CEC-500-2011-014/CEC-500-2011-014.PDF.
246
See Md. Public Serv. Comm’n, Order No. 82195, In the Matter of the Commission’s Investigation of InvestorOwned Electric Companies’ Standard Offer Service for Residential and Small Commercial Customers in Maryland,
Case No. 9117, at 3 (July 2008).
247
Mich. Public Act No. 286 (Oct. 2008).
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the past, demand response has often been targeted towards emergency and reliability events—that is,
demand response resources have been called upon primarily when an emergency situation or a
predicted spike in electricity demand necessitates short-term action to curb some portion of anticipated
peak demand. However, the advent of new advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) that is penetrating
greater market segments allows for wider use of price-based demand response (see infra section 6.3).248
The possibilities for growth in this area are tremendous—the International Energy Agency reports that in
more competitive markets, demand response has the potential to comprise 15% to 20% of peak
demand.249 Increasing customer exposure to real-time pricing will be a “key precondition” to reaching
this potential.250
PUCs have a central role to play in encouraging intelligent pricing structures that shift energy
consumption and flatten demand. One basic pricing tool that PUCs have at their disposal is the use of
strategic block-rate pricing to incentivize reductions in overall electricity consumption. Historically,
many utilities had in place declining block rates that incentivized consumption by making, for example, a
customer’s second 1000 kWh of electricity consumed during a given time period cheaper than its first
1000 kWh. Flipping this incentive structure on its head, through instead creating inclining block rates,
goes some way towards encouraging efficiency by sending customers price signals that communicate
the desirability of moderating electricity usage.251 Under an inclining block rate, the first “block” of
electricity consumed—usually set at some hundreds of kWh—is priced cheaper than the second block,
which in turn is cheaper than the third. Studies indicate that such inclining block rates “might encourage
significant conservation, with long-run reductions in electricity use nearing 20 percent, and customer
bills falling by more than 25 percent.”252 Inclining block rates have the additional advantages of being
cheap and easy to administer and not requiring any advanced metering technologies.253 However, their
effectiveness depends heavily on customers understanding the pricing scheme and being able to see,
through billing statements, how their consumption stacks up against the block rates.254
Inclining block rates may help reduce overall consumption. However, they will not produce true
“demand response” that shifts in response to seasonal, daily, or hourly fluctuations in electricity
demand.255 For this, more sophisticated dynamic pricing tools are necessary. Currently, most retail
electricity rates do not mirror the variation in wholesale prices in deregulated markets or the cost of
production in regulated markets. Rather, retail rates are generally fixed based on an average cost over
the year. However, the quantity of electricity demanded varies significantly throughout the day and
year, and in most regions, peaks in the late- afternoon and in the summer.256 The accompanying costs of

248
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providing peak power skyrocket, as less efficient generators must be called into service.257 A fixed rate
offers no incentives to alter electricity usage in response to the cost of production at that time, leading
to over-consumption during system peaks.
Under a dynamic retail price, customers are incentivized to adjust their consumption of electricity
according to the current price, flattening the consumption curve as they respond to pricing signals. By
shaving peak demand, PUCs can eliminate the need to keep inefficient generators online, reducing
reliability costs and meeting overall power demand at a lower cost. Additionally, dynamic pricing could
reduce the costs of managing supply volatility from variable energy resources, such as wind and solar.258
Although flattening the consumption curve is the principal benefit of dynamic pricing, some reduction in
overall consumption has occurred in some pilots and early programs.259
Currently twelve states have dynamic pricing requirements.260 Legislation has spurred much PUC
action, but at least three PUCs have independently mandated dynamic pricing. Moreover, eighteen
states have taken regulatory action regarding AMI (discussed infra section 5.3),261 and eight states
currently have an AMI deployment plan or requirement.262
“Dynamic Pricing” Defined
The term “dynamic pricing” actually encompasses a wide array of pricing structures. On the most
responsive end of the spectrum, under real-time pricing (RTP) regimes, the price of electricity varies
hourly (or more frequently) in response to the system’s marginal energy costs.263 Retail providers can
sell the power with little (if any) markup, as they do not have to compensate for the risk that their costs
might exceed the price charged. Time-of-use (TOU) tariffs set prices, which change seasonally, for
specific time periods to reflect the historical costs of meeting demand for those hours. The preestablished pricing periods alleviate uncertainty for the consumer, but in exchange, providers must bear
the risk that the price will not compensate for the cost of power and charge a risk premium. An
intermediate pricing structure, critical peak pricing (CPP), utilizes a set price structure but allows
providers, on a day’s notice, to price power higher for several hours when demand is expected to be
extraordinarily high relative to supply.264 While some PUCs have specifically required utilities to offer
257

Less than 1% of annual hours account for 10–18% of capacity needs in North America. Ahmad Fariuqui, Ryan
Hledlik, & John Tsoukalis, The Power of Dynamic Pricing, ELECTRICITY JOURNAL 22:3, 42—56 (2009).
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MIT, supra note 27, at 143-44.
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Customers who face dynamic pricing have reduced their overall consumption by as much as five percent. Chris
King & Dan Delurey, Efficiency and Demand Response: Twins, Sibling, or Cousins?, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Mar.
2006.
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RTP, others encourage any dynamic pricing p
plan,
lan, including TOU or CCP. As shown in Figure 6, TOU
pricing for commercial and industrial customers makes up by far the largest portion of dynamic pricing
in the U.S. right now, with RTP for commercial and industrial customers comprising the second most
popular dynamic pricing option. The remainder of this subsection sets forth the methods that PUCs are
using to promote dynamic pricing.
Figure 5:: National Amount of Energy Enrolled in Dynamic Pricing

Ordering Dynamic Pricing: Some PUCs require dynamic price structures for certain customer classes,
primarily large commercial and industrial users.265 For example, the New York Public Service
Commission mandated RTP for large commercial and industrial customers, who represent about 15% of
total peak demand. Some PUCs hesitate to issue broad orders related to pricing because they have
traditionally regulated rates through individualized rate proceedings. But dynamic pricing policies can
also proceed through this more traditional channel: some PUCs ha
have
ve explicitly identified rate design
proceedings as the appropriate forum to address dynamic pricing while giving broad guidelines to other
utilities by notifying utilities of future tariff expectations.266
PUCs have also employed the less aggressive tactic of requiring utilities to consider dynamic
pricing. In this regard, some PUCs have ordered dynamic pricing’s potential to help meet future demand
to be given comparable consideration to other alternatives for meeting supply needs.267 Other PUCs
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See NY Pub. Serv. Comm’n,, Order Denying Petitions for Rehearing and Clarification in Part and Adopting
Mandatory Hourly Pricing Requirements, Case No. 03
03-E-0641
0641 (April 24, 2006). Somewhat less stringently, the
Arizona Corporation Commission requires each utility to offer a time-based
based rate schedule to appropriate consumer
classes, and also mandates that the utilities report any variation in the utility’s wholesale generation costs
compared to these rates. See SCIENCE INT’L APPLICATION CORP., supra note 260.
266
For instance, in a 2008 rate proceeding for Pacific Gas & Electric, the California PUC set a timetable for the
implementation of mandatory, default, and voluntary dynam
dynamic
ic pricing programs for different customer classes.
Although the decision does not directly affect California’s other investor owned utilities, the ruling makes clear
that similar standards will be employed in other utilities’ future rate proceedings. P
Press
ress Release, Cal. PUC, CPUC
gives customers greater control over their electricity bills with dynamic pricing rates for GG&E (July 31, 2008).
267
See, e.g.,, Arkansas Public Service Commission, Order on Guidelines on Resource Planning for Electric Utilities,
Utilities
Docket No. 06-028-R (2007).
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have required that dynamic pricing be specifically addressed in all utility rate design proceedings.268
While this approach does not ensure dynamic pricing’s implementation, it at least requires utilities to
consider such pricing.
Allowing Dynamic Pricing: PUCs have the potential to act as a barrier instead of a catalyst for dynamic
pricing: because PUCs regulate private utility tariffs, utilities must seek PUC approval before instituting
dynamic pricing. At least nine PUCs in states that do not require dynamic pricing for any customer
classes have approved a dynamic pricing tariff for some customers.269 Approval of such rates is
uncontroversial for large commercial and industrial customers, and some PUCs have approved pilot
programs for residential and small commercial users.270 Controversy often surrounds residential
dynamic pricing programs due to concern that low-income households may be exposed to higher, more
volatile electric bills. For this reason, residential dynamic programs are typically voluntary, opt-in
programs. Some residential pilot programs have resulted in significant reductions of peak consumption
and high customer satisfaction, but the results among pilots have widely varied.271
Ensuring recovery of fixed costs: Because dynamic pricing pilot programs have often resulted in an
overall reduction to electricity consumption, they can result in a utility under-recovering its fixed
costs.272 PUCs have responded to this problem by adjusting rates to reflect the expected decrease in
customer usage.273 Additionally, separating charges for transmission and delivery from generation may
help alleviate this concern.274

6.3

Advanced Metering Policies

Integrally related to the topics of demand response and dynamic pricing is advanced metering.
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a two-way communications network and database system
that provides real-time usage and pricing data to both power providers and customers. Advanced
268

The California PUC ordered all utilities to address dynamic pricing options for all customer classes. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, Decision Closing this Rulemaking and Identifying Future Activities Related to Demand Response,
Dec. No. 05-11-009, Rulemaking 02-06-001 (Nov. 18, 2005).
269
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, STATUS OF SELECTED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT IN AMI AND TIME SENSITIVE RATES (2007).
270
Before the current mandates, California Public Utilities Commission implemented the first comprehensive
dynamic pricing test, which involved 2,500 residential and small commercial and industrial customers. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, Interim Opinion in Phase 1 Adopting Pilot Program for Residential and Small Commercial
Customers, Dec. No. 03-03-036, Rulemaking 02-06-002 (March 13, 2003). In Pennsylvania, PECO Energy filed a
petition for approval of a dynamic pricing pilot program, and in December 2010 the PAPUC approved the voluntary
time-of-use rate program. PA Pub. Util. Comm’n, PPL Electric Utilities Corporation Supplement No. 94 To Tariff
Electric – Pa. P.U.C. No. 201 – Time-of-Use Rates, Docket No. R-2010-2201138 (Dec. 2, 2010). Many other PUC
have approved similar pilot programs.
271
MIT, supra note 27, at 158-59; Ahmad Faruqui & Jennifer Palmer, Brattle Group, Dynamic Pricing and its
Discontents, CATO REGULATION, at 16, 21 (Fall 2011).
272
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING MARKETS 26 (Edison Electrical Institute
2007).
273
2008 Regulators Forum, Marsha Smith, Commissioner of Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 146 No. 11 Pub.
Util. Fort. 32 (discussing Idaho’s three-year pilot program initiated in 2007).
274
PUC activities in encouraging decoupling are discussed supra section 3.1.
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“smart” meters, which record and transmit real-time energy usage, are one important component of
AMI. Potential advantages of these meters include reduced meter reads and associated costs, increased
meter accuracy, better tracking of outages and faster restoration of service, and the ability to
implement new technologies such as smart thermostats and other appliances that respond to price
signals automatically, saving consumers money and electricity.275
Aside from those programs that allow utilities to directly control customers’ load at certain times via
remote technology, most demand response relies on being able to measure an appreciable drop in
energy consumption by a consumer during a peak period. For this reason, participation in demand
response is mostly limited to those customers who have meters that are capable of measuring and
reporting energy use in one-hour intervals or less.276 Similarly, RTP and CPP require an ability to
measure energy usage at various times of day. However, as more advanced meters are installed for
residential customers, these customers’ ability to participate in demand response programs—including
dynamic pricing programs—and reap the attendant energy and cost savings will increase. The most
recent FERC survey of advanced meters, from 2009, indicated an advanced meter penetration rate of
8.7 percent, though this number has certainly gone up in the years since.277 The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided considerable sums for additional installations, which should result in
an additional 15.5 million meters.278 In total, 65 million advanced meters are expected to be deployed
across the U.S. by 2015.279
There are several steps that PUCs can take to promote the penetration of advanced metering.
However, here more than in energy efficiency there has been considerable consumer pushback against
some PUC efforts. Steps that PUCs can take, along with some of the resistance that has been
encountered, are described below.
Planning: Several PUCs have developed “smart grid” implementation plans.280 In doing so, PUCs have
established an independent collaborative group to consider the view of all stakeholders.281 These plans
review the full range of implementation issues in an attempt to maximize results at the lowest customer

275

See, Electric Power Research Institute, Advanced Metering Infrastructure Information Sheet, available at
http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20070423091846-EPRI%20-%20Advanced%20Metering.pdf; NAT’L ENERGY
TECH. LAB., ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.netl.doe.gov/smartgrid/referenceshelf/whitepapers/AMI%20White%20paper%20final%20021108%20
(2)%20APPROVED_2008_02_12.pdf.
276
See Cal. PUC, Demand Response, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Demand+Response/ (last visited March
16, 2012).
277
FERC, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING STAFF REPORT 2 (Nov. 2011).
278
Id. at 3.
279
Id.
280
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE Ch. 4. SB 17 required the California PUC to develop a comprehensive plan.
The Illinois Commerce Commission acted on its own initiative in its Order in Docket No. 07-0566 to develop a
collaborative group to encourage the deployment of smart meters.
281
The Illinois Commerce Commission established the Illinois Statewide Smart Grid Collaborative in September
2008 by its Order in Docket No. 07-0566.
Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law

53

Public Utility Commissions and Energy Efficiency

costs.282 Such plans are especially beneficial when they consider and try to ensure the compatibility and
longevity of AMI investment decisions, given that such investments run some risk of obsolescence
during this time of rapid smart-grid technology development.
AMI mandates: After investigating opportunities to cost effectively install smart meters, some PUCs
have mandated that utilities develop plans for deploying smart meters and dynamic pricing.283 Other
PUCs have delegated the investigatory responsibility to the utilities, requiring utilities to examine the
feasibility and cost effectiveness of implementing AMI, and depending on the outcome of the study,
deploy the technology.284 Another option is to require utilities to supply AMI to customers that request
them.285 Or, in an effort to incentivize dynamic pricing, utilities can be required to give AMIs specifically
to those customers that elect an optional RTP plan. For example, Illinois legislation requires that a utility
servicing at least 100,000 customers file a tariff allowing residential customers to elect real-time pricing.
Utilities are entitled to recover incurred costs in implementing real-time pricing, but such costs must be
recovered against the entire customer base, not just those electing dynamic pricing.286 At the opposite
end of the spectrum, some PUCs are considering an opt-out policy, in which customers must pay a fee to
decline installation of a smart meter.287 Figure 6 shows the distribution of states that have adopted AMI
plans and requirements or that had AMI requirements pending as of late 2011.

282

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE Ch. 4.
See, e.g., Vermont Energy Efficiency and Affordability Act of 2008 (H 520). Although Vermont’s PUC did not
institute the policy, it serves a critical role in its implementation. Other PUCs could independently set up such a
system.
284
AZ Corp. Comm’n, Decision No. 70696 (2007); US DEMAND RESPONSE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 241.
Vermont’s Energy Efficiency and Affordability Act of 2008 (H 520) directs Vermont’s Public Service Board to
“investigate opportunities for Vermont electric utilities cost-effectively to install advanced ‘smart’ metering
equipment capable of sending two-way signals and sufficient to support advanced time-of-use pricing during
periods of critical peaks or hourly differentiated time-of-use pricing.” Id. § 7. After an investigation, the Board
must require each utility to file plans for deploying smart meters and TOU pricing, provided that the utility serves a
territory where such a deployment is “appropriate and cost-effective.” Id.
285
For example, in August 2007, the South Carolina Public Service Commission directed all utilities to make smart
meters available to all customers. Order No. 2007-618.
286
2005 Ill. Laws 977 (amending 220 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16-101A, 16-102, 16-107).
287
The Vermont Public Service Board has a schedule for adopting the Vermont Department of Public Service’s
recommendations for opt-out smart metering. Docket No. 73707 (2012).
283
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Figure 6:: Advanced Metering Legislation & Regulation288

Rate Recovery: Advance metering deployment costs remain relatively high for small volume
commercial and residential customers,289 deterring utilities from developing smart metering programs.
Some PUCs have approved recovery of advanced meter installation expenses connected with the
implementation of a dynamic pricing program.290 California’s PUC, in a monumental step towards
enabling widespread deployment of AMI, approved the business case for advanced metering, allowing
rate recovery independent of dynamic pricing.291 However, not all PUCs have been as receptive to rate
recovery for AMI, even when accompanied by dynamic pricing. The Hawaii and Maryland PUCs have
denied such request, due to the lack of information about cost effectiveness.292

288

U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SMART GRID LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICIES AND CASE STUDIES 2 (2011).
Advanced metering costs for residences averaged $300 per installed meter over the last five year but are
expected to fall to the $150—$250
$250 price range. A. Fariuqui et al, The Costs and benefits of Smart Meters for
Residential Customers,, White Paper (Washington, DC: Edison Foundation Institute for Electrical Efficiency, July
2011). Advanced meters and installation costs for large industrial and commercial customers can range up to
$5,000.
290
See, e.g., D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of the Application of PEPCO for Authority to Establish a Demand
Side Management Surcharge and an Advance Metering Infrastructure Surcharge
Surcharge, 278 P.U.R. 4th 155, 2009 WL
5048995 (Dec. 17, 2009).. The Oklahoma Corporate Commission (OCC) permitted rate recovery for AMI expenses
up to $366 million, but expenses beyond the floor must be shown to be prudently incurred for recovery. OCC also
explicitly provided that certain cost reductions expected to result for the smart Grid deployment were to be
passed-through
through to customers. OCC, Order No. 576595 (2010)
(2010).. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has also
approved smart metering plans for three utilities and allows for rate recovery for installing and operating the
meters and communication technology, educating customers, and implementing a dynamic pricing pilot. Penn.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order on Docket No. M
M-2009-2123950. For a brief description, see Press Release, Penn. PUC,
PUC approves Act 129 Smart Meter Plan for Met
Met-Ed, Penelec, (April 15, 2010), available at
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/General/press_re
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/General/press_releases/Press_Releases.aspx?ShowPR=2496.
291
The California PUC considered advance metering to be cost effective independently of dynamic pricing,
because it improves the operating efficiency of utilities. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Adopting
Dynamic Pricing Timetable and Rate Design Guidance for Pacific Gas & Electric Company, D. 08-07-045,
-07-045, Application
06-03-005 (July 31, 2008).
292
Hawaii PUC rejects Smart Grid Proposal
Proposal, PowerNews, Aug. 4, 2010, available at
http://www.powermag.com/smart_grid/Hawaii
g.com/smart_grid/Hawaii-PUC-Rejects-Smart-Grid-Proposal_2917.html.
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Education: In light of consumer backlash against dynamic pricing and advanced meters in some earlymoving states,293 PUCs should be careful not to rush AMI deployment without first educating customers
on the substantial benefits. A transition to dynamic pricing requires careful planning and education.
Failure to introduce customers to advanced metering and dynamic pricing gradually through education
and price comparison may result in strong and continued customer opposition.294 In approving these
rates and meters, PUCs should take steps to ensure that customers are adequately informed about
potential AMI benefits. In some cases, PUCs have themselves developed customer education plans.295
Other PUCs have taken a less active role, and have delegated the education responsibility to utilities
proposing dynamic pricing and deployment of smart meters. Generally, PUCs permit rate recovery for
expenditures developing and executing such programs.296
Overall, the national trend seems to be cautious advancement on AMI deployment, given some
of the challenges that aggressive AMI rollout programs have faced. There should be considerable room
for transfer of experiences and best practices as states progress further in implementing AMI programs.

293

See, e.g., Stop Smart Meters!, http://stopsmartmeters.org/2011/09/15/utility-and-smart-meter-tech-companyexecutives-get-grilled-by-the-public/ (last visited April 5, 2012).
294
MIT, supra note 27, at 164.
295
The District of Columbia Public Service Committee formed the AMI Task Force to design a detailed customer
education plan to ensure customers are kept informed of how to take advantage of the large scale smart meter
rollout underway by PEPCO. See D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 290.
296
In approving a utility smart meter pilot program, the Oklahoma Corporate Commission required the utility to
educate customers. OCC, Order No. 576595 (2010). Likewise, Pennsylvania PUC included an education requirement
in approving utility pilot programs, and granted rate recovery for the costs of education programs. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission, Order on Docket No. M-2009-2123950. In 2007, the South Carolina Public Service
Commission found a lack of awareness of the “availability and capability” of smart meters. In response, the
commission required utilities to propose a campaign to educate consumers. This requirement was not connected
with a dynamic pricing pilot program. Order No. 2007-618.
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DEMAND RESPONSE, DYNAMIC PRICING, & ADVANCED METERING BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about demand response and related policies may find the following more detailed resources
helpful:
M.H. Albadi, IEEE, Demand Response in Electricity Markets: An Overview (2007).
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., EDISON ELECTRICAL INSTITUTE, RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING MARKETS 26 (2007).
JOHN G. CASSATION ET. AL., MIT, MIT STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID (2011), http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/theelectric-grid-2011.shtml.
Edison Electric Institute, EEI Summary of State Regulatory Smart Grid Decisions (2011),
http://www.eei.org/whatwedo/PublicPolicyAdvocacy/StateRegulation/Documents/EEI_State_SG_Matrix_Update_Aug_2
011.pdf
Karen Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., ADVANCED METERING INITIATIVES AND RESIDENTIAL FEEDBACK PROGRAMS: A META-REVIEW FOR HOUSEHOLD
ELECTRICITY-SAVING OPPORTUNITIES (ACEEE June 2010), http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Metering/AdvancedMetering-Initiatives.pdf
Ahmad Faruqui and Sanem Sergici, The Brattle Group, Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity—A survey of the
experimental evidence (2009),
http://www.science.smith.edu/~jcardell/Readings/uGrid/House%20DemandResp%20Experience.pdf
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Staff Report, Assessment of Demand Response & Advanced Metering Staff Report (Nov.
2011).
BEN FOSTER & SUSAN MAZUR-STOMMEN, RESULTS FROM RECENT REAL-TIME FEEDBACK STUDIES (ACEEE Report No. B122, Feb. 2012).
INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY, THE COSTS & BENEFITS OF SMART METERS FOR RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (July 2011),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_BenefitsofSmartMeters_Final.pdf.
INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY, MOVING TOWARD UTILITY-SCALE DEPLOYMENT OF DYNAMIC PRICING IN MASS MARKETS (June 2009),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/IEE/Documents/IEE_Utility-ScaleDynamicPricing_0609.pdf.
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, STATUS OF SELECTED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT IN AMI AND TIME SENSITIVE RATES (2007).
INGRID ROHMUND ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVABLE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. (2010-2030),
http://eec.ucdavis.edu/ACEEE/2008/data/papers/5_297.pdf
Martha Rowley, Edison Electric Institute, State Regulatory Update: Energy Efficiency (2008),
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/EnergyEfficiency/Documents/state_reg_update_efficiency.pdf
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS IMPLEMENTATION CORPORATION, SMART GRID LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS (2011)
US DEMAND RESPONSE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, DEMAND RESPONSE AND SMART METERING POLICY ACTIONS SINCE THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005: SUMMARY FOR STATE OFFICIALS (2008).
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SMART GRID LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICIES AND CASE STUDIES 2 (2011).
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7. PLANNING
This handbook so far has focused on PUC policies and practices directed specifically at
promoting energy efficiency and demand response. The following several sections move to an
examination of the ways that commissions and advocates can push for energy efficiency to
receive increased attention within traditional PUC activities.
Introduction to the Importance of Planning
Including energy efficiency during the process of resource planning is crucial to the efficient use of
energy resources. Resource planning allows policymakers, PUCs, and utilities to consider long-term
issues and solutions, make decisions in advance, and create new directions for energy generation and
distribution. Incorporating efficiency into these plans adds another way of meeting energy needs,
through reducing energy requirements. Many experts and organizations have therefore recommended
that efficiency should be heavily considered in energy planning.297 Where they exist, methods of
planning currently differ widely between states. This section will summarize ways that energy efficiency
can be incorporated into planning both in states with regulated energy markets and those with
restructured markets.298 Although legislatures are chiefly responsible for selecting planning options,
PUCs generally have an important role in monitoring and enforcement and are crucial to their success.

7.1

Planning in Regulated Energy Markets

Integrated Resource Planning
The most common form of planning for electricity is integrated resource planning (IRP), which most
regulated states practice in some form.299 An integrated resource plan is “a long-range utility plan for
meeting the forecasted demand for energy within a defined geographic area through a combination of
supply side resources and demand side resources.”300 The plans evaluate resources according to specific
criteria, which can include minimizing the total resource costs.301 Typically, states require electric
utilities, either public or investor-owned, to practice IRP by regularly filing plans with the state energy or
utility commissions.302 From there, commissions can often regulate the utilities’ choices by accepting,
disapproving, or modifying plans.303 States such as Ohio require active involvement by the PUC in
planning, by mandating that utilities file long-range forecasts and estimating long-term energy demands
297

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 120, at 3-1 (2006).
As of September 2010, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have restructured markets. Status of
Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited April 16, 2012).
299
David Nichols, The Role of Regulators: Energy Efficiency, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 297 (2001).
300
STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, USING INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT IN
COST-EFFECTIVE ENERGY EFFICIENCY MEASURES 1 (2011).
301
Nichols, supra note 299, at 297.
302
Regulatory Assistance Project, US States with Integrated Resource Planning or Similar Planning Processes (Dec.
2009), available at www.raponline.org/document/download/id/4447.
303
Sautter, supra note 40, at 37, 39.
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in order to create efficient energy policies and proposals.304 Oregon’s PUC has gone further, using IRP
statutes to deny requests to build coal power plants in those cases where the requesting utility failed to
consider alternatives sufficiently.305 Generally, IRP is considered a “major lever” in developing and
implementing demand-side management, with energy efficiency advocates reportedly having great
success in getting utilities to adopt plans with robust
energy efficiency components.306 PUCs’ role in plan
approval or rejection allows them to have a major
voice in the contents of such plans, though the
For example: Minnesota
degree of control they exercise does vary state to
Minnesota is a state that has a leading role in
state.
Multiple advocacy groups have identified
general best practice standards in the creation of
IRPs. Plans should identify a broad range of options
on both the energy supply side and the demand side
to increase productivity of electricity use.307
Planners should create credible load forecasts using
realistic assumptions, while modeling a broad range
of possible load forecasts to account for variations
and incorporate uncertainty.308
Plans should
account for generation, transmission, distribution,
energy efficiency, and other relevant resources
while considering ranges of possible costs.309 The
process should integrate various perspectives
through public participation techniques that allow
input from general public and other stakeholders.310
Finally, plans should be properly implemented,
continuously monitored and evaluated for their
effectiveness, and flexible enough to adapt to new
situations and required updates.311 These broad
objectives are adopted in various ways across
different states by utilities and regulators.

efficiency and renewable power. Although coal
supplies almost 60 percent of its electricity, 9.4
percent of power comes from wind turbines, one
of the highest among states. The state has
pledged to conserve energy by setting a goal of
reducing retail electric and gas sales by 1.5
percent annually and has empowered its PUC to
ensure that utilities reach this goal. Statute
216B.2422 requires utilities to file a resource plan,
defined as “a set of resource options that a utility
could use to meet the service needs . . . over a
forecast period, including an explanation of the
supply and demand circumstances . . . These
resource options include . . . implementing
customer energy conservation.” The Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission then decides whether
to approve, modify, or reject the plans.
Minnesota requires a 15-year planning
horizon with updates every two years. According
to the Regulatory Assistance Project, the planning
process often results in utilities procuring
efficiency in excess of the amount required. In
2009, Minnesota’s efficiency programs saved
637,845 megawatt-hours (MWh).

304

Id. at 40.
Id.
306
Nichols, supra note 299, at 296-97.
307
USAID, BEST PRACTICES GUIDE: INTEGRATED RESOURCES PLANNING FOR ELECTRICITY 3.
308
STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, supra note 300, at 5.
309
Id. at 6.
310
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ENERGY VISION 2020 2.3 (1995),
http://www.tva.com/environment/reports/energyvision2020/ev2020_vol1ch02.pdf.
311
USAID, supra note 307, at 39–41.
305
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For example: Massachusetts
The Bay State is an example of a relatively
successful restructured state, well regarded for its
efficiency achievements. The state’s goals for
efficiency savings are ambitious: the 2008 Green
Communities Act requires efficiency savings of 2.4
percent per year starting in 2012.
The EPA characterizes the form of energy
savings in Massachusetts as a form of portfolio
management, as the Green Communities Act
attempts to boost alternative and renewable
energy as well as energy efficiency measures
through clean demand side resources. Section 21
of the Act empowers the Department of Public
Utilities (DPU) to ensure that resource needs are
met “through all available energy efficiency and
demand reduction resources that are cost
effective or less expensive than supply.” Every
three years, distribution companies and municipal
aggregators must prepare electric efficiency
investment plans that “provide for the acquisition
of all available energy efficiency and demand
reduction resources that are cost effective or less
expensive than supply.” Plans must include
lifetime assessments for costs and reliability,
amount of demand resources, estimated cost
savings, descriptions of programs, budgets and
incentives, estimated peak load reductions, and
other cost benefit estimates. The plans are then
reviewed on an annual basis with opportunities
for public hearings. The DPU can then accept,
modify, or reject plans based on the adequacy of
the resource analyses. This planning process
appears to have been successful in promoting
efficiency in a deregulated energy market.

7.2
Planning in Restructured
Energy Markets
Alternatives to IRP
Where markets have been restructured and
deregulated, state authorities must plan differently,
as utilities no longer have direct control over
generation. It is possible for PUCs in deregulated
states to require IRP for transmission and
distribution facilities only, as, for example,
Massachusetts has done.312 For states that want to
go further and help influence the generation mix in
their state, another suggested form of planning is the
strategic energy assessment (SEA), which can be
used by either regulated or restructured states.
Under such a model, state agencies and utilities
create scenarios based on detailed analysis of
present and expected energy demands and available
supply sources.313 Unlike with IRP, the authorities
conducting the assessment would not select a plan
for electric generation and investment, as they lack
this authority within a deregulated market.314
However, states could use their authority over
distribution utilities and facility siting to implement
efficiency boosting options.315
Currently only
Wisconsin, a state with regulated energy markets,
employs strategic energy assessment.316 However,
states with restructured markets could adopt SEA for
their energy planning.

312

STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, supra note 300, at 10-11.
Nichols, supra note 299, at 298-99.
314
Id. at 299.
315
Id.
316
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 302.
313
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Another alternative method of planning is to
require utilities to engage in their own energy portfolio
management (PM). Portfolio management requires
utilities to formulate resource plans and procurement
strategies that consider a range of scenarios, including
both supply-side and demand-side options for meeting
projected needs and diversifying fuel sources.317 The
use of PM allows utilities to include efficiency and
renewable energy in their evaluation and evaluate
options based on computer models that account for
various scenarios.318 An ideal portfolio would contain
options for a variety of fuel sources, technologies for
generation and transmission, programs to encourage
customer adoption of efficient measures, and financial
incentives to encourage reduced consumption.319 In
addition, the management process should allow
interested and affected parties to provide input and
information, and provide for assessment for difficulties
in the process that requires adjustments before the
next forecast.320 The Portfolio Management strategy
can be employed in restructured states, with
obligations placed on the default provider in the event
that retail choice is present but not prevalent.321
States that mandate the use of portfolio management
include Montana, Massachusetts, and California.322

For example: California
California—a state with a long track record of
success in promoting energy efficiency—uses
both long-term
planning and portfolio
management for energy planning, and has a
partially restructured energy market. California’s
PUC (CPUC) worked with a number of regulated
IOUs to develop a “Long Term Energy Efficiency
Strategic Plan” in 2008, with the goal of increasing
energy efficiency through 2020 and beyond. The
plan outlines a long-term strategy of integrating
energy efficiency programs into the marketplace
“without ratepayer subsidies or codes and
standards” by creating a “more sustained longterm, market transformation strategic focus.”
Under the plan, California utilities are predicted to
produce electricity savings of up to 7,000 GWh
between 2010 and 2012.
In addition to its long-term plans, California
engages in portfolio management that includes
requirements for both renewable energy and
energy efficiency. As discussed supra section 1.3,
California’s loading order policy requires utilities
to use efficiency resources before turning to other
supply options. The CPUC also has broad power
to approve, modify, or reject the procurement
plans of utilities.

317

SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, A BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS 4–6
(2011).
318
Id. at 7.
319
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY – ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION 6-3 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/resources/action-guide.html.
320
Id. at 6-11.
321
Id. at 6-5.
322
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 302.
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PLANNING BIBLIOGRAPHY
Those who want to know more about planning may find the following more detailed resources helpful:
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US Energy Information Administration, Status of Electricity Restructuring by State,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.
US States with Integrated Resource Planning or Similar Planning Processes, Regulatory Assistance Project (Dec. 2009),
www.raponline.org/document/download/id/4447.
USAID, Best Practices Guide: Integrated Resources Planning for Electricity, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACQ960.pdf.
Vermont Department of Public Service, Comprehensive Energy Plan 2011 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.vtenergyplan.vermont.gov/sites/cep/files/2011%20CEP_Volume%201.pdf.
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8. INCORPORATING ENERGY EFFICIENCY INTO OTHER AREAS OF PUC JURISDICTION
8.1

Siting of Generation and Transmission; Power Purchase Agreements

PUCs often—though not always—have some degree of authority over transmission and
generation facility siting.323 Typically, companies planning new facilities are required to apply for and
obtain from the PUC a “Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,” though in some states these
certificates are issued by separate siting boards. 324 Commissioners evaluate the project to determine,
among other things, whether its proponents have shown a demonstrated need.325
Energy efficiency can play an important role in the consideration of the need for a particular
generation or transmission project. PUCs differ in the amount of rigor that they apply in determining
the need for a project, and some deregulated states now apply a presumption of need on the theory
that if an investor is risking its own capital (rather than ratepayers’ money) on a project, there is little
need for PUC oversight.326 Within the need assessment, some states explicitly require the consideration
of energy efficiency as an alternative to new construction. For example, Florida law requires that in
considering the need for new generation, its PUC must “expressly consider the conservation measures
taken by or reasonably available to the applicant or its members which might mitigate the need for the
proposed plant and other matters within its jurisdiction which it deems relevant.”327 Vermont goes
further, requiring those applying for a “Certificate of Public Good” to meet ten statutory criteria,
including establishing that the project’s demand could not be met more cost effectively by energy
efficiency and that the project “will not have an undue adverse effect on esthetics, historic sites, air and
water purity, the natural environment and the public health and safety . . . .”328
Other states simply instruct the PUC to consider whether the project is in the “public interest”
or some such similar phrasing, leaving the details of this phrase to be worked out in subsequent
decisions.329 But whether or not a statute specifically requires energy efficiency or conservation to be
considered, a PUC’s duty to ensure that a project is necessary or in the public interest provides reason
323

See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public
Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 710 n.15 (2010). Sometimes this
authority is vested in a different state agency, or in a body comprised of representatives of multiple state agencies.
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id. at 721.
326
See David Nichols, The Role of Regulators: Energy Efficiency, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 295 (2001). Applying a
presumption of need can result in useful streamlining of the process if state regulations require a thorough “need”
evaluation to occur in some other context—resource planning, for example. However, it may be the case that
private investors in new generation resources under-consider the possibility that energy efficiency could provide
an alternative solution to load growth, such that applying a presumption of need based on a market justification
may perpetuate the market failures that plague energy efficiency.
327
Fl. Stat. Ann. § 403.519.
328
30 V.S.A. § 248(b).
329
Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the “Public Interest”, 113 W. VA. L. REV.
739, 758-59 (2011).
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enough, standing alone, for it to require serious consideration of energy efficiency as an alternative,
given that energy efficiency investments may often be cheaper and will always be cleaner than new
transmission or generation.330
Advocates can use the process of a project developer or utility applying for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity as an opportunity to ensure that the project’s proponents and the PUC have
adequately considered energy efficiency. For example, several intervenors recently argued to the New
Jersey Board of Public Utilities that a transmission line being proposed by the utility PSE&G had been
rendered unnecessary by the drop in energy demand caused by the U.S. recession and the ability of
energy efficiency and demand response to meet projected new demand.331 The Board disagreed in that
case, but even so, noted in its decision that it too “ha[d] advocated that PJM [the relevant regional
transmission operator] give greater recognition to demand response and energy efficiency measures in
its system planning.”332 This case is but one example of how PUCs are increasingly attuned to the ways
in which energy efficiency permeates all aspects of energy decision-making, and how advocates of
energy efficiency can help raise its profile in major system-wide decisions.
PUCs can also consider energy efficiency in a different vein when evaluating project siting: even
if energy efficiency may not eliminate the need for a new facility, PUCs can require a facility to
undertake efficiency measures to reduce its size or to offset some of the negative impacts that the
project may have. For example, in approving a new transmission project in 2009, the Minnesota PUC
exacted a number of conditions, including that the Minnesota project owners would offset their in-state
carbon emissions by investing in measures to reduce emissions an equal amount, including energy
efficiency measures above and beyond those already required by law.333
Many PUCs also have some approval authority over utilities’ proposed power purchase
agreements (PPAs). PPAs are long-term contracts between an electricity supplier and a utility
responsible for delivering electricity to its customers, and they are now used by many utilities to meet a
large portion of their loads.334 Like new transmission and generation, PPAs in many states must be
330

For example, the Illinois PUC, which is not explicitly required to consider environmental costs in facility siting,
has nevertheless “rigorously inquired into the details of environmental externalities.” Id. at 759.
331
See State of N.J. Board of Public Utilities, In the Matter of the Petition of Public Service Electric and Gas Company
for a Determination Pursuant to the Provisions of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 (Susquehanna-Roseland Transmission Line),
Decision & Order, Docket No. EM09010035 (Feb. 11, 2010). Advocates have petitioned the Board to reopen the
case, in light of new analysis that allegedly shows that the line has become unnecessary. See Motion to Reopen
Proceedings, In the Matter of the Petition of Public Service Electric and Gas Company for a Determination Pursuant
to the Provisions of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 (Susquehanna-Roseland Transmission Line), Decision & Order, Docket No.
EM09010035 (Dec. 20, 2010).
332
Id. This case also illustrates the complicated interrelationship among utilities, regional transmission
organizations, and PUCs in deregulated markets, all of whom play a role in making transmission, generation, and
siting decisions. This topic is beyond the scope of this handbook, but future work on best practices for
coordination among these entities might prove useful.
333
See Minnesota PUC, In the Matter of the Application of Otter Tail, Order Granting Certificate of Need With
Conditions, Docket No, E-017, ET-6131, ET-6130, ET-6144, ET-6135, ET-10/CN-05-619 (March 17, 2009).
334
See Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy Through Energy Efficiency,
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 712, 745 (2010).
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deemed in the public interest by the PUC before they are allowed to proceed. This review authority
gives PUCs the ability to place certain conditions on these PPAS. For example, California has adopted a
policy that prohibits its utilities from entering into a long-term PPA unless “any baseload generation
supplied under the long-term financial commitment complies with the greenhouse gases emission
performance standard established by the commission.”335 The provision goes on to specify that PPAs
cannot contract for generation supply that has a rate of greenhouse gas emissions higher than the rate
of emissions for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.336 While this California example does
not relate directly to energy efficiency, it stands as an example of the authority that PUCs can be given
over PPA agreements. It is conceivable that PUCs could similarly use their PPA approval authority to
prioritize energy efficiency through creating certain incentives.337

8.2

Mergers

Another interesting policy tool that can be used to incentivize energy efficiency is the power that
some state PUCs have to approve or disapprove mergers between utilities. For example, in Maryland,
the Public Service Commission must approve any acquisition that would give a company “the power to
exercise any substantial influence over the policies and actions of an electric company, gas and electric
company, or gas company, if the person would become an affiliate of the electric company, gas and
electric company, or gas company as a result of the acquisition.”338 Before approving the merger, the
Commission must find that the merger is “consistent with the public interest, convenience and
necessity, including benefits and no harm to consumers.”339
In December 2011, Maryland used this approval authority to advance its clean energy agenda.
Earlier that year, Exelon Corporation announced a planned takeover of the Baltimore-based
Constellation Energy Group. Originally, Exelon pledged to develop 25 megawatts of renewable energy
as part of its acquisition plan.340 After discussions with the state, Exelon and Constellation filed a new
merger settlement with the Public Service Commission that pledged development of at least 30 MW of
solar generation and an additional 125 MW of other renewable energy, and promised to contribute
funding to help the state develop off-shore wind.341 The merger settlement also proposed that Exelon
would contribute $50 million, not recoverable in rates, to help spur energy efficiency and demand-side
management.342

335

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8341(a).
Id. § 8341(d).
337
Duane, supra note 334, at 745. We did not find any examples of states currently implementing such a practice,
though that is not to say there are none.
338
MD Code, Public Utilities, § 6-105(e).
339
Id. § 6-105(g)(3).
340
See Julie Johnsson & Bradley Olson, Utilities in Power Squeeze as States Tie Mergers to Clean Energy,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 16, 2011.
341
See Joint Petition for Approval of Settlement, In the Matter of the Merger of Exelon Corp. and Constellation
Energy Group, Inc., Before the Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of Md., Case No. 9271, at 9-15 (Dec. 15, 2011).
342
Id. at 7.
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Prioritizing such environmental commitments during merger approvals is a relatively new
phenomenon; traditionally, state authority over mergers has been used to secure lower rates and
customer rebates.343 But now that state renewable energy and energy efficiency goals are becoming
central components of state energy strategies, it makes sense to ask what effects a major merger will
have on accomplishment of these state goals. This Maryland anecdote illustrates the power that state
approval of mergers can have to extract energy efficiency (and renewable energy) commitments from
acquiring parties. In states with similar merger approval laws, state officials and advocates should pay
attention to potential mergers as another avenue for gaining energy efficiency support.344

343

Julie Johnsson & Bradley Olson, supra note 340.
Separate from these state processes, FERC also has the authority to approve, or disapprove, most proposed
utility mergers.
344
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9. STATE NEPA REVIEW
For federal agency decisions, environmental review is required pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Many states have adopted similar environmental review requirements
for state agencies, through statutes that are often referred to as “state NEPAs” or “little NEPAs.”345 In
states with little NEPAs, often some of the decisions made by the PUC are subject to little NEPA rules,
providing another avenue for considering energy efficiency. (Often, rate-making is exempted from the
state NEPA, and some states exempt additional PUC decisions as well.346) Moreover, “[t]hese statutes
also provide for public participation from the early stages of government decision-making. Thus, state
NEPAs can provide a procedural device for early and significant public involvement in a utility
commission's decision-making about matters that could affect the environment and the health of the
public.”347
PUC consideration of decisions with significant environmental impacts often necessitates the
preparation of an “Environmental Impact Statement” (EIS).348 Initially, a less-detailed “Environmental
Assessment” is prepared. This provides the basis of a determination of whether or not significant
impacts are present such that a full EIS is necessary. In the case of proposed new generation and
transmission projects, an EIS is often required, because these large-scale projects tend to have
significant environmental implications. EISs typically must contain an evaluation of feasible alternatives
to a given proposed project,349 and it is here that advocates and commissioners can ensure that energy
efficiency has been adequately examined as a possible alternative to new generation or transmission, or
as a method of reducing the size of needed generation or transmission facilities.350 After a draft EIS is
published, state NEPAs typically require a time for the agency to accept and respond to comments.
Advocates can use this comment period to attempt to ensure that an EIS gives the fullest review
possible of energy efficiency alternatives.

345

As of December 2011, the Council on Environmental Quality reported that 19 states have state-level analogs to
NEPA. See State Environmental Planning Information, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/states/states.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
346
For example, New York exempts PSC decisions regarding siting of generation and transmission facilities over a
certain size from its State Environmental Quality Review Act, reasoning that the Certificate of Environmental
Compatibility and Public Need process provides analogous environmental safeguards. See N.Y. Envtl. Cons. L. § 80111(5)(b); N.Y. Pub. Serv. L. Art. 10; N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONS., THE SEQR HANDBOOK 10 (3d. ed. 2010).
347
Michael Dworkin et al., supra note 121, at 4.
348
Like the federal NEPA statute, state NEPAs typically only require EISs for those projects that are expected to
have “significant” environmental impacts. See, e.g., 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 6, § 617.7(a) (“To require an
EIS for a proposed action, the lead agency must determine that the action may include the potential for at least
one significant adverse environmental impact.”). The “significance” determination is therefore an important
preliminary step to an EIS even being prepared.
349
See, e.g., 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.9(5)(iv) (requiring an EIS to contain a “description and
evaluation of the range of reasonable alternatives to the action that are feasible, considering the objectives and
capabilities of the project sponsor,” including a “no action” alternative).
350
See Adam Riedel, Encouraging Energy Efficiency through NEPA Comments, (Columbia Law School Center for
Climate Change Law White Paper, July 2012), available at
https://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=621883.
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A good example of the state NEPA process at work can be seen in the Wisconsin PUC’s recent
consideration of a proposed transmission project. In Wisconsin, the sponsor of a new generation or
transmission project must apply to the PSC for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.351
Before ruling on the need for a project, the PSC is required to prepare either an EIS or an EA (often in
collaboration with the Department of Natural Resources).352 In November 2011, the Wisconsin PSC
released a draft EIS for the proposed 345 kilovolt “Alma-La Cross” transmission project, a 45 to 55 mile
long project.353
This draft EIS mentioned energy efficiency-relevant considerations in two sections. In its section on
“Need for the Proposed Project,” the draft EIS critically examined projected future demand. It
questioned the developers’ assertion that population growth would increase demand for electricity in
the communities that would ostensibly benefit from the new line.354 It noted that the best estimate of
projected peak load growth rate in the area was likely far below the figure used by the developers, and
concluded that further questioning was needed as to whether future demand growth would really tax
the existing electric system.355
The draft EIS also examined potential alternative solutions to building the proposed transmission
line. It summarized the applicants’ contention that demand-side management solutions would not
adequately address the needs of the area, and also mentioned the results of a study on energy
efficiency that concluded that energy efficiency opportunities exist in Wisconsin that could render the
area’s peak demand growth negative. The draft EIS noted, however, that “at this time, there is no
regulatory authority to ensure energy user compliance with load reduction and energy efficiency
goals.”356 Ultimately, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission ended up granting the project a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in May 2012, after concluding that there was not
adequate evidence that energy efficiency provided a reasonable alternative to new transmission for the
area.357
This draft EIS from Wisconsin illustrates two of the key ways that preparation of an EIS can facilitate
consideration of energy efficiency: first, planned energy efficiency measures can factor into the
projected future electricity demand for an area, ensuring that future estimates of demand are accurate
and potentially negating the need for a project. Second, potential energy efficiency policies may be able
to serve as a feasible alternative to a transmission or generation project—and often one that might be
351

These certificates are discussed in more detail supra section 8.1.
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.025(2) (2011) (subjecting the Commission to the state’s general environmental
impacts requirements and specifying that the commission shall promulgate standards for determining the
necessity of preparing an EIS); id. § 1.11 (setting forth the requirements of the state’s Environmental Policy Act).
353
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisconsin & Wisconsin Dep’t of Natural Res., Alma—La Crosse 345 kV Transmission
Project Volume I Draft Environmental Impact Statement, PSCW Docket No. 05-CE-136 (Nov. 2011).
354
Id. at XVI.
355
Id. at XVII.
356
Id. at 21.
357
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisconsin & Wisconsin Dep’t of Natural Res., Final Decision, Joint Application of Dairyland
Power Coop. et al. for Authority to Construct and Place in Service 345 kV Electric Transmission Lines and Electric
Substation Facilities, PSCW Docket No. 05-CE-136, at 18 (May 30, 2012).
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able to deliver the same benefits, at the same or lower costs, but with fewer environmental impacts.
In those states where a little NEPA is applicable, commissioners and advocates can and should use the
little NEPA process as an opportunity to ensure that energy efficiency is considered in both these veins.
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EXPLORING NEW MODELS

10.

This section of the handbook documents some newer experiments that PUCs are undertaking in the
field of energy efficiency policy. Although the tools described here are not as well-established, they may
prove to be key parts of the next generation of energy efficiency policies.

10.1

Geo-targeting

Geographic targeting, or “geo-targeting,” of energy efficiency involves targeting a state’s energy
efficiency programs to particular geographic locales. Vermont has been the leader on geo-targeting,
and it has chosen to focus its efficiency programs in those areas where greater efficiency investments
are most likely to defer the need for new transmission and distribution.
Vermont uses some of its energy efficiency funding to encourage efficiency statewide, and some to
focus on particular areas. Vermont’s energy efficiency utility,358 Efficiency Vermont, selects target areas
across the state where the transmission and distribution systems have been identified as constrained.359
It then “focuses on specific energy efficiency efforts for customers within these targeted territories,”
including “enhanced services or increased incentives to encourage efficiency measures.”360 Although it
might be seen as controversial to give some state residents higher incentives or more services than
others, Efficiency Vermont explains its decision in this way:
In addition to lowering the energy costs for participating homes and businesses, the
energy savings from Geographic Targeting will reduce the overall peak demand for
electricity. These efforts benefit all customers across the state by reducing expensive
power supply purchases. If enough homes and businesses improve their electrical
energy efficiency within these targeted areas, all Vermont electric ratepayers will
benefit by avoiding the need for additional transmission and distribution upgrades.361
Efficiency Vermont’s geo-targeting efforts are still in their infancy, but early results suggest that there
was significantly higher participation in energy efficiency programs in geo-targeted areas than there was
in the state as a whole.362 However, although geo-targeted programs were still required to be costeffective, programs in geo-targeted areas did end up costing approximately 25% more than programs on
average did across the state.363 But if these costlier programs result in avoiding spending ratepayer
money on new transmission and distribution in the future, the additional costs may well be worthwhile.

358

See infra section 10.3 for more detail on energy efficiency utilities.
See Efficiency Vermont, Geographic Targeting, at
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/about_us/energy_initiatives/geographic_targeting.aspx.
360
Id.
361
Id.
362
See T.J. Poor, Geotargeting in Vermont: Using Energy Efficiency to Avoid or Defer Transmission and Distribution
Constraints 9, Presentation at the ACEEE Conference on Energy Efficiency as a Resource (Sept. 2011), available at
http://aceee.org/conferences/2011/eer/program.
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Id. at 11-13.
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10.2

Combining Energy & Environmental Regulatory Functions

A recent trend among policymakers at both state and federal levels is the desire to better
integrate energy and environmental regulatory functions. This trend stems from a recognition that
energy and environmental policy are inherently linked, perhaps more so in the era of climate change
than ever before. As early as April 2007, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick reorganized his cabinet
and added the Department of Public Utilities and Division of Energy Resources to the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs.364 This created the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, a larger
office that oversees six departments, including the renamed Department of Energy Resources and the
Department of Public Utilities, as well as various other environmental departments and additional
offices.365
In February 2011, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy officially announced similar plans for the
creation of the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) by merging the
Department of Environmental Protection with various energy agencies including the former Department
of Public Utility Control.366 This announcement received media interest, with the Hartford Courant
noting potential “sweeping effects on environmental quality and the cost of energy to consumers”367
and the Connecticut Mirror stating that this is “expected to enhance energy planning efforts while
reducing spending across three existing agencies.”368
The governor’s plans became reality in July 2011, as the Connecticut Senate passed Bill No. 1243
(Public Act No. 11-80), establishing the DEEP with the goals of “(1) [r]educing rates and decreasing costs
. . . (2) ensuring the reliability and safety of . . . energy supply, (3) increasing use of clean energy and
technology . . . and (4) developing . . . energy-related economy.”369 The Act discusses several goals of
environmental protection and energy use, and specifically addresses the new Public Utilities Regulatory
Authority (PURA). The PURA remains responsible for rate regulation for public utilities and regulated
entities and is responsible for promoting policies that lead to just and reasonable utility rates.370
However, the Act states that “decisions of the [PURA] shall be guided by the goals of the [DEEP] . . . and
by the goals of the comprehensive plan and the integrated resource plan . . .”371 The new Authority
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About Us, Mass. Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, http://www.mass.gov/eea/utility/aboutus.html (last accessed April 16, 2012).
365
Id.
366
Press Release, Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy, Governor Malloy Proposes Consolidated Department of
Energy & Environmental Protection (Feb. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=473626.
367
Jon Lender, Malloy Would Merge Environmental, Utility-Control Agencies, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://articles.courant.com/2011-02-08/news/hc-consolidating-agencies-malloy-020920110208_1_state-budgetproposal-cost-savings-agency.
368
Keith Phaneuf and Mark Pazniokas, Malloy to Consolidate DEP, DPUC, THE CONNECTICUT MIRROR (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.ctmirror.org/story/11435/malloy-consolidate-dep-dpuc.
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S. 1243, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2011).
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therefore has similar functions as the previous Department, though it now operates under the DEEP and
is more focused on environmental issues.
Presently it is difficult to determine whether the new Connecticut DEEP will fulfill Governor
Malloy’s goals “to strengthen our ability to protect the environment; to clean, conserve and lower the
cost of energy; and to set the table for rapid and responsible growth.”372 But the model at least shows
increased sensitivity to the ways in which state environmental policy priorities should more overtly
influence and work in tandem with energy planning.

10.3

The Energy Efficiency Utility

Another expanding and evolving model of delivering energy efficiency is the “energy efficiency
utility” (EEU). In essence, such an entity formulates, publicizes, and administers energy efficiency
programs, such as those described in Appendix A. In 1999, Vermont became the first state to establish
an independent non-profit ratepayer-funded EEU responsible for delivering energy efficiency.373 The
purpose was to avoid the disincentives regular utilities faced with energy efficiency and to create an
efficiency utility with an effective administration system.374 After the legislature granted legal authority,
the Public Service Board approved a settlement between Vermont’s electric utilities, various consumer
and environmental groups, and the Department of Public Service (Vermont’s PUC).375 The EEU,
Efficiency Vermont, is administered by the Vermont Energy Investment Corporation and funded with a
4.5 percent fee on each customer’s energy bill.376 Between 1999 and 2009, Efficiency Vermont
contracted with the Public Service Board to provide energy efficiency to customers, with oversight by a
Contract Administrator and a Fiscal Agent.377 The Department of Public Service (DPS) had an active role
in the creation of Efficiency Vermont, proposing that the EEU carry out efficiency programs in
commercial and industrial markets, construction, dairy farms, residential constructions, and other areas
with potential for energy savings.378 Additionally, the DPS is “in charge of providing for formal
evaluation of . . . programs and program performance . . . [it] will also develop and present avoided cost
information, necessary to assess program design and expected benefits . . . [and it] will continue to
propose new initiatives . . . for the [EEU to consider].”379 However, the DPS has no direct authority over
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Malloy Proposes New Combined Energy, Environment Agency, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://nhregister.com/articles/2011/02/08/news/doc4d51da052a393996686495.txt.
373
Efficiency Vermont, How Efficiency Vermont Works,
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/about_us/information_reports/how_we_work.aspx.
374
Id.
375
Vt. Pub. Serv. Board, Investigation into the Department of Public Service’s Proposed Energy Efficiency Plan Re:
Phase II, 7 – 9 (Sep. 30, 1999), available at http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/orders/1999/5980eeu.PDF.
376
Susan Arterian Chang, The Rise of the Energy Efficiency Utility, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 2008),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/conservation/the-rise-of-the-energy-efficiency-utility/0.
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Energy Efficiency Utility Creation and Structure, VT. PUB. SERV. BOARD,
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the utility, with the exception of the power to request information.380 This created a unique system for
improving energy efficiency in Vermont.
In 2009, Efficiency Vermont saved approximately 85 million kWh of electricity, at an estimated cost
of 3.8 cents per kWh, significantly lower than the 13.6 cents per kWh electric utilities would have to
spend to generate such an amount of power.381 The success of Efficiency Vermont prompted the
legislature and the Public Service Board to move from 3 year contracts to a longer and more stable 12
year “Order of Appointment” structure with increased responsibility and oversight.382 The new
structure has increased the role of the Department of Public Service, which has the power to certify
Efficiency Vermont’s performance and evaluate its progress towards satisfying its responsibilities on an
annual basis.383 Based on Vermont’s success, several other states have picked up on this model,
including Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, and Oregon.384
Delaware’s “Sustainable Energy Utility” (SEU) represents a second generation of EEUs, with more
ambitious plans and scope than Vermont’s utility-sector focus, and, consequently, a non-PUC state
administrator. The Delaware General Assembly first created the Sustainable Energy Utility Task Force in
June 2006 following rising electricity prices.385 The Task Force noted Delaware’s current inefficiency
relative to neighboring states and its potential for energy savings, and stated three goals for the SEU:
“[1] Provide market development for . . . high-efficiency alternatives in energy-using equipment to
enable 30% savings in household and company energy use . . . [2] Provide expanded weatherization
services to residences . . . [3] Promote at least 300 MW of customer-sited renewable energy applications
[by 2019].”386
The SEU model in Delaware seeks to provide a full spectrum of sustainable energy services entirely
through a third party, streamlining service delivery to customers while creating a single point of contact
for energy users.387 By acting as “a single statewide clearinghouse” for efficiency services in all end-use
markets and fuels, the SEU uses competitive contracts and incentives to go beyond other energy
efficiency utilities while minimizing administrative costs.388 The Delaware Energy Office and a newly
created Oversight Board oversee the SEU, whose funding comes from multiple sources that minimize
380
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http://www.seu-de.org/docs/SEU_Final_Report.pdf.
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Id. at 7, 47-49.
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JOHN BYRNE ET AL., CENTER FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY UTILITY DESIGN: OPTIONS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 19 – 20 (2007), available at
http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2007_es_Wash%20DC_SEU_report_final.pdf?_encoding=UTF8.
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public liability: Delaware’s green energy fund, sales of Renewable Energy Credits, energy shared savings
programs (the SEU receives a portion of customer cost savings from efficiency), and tax-exempt
bonds.389 Delaware’s PUC has no jurisdictional authority to regulate the SEU and is limited to regulating
electricity and gas markets.390 So far, the SEU has focused mainly on public buildings, issuing bonds to
fund retrofits that private contractors are then hired to execute. Although the SEU is still relatively new,
it has already attracted pledges of $40 million in private equity.391
Independent energy efficiency providers such as those of Vermont and Delaware may have
numerous advantages. Third-party administrations are able to focus on energy efficiency as they have
no other sales incentives, can implement efficiency measures at low cost because they are not
concerned by recovery of lost margins, and can reduce inefficiency by running a single statewide
program.392 However, experts caution that choosing the right administrative model is a state-specific
process.393

10.4

Harnessing the Power of Data

California’s AB 1103 and resulting regulations represent another way in which energy efficiency can
be encouraged: using the power of consumption data to influence property buying, leasing, and lending
decisions. AB 1103 and proposed (but not yet finalized) implementing regulations require that
beginning in 2013, nonresidential building owners must maintain and disclose energy usage data to
prospective buyers, lessees, and lenders.394 This data must be managed through the EPA’s Energy Star
program, which allows for benchmarking that compares the energy performance of various buildings.395
It also imposes an obligation on utilities in California to maintain their customers’ energy use data in a
form compatible with the Energy Star program.
Although the AB 1103 program is not strictly a PUC initiative, as it is administered by the California
Energy Commission and imposes primary obligations on building owners, it does directly place certain
important obligations on utilities to maintain and make available energy consumption data. Similar
programs in states without California’s unique regulatory structure probably would necessitate PUC
389

Id. at 21-25.
Jason Houck, Wilson Rickerson, The Sustainable Energy Utility Model for Energy Service Delivery, 29 BULLETIN OF
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 95, 102 (2009), available at
http://www.ceep.udel.edu/publications/2009_es_BSTS_SEU_model_DE_Wash%20DC_Houck_Rickerson.pdf.
391
John Byrne et al., Shifting from the Economics of Obesity to Sustainable Energy, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/02/shifting-from-the-economicsof-obesity-to-sustainable-energy#close=1.
392
DIANE MUNNS, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, TREND ANALYSIS: ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (Sep. 2008),
available at
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/EnergyEfficiency/Documents/Third_Party_Trend_Analysis_Sep2008.pdf; Chang,
supra note 376.
393
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
394
See Cal. AB 1103; Cal. Energy Comm’n, Nonresidential Building Energy Use Disclosure Program, Proposed
Regulations, Title 20, Div. 2, Ch. 4, Art. 9, §§ 1680-85 (2012). Information need not be provided, however, to
individual lessees—the regulations only apply when the entire building is sold, leased, or financed. Id. § 1684.
395
Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 394, § 1685.
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involvement to oversee utility obligations. The theory behind this program is that building energy
efficiency policies need to go beyond merely reaching new construction and major retrofits, which is the
role most state building codes now serve. By requiring disclosures during lease, sale, and lending, the
law will impact far more buildings. Of course, it does not impose substantive energy efficiency
improvement requirements, as many building codes do. Nevertheless, requiring the provision of energy
data along with comparisons to the performance of similar buildings should incentivize building owners
to make greater efficiency investments, and should raise awareness of the costs of energy and potential
financial and performance benefits of energy efficiency investments. Given that reliable information
about the payoffs of energy efficiency appears to be one of the main hurdles to increasing participation
in energy efficiency programs, California’s information-forcing law may also solve one critical piece of
the puzzle of increasing demand for energy efficiency programs.396
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11.

GREENHOUSE GAS POLICIES: A TANGENTIAL DRIVER

In response to growing concerns about climate change, many states have taken actions directly
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the electricity sector. These policies include
pricing carbon emissions and mandating that a percentage of electricity be provided by non-emitting
sources. With respect to PUCs’ efforts to encourage energy efficiency, it is important to note two
aspects of the interaction between carbon reduction policies and energy efficiency policies. First, PUCs’
energy efficiency policies do not appear to conflict with these other policies. Second, these other
polices, while important in helping to send the right market signals about the true costs of various
energy sources, will not by themselves adequately promote energy efficiency, because they fail to
address the incentive problems that have thus far prevented the implementation of cost effective
energy efficiency improvements.397 Unless energy efficiency is promoted in its own right, the costs of
reducing carbon emissions will be unnecessarily high. Thus, there is a strong case to be made for PUCs
taking steps to encourage energy efficiency in tandem with other climate change policies.

11.1

Carbon Pricing Policies

Some states have attempted to control carbon emissions by attaching a price to such
emissions. The price can either be levied directly through a tax on electricity generators or indirectly
through a cap and trade policy. A cap and trade program sets a limit of the quantity of greenhouse
gases to be emitted. Each emitter is either allocated, or must purchase at auction, credits that allow it
to emit a certain quantity of GHGs. These credits can also be traded through secondary markets,
effectively establishing a price for carbon. The Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states have had a GHG
cap-and-trade system in place since 2009, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Since
2010, RGGI allowances have traded at or near their floor price, such that the program has not
significantly increased the costs of carbon-intensive generating sources.398 However, RGGI auctions
have been successful in raising significant money—$913 million through November 2011—about half of
which has been invested in energy efficiency programs.399 California recently adopted the second capand-trade program in the country for GHGs and finalized its regulations in late 2011.400 California’s first

397

As mentioned earlier, many cost-effective energy efficiency improvements are not implemented due to various
incentive problems. The foremost of these incentives problems is the relatively small gain accompanying such
improvement in comparison to the effort required to make the improvements. Moreover, often the owner of the
property does not pay the energy bills. In this situation, neither the renter nor the owner has the proper incentives
to undertake energy efficiency improvements.
398
See POTOMAC ECONOMICS, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MARKET FOR RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCES: 2010, AT 5 (April 2011).
399
See PAUL J. HIBBARD ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON TEN NORTHEAST AND
MID-ATLANTIC STATES 20-21 (The Analysis Group, Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Economic_Impact_RGGI_Report.pdf.
400
For a more robust description of RGGI, see REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INNOVATIVE, OVERVIEW OF THE CO2 BUDGET
TRADING PROGRAM, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf. For a description of
California’s Cap and Trade Program, see CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCE BOARD, OVERVIEW OF ARB EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM,
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf.
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allowance auction is scheduled for November 2012, and enforceable compliance obligations begin in
2013.401
A carbon tax, on the other hand, sets a fixed price on carbon emissions. While no states
currently use a direct tax on carbon, a few states utilize a variation thereof that is often referred to as a
carbon “adder.”402 A carbon adder requires utilities to account for the future financial risk associated
with GHG emissions in evaluating new long-term resource investments by including a carbon “adder” in
their resource cost calculations. During the planning stage, the adder increases the imagined price of
electricity from carbon emitting sources of electricity, thus encouraging utilities to select cleaner sources
of power.403
In essence, carbon pricing policies raise the price of electricity to account, at least in part, for
the externalities of emitting carbon. To the extent that suppliers’ costs of producing conventional
energy better approximate the costs to society, carbon pricing will play a more and more important role
in driving additional energy efficiency investments. However, although such policies have the potential
to play an important role in encouraging energy efficiency, they do not address the incentive and
informational problems inhibiting energy efficiency. Simply raising the price of electricity will not
properly encourage renters or landlords to invest in substantial energy efficiency improvements, nor will
higher prices resolve the financing difficulties confronting such improvements.404
Moreover, a well-utilized energy efficiency program can result in emission reductions per dollar
spent of five to seven times that of just a carbon pricing program.405 Efficiency therefore helps lower the
compliance costs of a carbon pricing scheme. As one expert explains: “Efficiency studies and two
decades of utility Demand Side Management (DSM) experience remind us that it will cost far less to
avoid carbon emissions through energy efficiency than by adding or substituting expensive lowemissions generation on the grid.”406 The revenues from cap-and-trade auctions can also be used to
directly fund energy efficiency programs—a practice currently used by many RGGI states.407
401

See California Air Resource Board, California Cap-and-Trade Implementation Frequently Asked Questions (June
25, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/implementation/faq.pdf.
402
See Laura H. Kosloff & Mark C. Trexler, Consideration of Climate Change in Facility Permitting, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 259, 264-65 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). California has had a carbon adder policy since
2004, and Oregon and Colorado have also utilized a carbon adder. Id.
403
Cal. PUC, Opinion Adopting Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company and San Diego
Gas & Electric Company’s Long-term Procurement Plans, Decision No. 04-12-048, Rulemaking 04-04-003 (Dec. 16,
2004).
404
Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation Can Mobilize Efficiency and
Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33 VT. L. REV. 201, 209 (2008). These barriers include the
relative price inelasticity of demand for electricity, the split incentives between builders and building occupiers and
landlords and tenants, confusion and lack of motivation of the part of consumers, the long payback period for
some energy efficiency investments compared with the average period of home occupation, and the difficulty
obtaining up-front financing for efficiency improvements. Id.
405
Cowart, supra note 2.
406
Cowart, supra note 404, at 206.
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Cowart, supra note 2.
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In sum, PUCs that wish to reduce state carbon emissions at lowest cost should consider carbon
pricing and energy efficiency as synergistic strategies to be employed alongside one another, rather than
as substitutes or competitors.

11.2

Renewable Portfolio & Emission Performance Standards

Thirty states currently have a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS),408 mandating that a
minimum (and typically increasing) percentage of electricity be provided by renewable generation. An
RPS generally creates a market for Renewable Energy Credits (RECs), each of which corresponds to one
kilowatt-hour produced by a renewable source. Utilities must obtain RECs to cover the required
percentage of their annual electricity sales. To meet their obligations, utilities can choose to invest in
renewable generation, enter direct contracts with renewable generating facilities, or purchase excess
credits from other utilities or through the spot market.409
As with carbon pricing, encouraging energy efficiency does not interfere with an RPS program.
Energy efficiency lowers the total amount of power demanded, while an RPS shifts how that amount of
power will be provided. In fact, improving energy efficiency will ease compliance with RPS: as the
amount of power demanded decreases due to energy efficiency, each additional MW of renewablegenerated electricity supplied will constitute a larger percentage of total energy sales. Thus, PUCs can
indirectly help utilities comply with RPS targets by also mandating energy efficiency programs.
Conversely, an RPS does little to encourage energy efficiency—much like cap-and-trade, it increases
electricity prices but does not address the incentive and information problems confronting energy
efficiency.
A separate policy to encourage cleaner generation is an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS),
which limits the emissions rate of retail electricity suppliers’ new supply contracts. For instance,
California’s EPS program requires that electricity retailers’ new long-term generation contracts be with
power plants that have emission rates no greater than a combined natural gas turbine plant.410 This
requirement means that in effect, power plants with greater emission rates (namely, coal) will not be
allowed to enter into long-term, base-load supply contracts with electricity retailers.
An energy efficiency program will not disrupt EPS programs. Like an RPS, an EPS focuses on
changing the generation mix over time. While an effective energy efficiency program will lower the total
amount of energy required, such a program will not affect the electricity retail providers’ current or

408

Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Square Pegs for Round Climate
Change Holes?, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 183 (2010).
409
For a comparison of RPSs in various states, see id.
410
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Docket No. R.06-04-009; Press Release, California Public Utility Commission, PUC sets
GHG Emissions Performance Standard to help mitigate Climate Change, (Jan. 25, 2007) available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Published/NEWS_RELEASE/63997.htm.
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future contracts.411 Moreover, an EPS will do little to encourage energy efficiency, as the only effect on
end-users may be a modest increase in price, which will not address the implementation problems
mentioned above.
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12.

GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES

It is important for PUCs to hear from the public that energy efficiency is a priority worth
pursuing vigorously. All PUCs have a mechanism by which public advocates can intervene in PUC
proceedings to voice their opinions on important policy decisions, and as shown in several sections
throughout this handbook, intervenors have often (though by no means always) considerably influenced
PUC decision-making. Having an understanding of how to participate in these proceedings and
ratemakings is an important first step in encouraging greater public participation in PUC activities. To
this end, this section provides an overview of the typical procedures PUCs follow in making decisions. It
first identifies the different types of proceedings (subsection 12.1), and then outlines the various stages
of these proceedings and describes the time and resources necessary for effective participation in each
type of proceeding (subsections 12.2-12.3). However, it is important to also note up front that rules
and practices vary from state to state. Becoming familiar with a particular state PUC’s rules of practice
and procedure is critical to effective advocacy.

12.1

Types of Proceedings

The types of proceedings that commissions handle vary widely from state to state,412 but there
are enough similarities to offer an overview applicable in most situations. Being familiar with each type
of proceeding should aid interested persons in advocating before regulators for the implementation of
more energy efficient policies.
Informal proceedings: Commissions may establish de facto policies on issues in a variety of situations,
such as when a commission’s general counsel decides to clarify a policy in response to a letter from a
company, legislator or consumer.413 The extent to which commissions use informal proceedings to set
policies varies from state to state, so it is important for advocates to know which policies in their state
are set through such practices. This is especially true for informal proceedings because the public tends
to have little or no involvement in them, even though it is often easier to have a successful impact on
informal proceedings than it is to do so in adjudicatory ones.414
Rulemaking proceedings: These proceedings are typically initiated by the commission and generate
rules which will apply to a class of companies or an entire regulated industry (e.g., gas, electric or
water).415 A rulemaking case typically begins when the commission decides to investigate a new

412

For example, California’s PUC uses five types of formal proceedings to review issues that come before it:
application, formal complaint, order instituting investigation, order instituting rulemaking and a petition for
rulemaking. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CONSUMER GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/42839.pdf.
413
See A Consumer’s Guide, supra note 415.
414
This is because participating in informal proceedings does not require nearly as much formal legal knowledge,
time or money. See id.
415
CHARLIE HARAK, JOHN HOWAT & OLIVIA WEIN, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO INTERVENING IN STATE PUBLIC UTILITY PROCEEDINGS
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problem that affects a whole industry and issues a general notice to the public. Unlike adjudicatory
proceedings, any person may file written comments once the initial notice has been issued and there is
no need to file a petition to intervene.416 This type of proceeding is more like a legislative fact-finding
process where interested parties are invited to submit written comments, rather than a formal legal
proceeding in a court-type setting.417
Ratemaking/adjudicatory proceedings: Ratemaking proceedings are typically initiated by a company or
by the PUC itself and are conducted similarly to civil cases in court. They therefore require careful
conformity to each state commission’s rules and practices. In rate cases, utilities typically request to
change the rates they charge or the services they offer, or the PUC investigates whether existing rates or
services should be changed to meet statutory standards. Often such proceedings involve the review of a
specific company’s operations, the approval of the construction of new power plants, or the review of
rate hike requests.418 The commission decides such issues only after hearing witnesses, accepting
evidence, and reading briefs. For these proceedings, most states require a party to file a “petition to
intervene” before participating.
Some states separate out ratemaking and siting cases from other more formal adjudicatory proceedings,
such as enforcement actions, where the PUC sits as a court and can enforce its rules and decisions
through fines and other penalties.419 Stricter rules for intervenors and more formal rules of evidence
may apply in this latter category, whereas intervenors may be allowed to participate more liberally in
ratemaking and siting cases. Consultation of relevant PUC rules is important to understand the
particular requirements for any given jurisdiction.

12.2

Participating in Utility Proceedings

Informal: Parties should look for opportunities to advance their goals through informal proceedings, but
it is important to keep in mind that policies adopted informally can easily be reversed. Winning a victory
in an adjudicatory case is much more likely to be long lasting.420 Informal proceedings are often not
publicized; for advocates, maintaining informal contacts with PUC staff may be the best way of knowing
when relevant informal proceedings occur.

rulemaking proceedings may be instituted only by the PUC itself, PUCs typically will entertain petitions by utilities,
public advocates, or others proposing the initiation of such proceedings on specific topics. See note 392, supra.
416
For this reason, intervening in rulemakings typically requires fewer resources than intervening in rate cases. Id.
417
The Legal Process [hereinafter “The Legal Process—Washington”], WASH. UTILS. & TRANSP. COMM’N,
http://www.utc.wa.gov/aboutUs/Pages/theLegalProcess.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
418
See id.
419
See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Uts. Code § 1701.1 (differentiating “adjudication cases,” which it defines as “enforcement
cases and complaints,” from “ratesetting cases”); 5 VA. ADMIN. CODE. § 5-20-80 (distinguishing “regulatory
proceedings,” including rate cases, from “adjudicatory proceedings”).
420
Informally adopted policies are easily undone because there is no formal process through which they are
adopted which means that they can also be changed without any formality. Changes can be a result of newly
appointed commissioners, staff or any other reason. See id.
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Rulemaking: When a rulemaking is taking place, the extent of participation possible will depend on what
the commission decides will follow the issuance of the notice to the public. The most common way to
participate in rulemaking proceedings is the filing of written comments. In those situations where a
commission also decides to hold public hearings, advocates may speak publicly at these events. Also, if
informal sessions are held, advocates may participate by attending these sessions and exchanging ideas
about the proposed rules.421
Adjudicatory/Ratemaking Proceedings: Typically parties may participate in these proceedings by
seeking either “full party” status (intervenor) or “limited party” (interested party) status. To gain
intervenor status, a party files a motion to intervene showing that the party’s substantial interests may
be affected by the case. Once approved by the commission, a party with intervenor status has the same
rights and obligations as the other formal parties and is similarly bound by the commission’s procedural
rules.422 Parties with “limited” status, on the other hand, are not parties to the case and may be
prohibited from conducting discovery or cross-examining witnesses. They may however, be allowed to
make a written or verbal statement for the record in support or in opposition to a case or to give
information to the commission staff that they believe may be useful.423
Ex parte restrictions: Once a formal proceeding--whether rulemaking or adjudicatory--has been
instituted, the commission’s rules may forbid communications with commissioners and members of the
commission staff with respect to the subject matter of the proceeding unless they are formally filed with
the commission and served on all parties to the proceeding. The scope of ex parte restrictions will vary
from state to state, but their underlying purpose is to assure that commission decisions are made on the
basis of evidence and arguments that are in the public record.424

12.3

Stages of Adjudicatory/Ratemaking Proceedings

Initial Filing: A proceeding begins when an individual or a regulated utility files an “application” with the
commission.425 Initial filings, particularly in rate cases, often include, or are shortly followed by, written
direct testimony of the applicant’s witnesses in support of the relief, e.g., increased rates, requested. It
is important to get a copy of this initial filing as early as possible in order to determine which issues of
interest will be raised during the case. Most PUCs maintain online dockets through which these filings
are publicly available. The commission itself may institute a proceeding to investigate a utility’s existing

421

For example, interested parties may discuss best ways to implement policies, technical issues, or the positive or
negative consequences of a proposed rule.
422
For example, a full party has the right to submit testimony of its own witnesses, conduct discovery, crossexamine other parties’ witnesses, make legal arguments; its witnesses are themselves subject to crossexamination. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas, http://www.puc.state.tx.us/agency/rulesnlaws/Participate.aspx
(last accessed Jan. 31, 2012).
423
Id.
424
See, e.g., Article 8 of the CPUC rules.
425
PUCs conduct adjudicatory hearings on a number of issues including new fees for utility services, rate hike
cases, approvals of new power plants, and cases involving cost of fuel or proposed mergers. See A Consumer’s
Guide, supra note 415.
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rates or terms of service. Moreover, outside parties may file complaints challenging such rates or
services and asking the commission to institute a formal ratemaking or legislative proceeding.
Notice: After the commission receives an initial filing or institutes an investigation, it issues a public
notice through newspapers, its website, and/or mailing lists of interested persons. Along with other
pertinent information, the notice will include a deadline for filing petitions to intervene, which may be
strictly enforced.426 Although different states have varying rules on the contents of the petition, a
typically successful petition to intervene will clearly state a party’s interest in the proceeding and include
a description of how the party will be affected by the outcome.427
Conference: Soon after an initial filing has been made and notice has been given of the pending
proceeding, a commission will typically hold a prehearing conference in order to identify potential
parties, narrow down the issues of the case, and set the schedule for the case.428 Attendance at these
conferences will increase the likelihood of intervenors becoming part of any forthcoming settlement
talks between the parties and will, at the very least, put the other parties on notice of intervenors’
active involvement and dedication to the issues in the proceeding.429 Commissions often also assign a
hearing officer or an administrative law judge (ALJ) to oversee a particular case. The officer or ALJ hears
evidence, considers briefing, and issues a proposed decision for the commission’s consideration.
Discovery: Each party to an adjudicatory case has the right to gather information and pose questions to
the other parties involved. The process by which parties to a proceeding exchange information is known
as “discovery” and it is typically accomplished through data requests, either written or oral.430
Information in a PUC’s files is typically also available through public records laws, though for parties,
discovery often proves a better method. The usual means of discovery in utility cases is through written
questions (interrogatories) and/or document demands that one party serves upon another party. Oral
discovery is called a “deposition” and is generally allowed, although it is uncommon in commission
proceedings.431

426

While some states are strict about this deadline, others do not require a formal petition to intervene as long as
the party shows up at the initial pre-hearing conference and there are no objections to the intervention. See id.
427
For example, New Hampshire’s rules require a party seeking intervenor status to demonstrate that the party’s
“rights, duties, privileges, immunities or other interests may be affected by the case.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541A:32.
428
For example, the Vermont Public Service Board’s scheduling of a case involving a siting decision includes a visit
to the site in question, setting a public hearing date, and determining deadlines for the filing of various motions
and briefs. Vermont Public Service Board, Citizens’ Guide to the Vermont PSB’s Section 248 Process [hereinafter
“Vermont Citizens Guide”], available at
http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/publications/Citizens_Guide_to_248.pdf.
429
See A Consumer’s Guide, supra note 415.
430
See id. at xxi.
431
Discovery rules vary from state to state and in some states there may not even be any written rules on
discovery. In such cases, discovery procedure is governed by accepted practice in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Discovery: Custom & Practice Guidelines, available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/117475.pdf.
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Answering Testimony: After an initial round of discovery, intervenors and the PUC staff will normally be
allowed to submit testimony of their own, contradicting or supporting the initial testimony filed by the
applicant. Such testimony will itself be subject to discovery, and the applicant may then have an
opportunity to file rebuttal testimony.
Hearing: Following the completion of discovery and submission of the successive rounds of testimony,
the commission will typically hold trial-type hearings at which witnesses who have submitted testimony
will be subject to cross-examination by other parties. Although most witnesses who take the stand in
utility cases are “experts” in the subject matter they are testifying about, it is important to note that
parties are nonetheless free to present non-expert witnesses as well. All witnesses, whether experts or
not, should be ready to be cross-examined by opposing counsel when they take the stand to give
testimony.432
Briefs: Once all evidence has been presented and the hearing phase of the case is complete, the parties
are given time -- typically a few weeks -- to submit their briefs. There may also be pre-hearing briefing
as well. A brief should be a concise summary of the relevant evidence presented at the hearing, arguing
why the commission should rule in your favor based on applicable law.433 Rules governing the brief’s
format and procedure for submission vary substantially from state to state and should be consulted
early on. In cases heard by a hearing examiner or administrative law judge, briefs (and often reply
briefs) are submitted to the judge before he or she issues a proposed decision, and, after issuance of the
proposed decision, to the commission urging adoption, modification, or reversal, of that decision.
The decision: The final step is the commission issuing its decision. A party that participated in the
commission’s proceedings and is not satisfied with the commission’s ultimate decision will generally
have the right to appeal it in front of a court. The instruction for pursuing an appeal will likely be
attached to the final decision. However, appellants typically face a high burden when appealing
commission decisions.434
Strategies for Successful Intervention
Although beyond the scope of this handbook, there are numerous publications available that offer more
detailed advice on (1) how and when it might make sense to intervene in PUC proceedings; and (2) how
intervenors can maximize their effectiveness. Additionally, a majority of states have utility consumer
advocates, appointed to represent consumers in front of the state PUC, who may be of great assistance.
For further information, advocates should consult the sources listed in the bibliography below.

432

Id.
Id.
434
Id. In some cases, a party may be required to seek rehearing by the commission before appealing the decision.
See, eg, Cal. Pub. Util Code Sec 1756.
433
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RESOURCES FOR INTERVENORS: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Citizens’ Guides
Cal. Public Utilities Commission, Guide to Public Participation (2010), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B1C2F5B2-8A22-492B-B695-8751AE7FBA76/0/GuidePblcPrtcptnApr10.pdf
Charlie Harak, John Howat & Olivia Wein, A Consumer’s Guide to Intervening in State Public Utility Proceedings,
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/additional_resources/consumers_guide.pdf
Regulatory Assistance Project, Electricity Regulation in the U.S.: A Guide (March 2011), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645
Vermont Public Service Board, Citizens’ Guide to the Vermont PSB’s Section 248 Process), available at
http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/publications/Citizens_Guide_to_248.pdf
Websites
Nat’l Assoc. of State Utility Consumer Advocates, http://www.nasuca.org/archive/index.php (NASUCA is the national association
of utility consumer advocates across states. Contact information for individual state advocates is available in its online
member directory).
“Online Bibliography of Consumer Education and Public Information Materials from Public Utilities Commissions,”
http://www.wutc.wa.gov/PUCPubs.nsf/ebe6b246327a29278825651d0065b867!OpenView
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Appendix A: Utility and Third-Party Administered Programs
Although this handbook has focused on the policy and regulatory levers that PUCs utilize to drive energy
efficiency improvements, it is utilities and other state and third-party administrators who are
responsible for turning state policy goals into concrete, measurable energy efficiency improvements.
This appendix provides an overview of the major types of programs employed by utilities and other
program administrators to meet state energy efficiency goals, and gives some examples of their use; it is
not comprehensive.

Categories of Programs
•

•

•

•

•

Audits and Consultants – Audits and consultants help a resident or business assess how much
energy their home or office uses and evaluate what improvements could be made to increase
efficiency. This generally includes an evaluation of air leakage, insulation, lighting, and
appliances. Vermont offers up to $2500 in incentives for energy audits. New York’s FlexTech
program provides cost-sharing incentives for efficiency studies, analysis, and strategies for
increasing efficiency. The budget for FlexTech programs was $41,554,608 in 2011.
Lighting – Incentive programs are available in many states for improvements in both residential
and commercial lighting systems. For example, California utilities run residential lighting
incentive programs for compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), light emitting diodes (LEDs), halogen
lighting, and other lighting products. The program uses manufacturer and retailer rebates for
products typically purchased by contractors. The state spent $75 million on this program from
September 2008 to July 2010. New York also has a CFL expansion program, which had a 2011
budget of $5.3 million.
Agricultural – Several states have programs that offer rebates for installing more energy
efficient farm equipment. Pump systems account for more than 80 percent of agricultural
electric use in California, and California spent $14.7 million on pump tests and repairs between
September 2008 and July 2010. As another example, Vermont offers standard rebates for
improvements in agricultural lighting, dairy equipment, and refrigeration.
Construction – In many states there is a focus on ensuring that the next generation of buildings
will maximize efficiency. For example, Southern California Edison developed the Sustainable
Communities Program to support the construction of zero net energy (ZNE) buildings. Pacific
Gas & Electric has a Zero Net Energy Pilot Program, and even held a Zero Net Energy Design
Competition. Indeed, California’s Long Term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan calls for all new
residential construction to be ZNE by 2020, and all new commercial construction be ZNE by
2030.
Demand Response and Load Management – Managing the timing and nature of the demand for
power in order to level out demand across time will be an important area of investment that
could see growth in the coming years. Currently, Burbank Water & Power (CA), Omaha Public
Power District (NE), Austin Energy (TX), and City of Palo Alto Utilities (CA), among many others,
offer time-of-use rates to industrial customers. Some (mostly smaller) utilities, such as the City
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•

•

•

•

of Burlington Electric Department (VT), offer time-of-use rates to residential customers as well.
Further, both Texas and California have provided customers with smart meters. AEP Texas plans
to have smart meters available to all customers by 2013 and Southern California Edison
customers will have smart meters installed throughout 2012.
Low-income Projects – California allows low-income customers to enroll in the CARE program,
which makes them eligible for participation in the Energy Savings Assistance Program. The
Energy Savings Assistance Program provides no-cost attic insulation, energy efficient
refrigerators and furnaces, weatherstripping and caulking, and more. Eleven different utilities
including Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison are involved with this program.
Vermont has the Low-Income Energy Efficiency Partnership (LEEP), and has guaranteed that at
least $7,500,000 will be spent on low-income efficiency projects during the 2012-2014 period.
Appliances – Some states have programs that mimic “cash for clunkers,” where old, inefficient
appliances can be replaced with newer, more efficient ones at reduced prices. This was a
federally funded program that distributed more than $300 million in funding for efficient
appliance rebates. A total of 1.7 million rebates were given out. ConEdison is currently paying
$50 to customers who recycle their old, working refrigerator or freezer, and $20 to customers
who recycle old air conditioners. Pacific Gas & Electric is offering $35 for old, working
refrigerators and freezers, and $25 for air conditioners.
Financing – Many states provide special financing structures for the above efficiency projects.
In addition to on-bill financing, which is discussed supra section 4, utilities and third-party
administrators are running many other innovative loan programs. NYSERDA, for example, is
working to expand the number of persons eligible for energy efficiency financing loans by
moving to a two-tiered underwriting process. Under this process, applicants who would be
rejected for a loan based on traditional creditworthiness measures are given a second
opportunity to qualify for financing based on their utility bill repayment history in lieu of their
credit history. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities has recently approved an innovative
financing scheme as well, the Large Energy Users Pilot program, which will grant low interest
loans of up to $1,000,000 for eligible new efficiency projects in some of the state’s largest
commercial and industrial facilities.
Whole-house improvements – As utilities experience a need to move beyond traditional lighting
and appliance solutions to achieve the ambitious targets being set for them in many states, they
are increasingly developing programs aimed at improving the efficiency of an entire house,
including fixing leaks, reducing plug loads, adding insulation, and replacing heating and cooling
systems. These programs, however, typically require substantial owner investments and thus
are ideally accompanied by strong financing programs.
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The following resources provide more detailed information on specific energy efficiency programs that
are being used to meet state-mandated goals:
•

•

•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•

•

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Utility Policies,
http://www.aceee.org/sector/state-policy/utility-policies (providing an overview of the
efficiency programs in all 50 states).
American Public Power Association, Demand Response Programs of Public Power Utilities,
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/PublicPowerDemandResponseprograms.pdf (compiling
utility demand response offerings).
Benefits.gov, Energy Assistance, http://www.benefits.gov/benefits/browse-bycategory/category/ENA (providing a state-by-state list of low-income energy assistance
projects).
Cal. Energy Commission, Energy Efficiency Programs, http://www.energy.ca.gov/efficiency/
California Public Utilities Commission, Statewide Programs and Activities,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Energy+Efficiency/Statewide+Programs.htm (breaking
down California’s energy efficiency programs by sector).
Center for Climate Change Law, State Actions on Clean Energy: A Fifty-State Survey,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/energy-law
Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, http://www.dsireusa.org/
Efficiency Vermont, 2012 Annual Plan,
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/docs/about_efficiency_vermont/annual_plans/EVT_Annual
Plan2012.pdf
Efficiency Vt., All Rebates and Ways to Save, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/Index/ways-tosave-and-rebates.aspx
Institute for Electric Efficiency, Compilation of U.S. Energy Efficiency Program Profiles (June
2009),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/IEE/Documents/IEE_EEProgSummariesPUBLIC_0609.pdf
(describing existing programs across a range of program types)
Institute for Electric Efficiency, Jump-Starting Your EE Portfolio: Quick Start, Quick Return Energy
Efficiency Programs (May 2009), http://www.edisonfoundation.net/IEE/Documents/JumpStartingEEPortfolio_0609.pdf
Long Island Power Authority, Draft Electric Resource Plan 2009-2018 (2009)
Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Energy Efficiency,
http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/energy-efficiency/ (providing an overview
of Massachusetts utility efficiency programs).
MASS SAVE, http://www.masssave.com/
New York State Energy Research & Development Authority, Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Programs, http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/en/Energy-Efficiency-and-Renewable-Programs.aspx
(providing an overview of New York’s energy efficiency programs).
NYSERDA, Energy Audit Program, http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/Page-Sections/Commercial-andIndustrial/Programs/FlexTech-Program/Energy-Audit-Program.aspx
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•

•
•
•

KAREN PALMER ET AL., BORROWING TO SAVE ENERGY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY-EFFICIENCY FINANCING
PROGRAMS 1-2 (Resources For the Future April 2012), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFFRpt-Palmeretal%20EEFinancing.pdf
SEE ACTION, ROADMAP FOR THE HOME ENERGY UPGRADE MARKET: RESIDENTIAL RETROFIT WORKING GROUP
(2011), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/pdfs/retrofit_energyupgradesroadmap.pdf
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Incentive Programs,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/energyincentiveprograms.html
MARK ZIMRING ET AL., ENVTL. ENERGY TECH. DIV., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., LBNL-5244E, DELIVERING
ENERGY EFFICIENCY TO MIDDLE INCOME SINGLE FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS (2011),
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/lbnl-5244e.pdf
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Appendix B: Full Bibliography
This handbook is organized thematically, with a bibliography included at the end of each major section.
A full bibliography is available below.
M.H. Albadi, Demand Response in Electricity Markets: An Overview (IEEE 2007).
American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy (ACEEE), Energy Efficiency Resource Standard: In
Practice (2009), http://aceee.org/fact-sheet/eers-practice-detailed-april-2009
ACEEE, 2011 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, http://www.aceee.org/sector/state-policy/scorecard.
ACEEE, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RESOURCE STANDARDS: EXPERIENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2006),
http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e063.htm
ACEEE, Energy Efficiency Resource Standards: A State Model (November 2009),
http://www.aceee.org/files/pdf/white- paper/eers_statemodel.pdf
ACEEE. “Incentivizing Utility-Led Efficiency Programs: Performance Incentives,”
http://aceee.org/sector/state- policy/toolkit/utility-programs/performance-incentives
ACEEE Website on EERS, http://www.aceee.org/topics/eers
ACEEE, Utility Policies, http://www.aceee.org/sector/state-policy/utility-policies
American Public Power Association, Demand Response Programs of Public Power Utilities,
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/PublicPowerDemandResponseprograms.pdf
Applied Public Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation, Evaluating Low-Income Energy
Efficiency Programs (2011), http://www.appriseinc.org/reports/Evaluating%20LowIncome%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Programs.pdf
CATHERINE BELL ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, ON-BILL FINANCING FOR ENERGY
EFFICACY IMPROVEMENTS: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND BEST
PRACTICES, REPORT E1118 (2011).
Benefits.gov, Energy Assistance, http://www.benefits.gov/benefits/browse-by-category/category/ENA
BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: HOW TO PROCURE ELECTRICITY RESOURCES
TO PROVIDE RELIABLE, LOW-COST, AND EFFICIENT ELECTRICITY SERVICES TO ALL RETAIL CUSTOMERS (2003).
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., EDISON ELECTRICAL INSTITUTE, RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING
MARKETS 26 (2007).
Timothy J. Brennan & Karen Palmer, Energy Efficiency Resource Standards: Economics and Policy
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 12-10, Feb. 2012).
Timothy J. Brennan, “Night of the Living Dead” or “Back to the Future?” Electric Utility Decoupling,
Reviving Rate-of-Return Regulation, and Energy Efficiency (Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper 08-27, Aug. 2008).
MATTHEW BROWN, ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, PAYING FOR ENERGY UPGRADES THROUGH UTILITY BILLS: BRIEF #3:
STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES: OPTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2010), http://ase.org/resources.
Matthew Brown. On-Bill Financing: Helping Small Business Reduce Emissions and Energy Use While
Improving Profitability, National Small Business Association (2009),
http://www.nsba.biz/docs/09OBFNSBA.pdf
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Matthew Brown, The Energy Efficiency Resource Standard: Observations on an Emerging State Policy
(Harcourt Brown 2010), http://harcourtbrown.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Energy-EfficiencyResource-Standard_Observations-on-an-Emerging-State-Policy.pdf
John Byrne et al., Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, Sustainable Energy Utility Design: Options
for the District of Columbia (2007), available at
http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2007_es_Wash%20DC_SEU_report_final.pdf?_
encoding=UTF8.
Cal. Energy Comm’n, Nonresidential Building Energy Use Disclosure Program, Proposed Regulations,
Title 20, Div. 2, Ch. 4, Art. 9, §§ 1680-85 (2012).
Cal. Energy Comm’n, Energy Efficiency Programs, http://www.energy.ca.gov/efficiency/
California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Statewide Programs and Activities,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Energy+Efficiency/Statewide+Programs.htm
Cal. PUC, Guide to Public Participation (2010), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B1C2F5B2-8A22-492B-B6958751AE7FBA76/0/GuidePblcPrtcptnApr10.pdf
Cal. PUC, California Long Term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan (Sep. 2008),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D4321448
-208C-48F9-9F621BBB14A8D717/0/EEStrategicPlan.pdf.
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions Website on EERS,
http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/efficiency_resource.cfm
Center for Climate Change Law, State Actions on Clean Energy: A Fifty-State Survey,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/energy-law
Center for Energy and Public Policy, Columbia University SIPA. “On-Bill Financing” for Energy Efficiency
(2009),http://energy.sipa.columbia.edu/researchprograms/urbanenergy/documents/On%20bill%
20Fin ancing%20FINAL.pdf
Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy: Connecticut FY2012 – FY2013 Biennium Governor’s Budget,
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?a=11&Q=473940.
Connecticut Office of Fiscal Analysis: transparency.CT.gov,
http://transparency.ct.gov/html/searchExpenditures.asp?LEVEL=AGENCY&ENTITY=DEP&PERIOD
=2011.
Adam Cooper & Lisa Wood, Making Building Energy Codes and Appliance/Equipment Standards Part of
Utility Energy Efficiency Portfolios (Institute for Electric Efficiency Aug. 2011),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/reports/IEE_IntegratingC&SintoEEPortfolios_final.pdf
Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation Can Mobilize Efficiency
and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33 VT. L. REV. 201 (2008).
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/
Edison Electric Institute, Summary of State Regulatory Smart Grid Decisions (2011),
http://www.eei.org/whatwedo/PublicPolicyAdvocacy/StateRegulation/Documents/EEI_State_S
G_Matrix_Update_Aug_2
011.pdf
Efficiency Vermont, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/Index.aspx.
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Efficiency Vermont, Geographic Targeting,
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/about_us/energy_initiatives/geographic_targeting.aspx.
Efficiency Vermont, 2012 Annual Plan,
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/docs/about_efficiency_vermont/annual_plans/EVT_Annual
Plan2012.pdf
Efficiency Vermont, All Rebates and Ways to Save, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/Index/ways-to
-save-and-rebates.aspx
KAREN EHRHARDT-MARTINEZ ET AL., ADVANCED METERING INITIATIVES AND RESIDENTIAL FEEDBACK PROGRAMS: A
META-REVIEW FOR HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY-SAVING OPPORTUNITIES (ACEEE June 2010),
http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Metering/Advanced- Metering-Initiatives.pdf
ELCON, Revenue Decoupling (2007), http://www.elcon.org/Documents/Publications/31RevenueDecoupling.PDF.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES WITH INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(2007), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf.
EPA, Clean Energy – Environment Guide to Action (Apr. 2006),
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/resources/action-guide.html.
EPA, State and Local Climate Policy Tracking, http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/tracking/
EPA, “Renewable Portfolio Standards Fact Sheet,”
http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html
EPA, “Output-Based Environmental Regulations Fact Sheet,”
http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/obr_factsheet.html
Jiyong Eom and James Sweeny, Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Delivered Energy Efficiency Programs in
California (Precourt Energy Efficiency Center, Stanford University 2009),
http://www.stanford.edu/group/peec/cgibin/docs/modeling/research/Shareholder%20Incentives%20for%20UtilityDelivered%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Programs%20in%20California.pdf.
Ahmad Faruqui and Sanem Sergici, The Brattle Group, Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of
Electricity—A survey of the experimental evidence (2009),
http://www.science.smith.edu/~jcardell/Readings/uGrid/House%20DemandResp%20Experienc
e.pdf
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Staff Report, Assessment of Demand Response &
Advanced Metering Staff Report (Nov. 2011), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/sep-09demand-response.pdf
BEN FOSTER & SUSAN MAZUR-STOMMEN, RESULTS FROM RECENT REAL-TIME FEEDBACK STUDIES (ACEEE Report No.
B122, Feb. 2012).
Tom Franks et al., Seeking Consistency in Performance Incentives for Utility Energy Efficiency Programs,
ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings (2010),
http://eec.ucdavis.edu/ACEEE/2010/data/papers/2052.pdf.
KATHERINE FRIEDRICH ET AL., ACEEE REPORT NO. U091, SAVING ENERGY COST-EFFECTIVELY: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE COST OF ENERGY SAVED THROUGH UTILITY-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (2009).
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MERRIAN FULLER ET. AL., DRIVING DEMAND FOR HOME ENERGY IMPROVEMENTS (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l. Lab.
2010), http://drivingdemand.lbl.gov/reports/lbnl-3960e-nlrp.pdf/.
Michael B. Gerrard, ed., THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES (American Bar
Association 2011)
Sandy Glatt, State Energy Efficiency Resource Standards Analysis, 9 (Dep’t of Energy 2010),
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/industry/states/pdfs/eers_web_final.pdf
Ivan Gold and Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Square Pegs for Round
Climate Change Holes?, 35 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 183 (2010).
Great Lakes Wind Collaborative, Best Practices for Sustainable Wind Energy Development in the Great
Lakes Region (July 2011), http://www.glc.org/energy/wind/pdf/bptoolkit/GLWC-BPToolkitBP04.pdf.
Charlie Harak, John Howat & Olivia Wein, A Consumer’s Guide to Intervening in State Public Utility
Proceedings,
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/additional_resources/consumers_guid
e.pdf
Sara Hayes et al., Balancing Interests: A Review of Lost Revenue Adjustment Programs for Utility Energy
Efficiency Programs (ACEEE Report No. U114, Sept. 2011), http://aceee.org/researchreport/u114.
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